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Executive Summary
Growing Concerns, Growing Markets, Loss of Forests, Social Impacts
International concern has been growing about the impacts of the continuing expansion 
of oil palm plantations. The spread of oil palm has been blamed for extensive forest 
destruction, uncontrolled forest fi res, loss of precious wild species and the undermining 
of environmental services. Yet already in Indonesia some 5 million people are involved in 
estates and mills as labourers or their families and as many again are tied to large estates as 
smallholders. Palm oil has major social as well as environmental impacts.
World markets for edible oils are set to double in the next twenty years, implying a doubling 
of the area under oil palm if market share is maintained. New markets for ‘biofuels’ also 
provide scope for increased palm oil sales. Indonesia’s national development plans are 
designed to secure it a large share of these markets. 
Palm Oil Expansion in Indonesia is Accelerating
Indonesia is also one of the world’s most populous and rural countries, with a total 
population of 220 million people, of whom between 60 and 90 million people make a 
livelihood from areas classifi ed ‘State Forest Areas’, which cover some 70% of the national 
land area. A large proportion of the rural people regulate their affairs through custom 
and are referred to as ‘people governed by custom’ (masyarakat adat) – referred to as 
‘indigenous peoples’ in international law. 
Oil palm expansion has major implications for rural Indonesians. It implies a major 
reallocation of land and resources, dramatic changes to vegetation and local ecosystems, 
substantial investment and new infrastructures, movements of people and settlements, 
major transformations of local and international trade and requires the intervention of 
multiple government agencies. Done right, palm oil should generate wealth and employment 
for local communities. Done wrong, oil palm estates can lead to land alienation, loss of 
livelihoods, social confl icts, exploitative labour relations and degraded ecosystems.
Indonesia now has some 6 million hectares of land under oil palm and has cleared three 
times as much, some 18 million hectares of forests, in the name of oil palm expansion, 
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mainly so speculators can get access to the timber. Existing regional development 
plans have already allotted a further 20 million hectares for oil palm plantations, mainly 
in Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and West Papua, and new plans are currently under 
discussion to establish the world’s largest palm oil plantation of 1.8 million hectares in the 
heart of Borneo. 
 
Multidisciplinary Study of the Impacts on Local Communities in Three Provinces
Where is the land for this massive planned expansion of oil palm to come from? Who are 
the current owners of this land? How do companies acquire such lands?  What are the 
implications for indigenous peoples and local communities of this major reallocation of 
lands and forests? This investigation was designed to answer such questions.
Between July 2005 and September 2006, the Indonesian NGO, Sawit Watch which 
monitors the Indonesian palm oil sector, the international human rights organisation, 
Forest Peoples Programme,  in collaboration with lawyers from the Indonesian human 
rights organisation, HuMA, and land tenure specialists from the World Agroforestry Centre 
(ICRAF), carried out an intensive, multi-disciplinary study of the legal and institutional 
processes of land acquisition for oil palm plantings in Indonesia with a focus on the rights 
of local communities and indigenous peoples. The work, which was carried out in close 
coordination with local NGOs and community organisations, included extensive fi eld 
studies and interviews, as well as background legal documentation and research. 
Local Realities and National Frameworks
The research looked into the way land had been or was being acquired by six companies 
operating in West Lampung district in Lampung Province (Sumatra), Sanggau district in 
West Kalimantan Province (Borneo) and West Pasaman district in West Sumatra Province. 
During the fi eld studies detailed interviews were carried out with local community leaders 
and members, government offi cials at local and provincial levels, Non-Governmental 
Organisations, researchers, company personnel, university researchers and professors, 
and members of the local legislatures. 
The research was also framed by the coming into being of the Roundtable on Sustainable 
Palm Oil (RSPO), an industry-led initiative, involving conservation organisations and 
social justice groups, that aims to reform the way palm oil plantations are developed, in 
accordance with international norms and standards.
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The purposes of the study were to:
Document the situation, views and recommendations of local communities and 
smallholders, who are involved in or affected by oil palm production;
Assess the implications of the expanding Indonesian palm oil sector for local 
communities and indigenous peoples;
Document the legal protections of customary institutions and customary rights;
Understand in detail the legal steps by which companies acquire land for palm oil 
plantings in Indonesia;
Assess the extent to which these laws are adhered to and effectively protect the 
interests and rights of communities and indigenous peoples;
Ascertain if the RSPO standard suits the Indonesian reality and is considered applicable 
by local communities, government offi cials and companies;
Make recommendations on how Indonesian policies, laws and procedures should be 
reformed to adequately protect indigenous peoples’ and local communities’ rights in 
line with the country’s obligations under international law.
Laws Subordinate Weakly Protected Customary Rights to the ‘National Interest’
The Indonesian Constitution respects the existence of customary law communities, 
acknowledges their right to be self-governing and recognises their customary rights in 
land. Indonesia has also ratifi ed some key pieces of international law which protect the 
rights of indigenous peoples and local communities. However, other laws provide only 
weak recognition of customary rights and allow government agencies a great deal of 
discretion in deciding whether to respect them or not.
Furthermore, the institutions of these customary law communities were severely weakened 
during the New Order (Orde Baru) when a uniform administrative structure was imposed 
throughout Indonesia down to the village level. Although Regional Autonomy laws have, 
since 1999, restored the possibility of customary authorities once again taking charge of 
village affairs, only in certain parts of Indonesia, such as in West Sumatra, have customary 
authorities in fact regained control of their areas.
A similar gap between legal principles and practice is found with respect to land rights. 
While laws recognise the rights of customary communities to their lands, ambiguously, 
procedures for titling such lands are absent, defective or rarely applied. Procedures 
for the titling of individual land holdings are also lag far behind the rate at which new 
land holdings are being created. A fi ve-year-old National Assembly Decree (TAP MPR 
IX/2001), requiring reforms of forestry and agrarian laws, has yet to be put into effect. 
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
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Policies Favour Large-scale Plantation Development 
On the other hand, the Constitution and laws of Indonesia recognise the right of the 
State to control and allocate natural resources for the benefi t of the Indonesian people. 
The laws allow the reallocation of lands for State purposes and for private sector uses in 
accordance with national development plans. The result is that community rights are all 
too easily subordinated to private sector expansion.
A complex web of laws has evolved to promote plantation development. Although 
designed to ensure sound investment, coordinated planning, the public interest and the 
resolution of confl icting rights, these laws make little provision for community rights and 
interests. Too often the law treats what are in reality indigenous peoples’ lands as State 
lands. These State lands are either considered to be unencumbered with rights or are 
allocated to companies through a process that strips communities of the few rights that 
the government does recognise. Indigenous peoples’ rights are thus extinguished and the 
lands allocated to companies as 90-year leaseholds on State land.
Forest Conversion of Dubious Legality
In 1982, some 142 million hectares of Indonesia were designated as Forest Areas, of which 
some 30 million were then categorised as available for conversion. A procedure was then 
elaborated to consult local communities and authorities about the status of these areas 
before they could be delineated and gazetted, as State Forest Areas if unencumbered. To 
date only 12% of these Forest Areas has been properly gazetted as State Forest Areas. 
Legally, the remaining areas remain of uncertain status.  
In practice, however, through administrative oversight, all forest areas are being treated 
as if they are owned by the state and many have then been released for conversion before 
being gazetted. This is legally problematic, as the areas may well be encumbered with rights 
and therefore the state should not be allocating them to third parties. Indeed, already 23 
million hectares of forest areas have been converted to non forest zones, the majority 
in the name of conversion to oil palm plantations, though only 6 million hectares have 
actually been planted. This process is still happening.
Although the Forestry Department has called for a moratorium on further conversion of 
forests this has been done through the weakest of all possible regulations, symptomatic of 
a long-term tussle between different Ministries seeking to control Indonesian land.
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Case Studies Show Wide Differences in Provincial Interpretation of Laws
The research shows clearly how indigenous peoples in the six case study areas do 
enjoy rights to their territories and to self-governance through customary authorities, 
in accordance with customary law. Clearly identifi ed groups control land as collectively 
owned areas (tanah ulayat) subject to well developed rules regulating land ownership, land 
transfer and group membership.
However, the research shows that provinces vary greatly in the extent to which local 
governments accept the rights in land of local communities, despite operating within 
the same national legal framework. In West Kalimantan, customary land rights are given 
little recognition at the most being treated as ill-defi ned use rights on State lands. In 
Lampung, customary rights are accepted in court adjudications but the administration 
rarely recognises community rights in land, preferring to issue individual titles to villagers. 
In West Sumatra, by contrast, the provincial government does recognise the collective 
land rights and jurisdiction of customary institutions as self-governing authorities (Nagari) 
and communities are treated as rights holders.
Serious Legal Abuses and Violations of Human Rights
The case studies reveal that local communities face serious problems and most are in 
confl ict with companies over land. There is a widespread feeling that communities have 
been cheated of their lands, inveigled into agreements through false promises and denied 
a voice in decision-making. Among the many irregularities in the way lands have been 
acquired and held by companies, the most notable include the following: 
customary rights not recognised;
plantations established without a government license; 
information not provided to communities;
consensus agreements not negotiated;
customary leaders manipulated into making forced sales;
compensation payments not paid;
promised benefi ts not provided; 
smallholders lands not allocated or developed;
smallholders encumbered with unjustifi able debts;
environmental impact studies carried out too late;
lands not developed within the stipulated period;
community resistance crushed through coercion and use of force;
serious human rights abuses.
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
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In effect the government is failing in its Constitutional duty to protect the rights of 
customary law communities. Even where government agencies facilitate negotiated 
transfers of community lands to companies, community leaders are being duped into 
signing agreements which they think entail temporary transfers of use rights, when the 
government knows that they are actually agreeing to the extinguishment of their rights in 
land. 
A Flawed Legal and Policy Framework
The research substantiates, in considerable detail, the oft-made claim that oil palm 
plantations have been established in Indonesia without respect for the rights of indigenous 
peoples and local communities. Yet, international standards, such as those set out in 
international law, elaborated in international jurisprudence, adopted in ‘best practice’ 
codes, consolidated in the United Nations’ Declaration on the Rights of  Indigenous 
Peoples, and recently adopted by the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil, do require 
respect for such rights. Indeed the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia also requires 
respect for the rights of customary law communities.
The study reveals that the processes which nevertheless lead to these rights being violated 
in the development of oil palm estates result from: 
Contradictory laws, which fail to secure indigenous rights while encouraging land 
expropriation for commercial projects in the ‘national interest’;
An absence of regulations, as a result of which procedures for the recognition of the 
collective land rights of customary law communities are unclear;
Weak institutional capacity, both in the national land agencies and in the district 
bureaucracies, which makes recognition of customary rights diffi cult;
National and regional policies and spatial planning processes which favour the 
conversion of ulayat lands and forests into oil palm plantations to increase national 
and district revenues.     
Challenging Recommendations
In fact the National Assembly (MPR), the highest body in the legislature, has already 
recognised the need for an overhaul of Indonesian laws related to land and natural 
resources and, in particular, to custom. This study thus makes concrete suggestions about 
the main legal reforms necessary to give this effect by: 
▪
▪
▪
▪
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Balancing the controlling right of the state with greater respect for community rights, 
so communities’ interests are secured in national development projects;
Removing the impediments to the recognition of customary rights in the basic agrarian 
law, the forestry act and the plantation act;
Reassessing the legal status of forests areas and conversion zones to determine which 
are actually the lands of communities;
Developing a dedicated law for the protection of indigenous peoples to secure 
constitutional rights not yet secured by other laws;
Adopting procedures requiring the free, prior and informed consent of customary law 
communities as a condition of permitting oil palm plantations on their lands.
Steps Towards Justice
The study recognises that these legal reforms will take some time to be passed and 
put into effect. In the interim, mechanisms need to be established to resolve existing 
confl icts between companies and communities, treating communities as land owners and 
negotiating for the restitution or compensation for lands that have been unfairly taken. 
Just such mechanisms are indeed required by the RSPO standard.
The fi ndings of this study are that very few oil palm estates in Indonesia are likely to 
comply with the RSPO standard, in the short term. Indeed the current policy and legal 
framework implants a process of land acquisition and estate development quite contrary 
to the RSPO standard. Indonesian laws and policies deny customary rights, encourage 
State-sanctioned land grabbing, and ignore the principle of free, prior and informed 
consent. If the current approach to estate development is not changed, there is a risk that 
‘unsustainable’ Indonesian palm oil will be excluded from international markets. 
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
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Chapter 1
Introduction 
1.1  Reasons for and Scope of the Study
Palm oil is one of the world’s major commodities. Its production has historically been 
associated with extensive clearance of tropical forests and consequent loss of habitat for 
endangered species, the (often illegal) takeover of indigenous peoples’ and farmers’ lands 
and the exploitation of workers and smallholders. Groups such as Friends of the Earth1 and 
the World Rainforest Movement2  have documented in detail how palm oil plantations are 
a major force driving deforestation. Forest clearance for new plantings is also a major cause 
of forest fi res and air pollution, which contribute to seasonal hazes that are a serious threat 
to public health. Plantations are often established on indigenous peoples’ and farmers’ 
lands without their consent or respect for their rights. The conditions of smallholders and 
labourers working on or linked to large plantations are often very poor.3 
Markets for edible oils are currently in a phase of rapid growth, notably in India, China 
and Eastern Europe. To supply this market, production of palm oil is predicted to double 
in the next twenty years, implying at least another 5 to 10 million hectares of new oil palm 
plantings in the same period. Although new oil palm plantations are now being established 
in many places, notably Sarawak and Sabah, Thailand, the Philippines, Ecuador, Costa 
Rica and Colombia, the country planning the greatest expansion is Indonesia. 
Where is the land for this expansion to come from? Who are the present owners, users 
and occupiers of this land? Are their rights and interests being respected? What is the legal 
process by which lands for new plantings are acquired? Are these laws being observed? 
Do they offer adequate protection for communities? What are the implications of this 
massive expansion of oil palm for indigenous peoples and local communities?
This study has been undertaken to help answer such questions and to contribute to 
national and international policy discussions aimed at applying improved standards for 
the establishment and management of oil palm estates and the production and use of palm 
oil and other products derived from oil palms. Specifi cally the study has been designed to 
assess, and contribute to, the application of the standard for ‘sustainable palm oil’ adopted 
by the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (see section 2.1). 
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1.2   Methods, Data Availability and Limitations
The study has been carried out by an international research team combining international 
and Indonesian researchers from the Land and Tree Tenure Programme of the World 
Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF), two Indonesian NGOs, Sawit Watch and HuMA, and 
the international human rights organisation, the Forest Peoples Programme. The 
multi-disciplinary team, which comprised two lawyers, a human rights specialist, an 
educationalist, a biologist, a land tenure expert and a social anthropologist, also benefi ted 
from considerable assistance from local NGOs, community leaders, smallholders, and 
indigenous peoples’ organisations.  
The core of the study comprises fi eld assessments of the situation in six oil palm 
companies’ operations in the districts of West Lampung (Lampung, Sumatra), West 
Pasaman (West Sumatra) and Sanggau (West Kalimantan, Borneo) carried out between 
June and September 2005. Data has been gathered by interviews, and workshops, with 
company personnel, government offi cials, politicians, local NGOs and indigenous 
organisations, community leaders and villagers. Extensive work has also been undertaken 
to compile and analyse existing Indonesian laws, and assess all available documentation 
about the processes by which companies have acquired operating permits and land. The 
research has been contextualised through a review of the available literature as listed in 
the references and footnotes.
This study does not claim to be exhaustive. Apart from the obvious limitations of time 
and resources, the study faced notable diffi culties in getting access to key documents 
establishing (or not) the legality of company operations and the extent of community 
lands and claims. Environmental Impact Assessments (AMDAL) were not available for 
all the operations studied. Provincial Spatial Plans show inconsistencies and irregularities. 
Land deeds and records of sales in the archives and cadastres of the (BPN) national 
agrarian offi ces were often incomplete or absent and some are classifi ed by BPN as 
confi dential data. Only a few of the communities visited had carried out independent, 
participatory mapping exercises to demonstrate the extent of the lands to which they 
claim customary rights. Only two of the companies that we tried to visit were prepared to 
engage in dialogue, although one of them was extremely helpful.  
The case studies are thus the best we could achieve within such constraints and should not 
be considered as equivalent to full legal audits or assessments of compliance with RSPO 
criteria. The study only examined briefl y the situation of smallholders and was not able to 
devote enough time to an examination of their circumstances, concerns and aspirations 
– a follow-up study on Indonesian smallholders is thus programmed for 2006. 
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Notwithstanding these limitations, the investigation does clearly illustrate some of the 
major shortcomings of current laws, policies and procedures relating to land allocation 
for oil palm plantations in Indonesia, and the consequent problems experienced by 
communities. 
1.3  Global and National Trends 
Globally, the consumption of products containing oil palm products has been steadily 
increasing over the past 150 years, with only temporary dips occasioned by world wars 
and economic recessions. While still a major smallholder crop and food source in West 
and Central Africa, historically the major growth in demand for palm oil products has 
come from Western Europe. Palm oil has become the world’s greatest traded edible oil, 
making up some 40% of the edible oil trade, about double the fi gure for second-placed 
soybean oil.4   
Since the 1990s, Western European demand for oil palm products has been more or less 
stable, while demand from India, Pakistan, China and the Middle East has exploded (see 
fi gure 1.1). These new markets, and markets in Eastern Europe, are set to expand further 
as the people in these countries increasingly adopt ‘western’ consumerist lifestyles. It is 
the growth in these markets which is currently the main driver of palm oil expansion in 
South East Asia. Global demand for palm oil is set to double by 2020 with an annual rate 
of increase predicted at near 4% per year (compared to 2% per year predicted for soybean 
oil).5 
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Figure 1.1: Main consumers of globally traded palm oil.6 
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Palm oil is used in a great variety of products being one of the main sources of cooking 
oil, shortening, ice creams and margarine, as well as being used in common items like 
detergents, soaps, shampoos, lipsticks, creams, waxes, candles and polishes. It is also used 
as a lubricant in industrial processes. Palm oil also yields oleins used in chemical processes 
to produce esters, plastics, textiles, emulsifi ers, explosives and pharmaceutical products. 
In Western Europe palm oil is extensively used in processed foods. Indeed, it is estimated 
that 7 in 10 of all products on UK supermarket shelves contain palm oil, yet many western 
consumers are unaware of the fact that the goods they buy contain the oil.7 
By 2002, Malaysia and Indonesia were producing some 80% of internationally traded palm 
oil, with Malaysia being the major producer.8 South East Asia has proven attractive to oil 
palm developers for a number of reasons, including the favourable climate, comparatively 
low labour costs, low land rents and concerted government plans to develop the sector, 
through provision of attractive (or unenforced) legal frameworks, cheap loans and fi scal 
incentives. 
However, with rising labour costs and land scarcity increasingly a factor in Peninsular 
Malaysia, expansion now focuses on Sabah and Sarawak (Malaysian Borneo), Thailand, 
Cambodia, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. In Thailand between 2003 and 
2004, palm oil plantations increased by nearly 4% to cover a total area of around 300,000 
ha.. The Thai government now plans continued planting at the rate of 64,000 ha. per year 
for 2004-2029, to achieve a target of 1.6 million hectares of new plantings by 2030. This 
expansion has major social implications, being directed at old rice fi elds, other cash crop 
areas and rubber plantings.9  
However, the number one country currently attracting palm oil investors is Indonesia. 
From a low level of 120,000 ha. of productive oil palms in 1968, a fi gure which rose to 
250,000 ha. by 1978, oil palm in Indonesia is now experiencing a fi rm rate of increase, 
reaching 2.98 million hectares by 1998, booming to 4.1 m. ha. by 2004 and topping 5 
million ha. of productive oil palms by 2005 (see fi gure 1.2).10 
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Figure 1.2: Areas of productive oil palm in Indonesia
Oil palm plantings in Indonesia are not only expanding in total area but are also experiencing 
a rapid transformation of ownership. Early plantations were predominantly state-run 
schemes, many fi nanced by World Bank, European Community and Asian Development 
Bank loans. During the 1970s and 1980s, expansion focused on developing plantations in 
government-sponsored transmigration schemes (PIR-Trans), in which para-statal agencies 
controlled nucleus estates (inti) surrounded by extensive areas made up of 2 to 5 hectare 
smallholdings (plasma) operated by sponsored migrants.11  
Today, however, the greatest expansion is in private sector holdings, not only through 
the privatisation of previous state-owned enterprises but also through the establishment 
of extensive new plantings. Many of these private sector schemes are funded through 
international investments or as local subsidiaries of foreign corporations. By 2002, there 
were some 50 Malaysian companies operating in Indonesia. There are great local and 
regional differences in the extent to which private sector companies are obliged to establish 
smallholdings as part of these estates. 
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These broad trends seem set to continue but government fi gures show that rates of 
land acquisition for plantations fell temporarily following the collapse of the Suharto 
regime in 1998.13  It took more than four years before investors regained confi dence 
and established new political connections so that rates of planting could be restored to 
the levels achieved under the Orde Baru (fi gure 1.4), though, according to more recent
Figure 1.4: Annual rate of oil palm planting in Indonesia 1996-200214
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fi gures, in the past fi ve years, annual planting has increased to as much as 401,200 ha. per 
year.15 
Nor have oil palm plantings been equally spread across Indonesia. Plantings have been 
concentrated in Sumatra and Kalimantan, with a notable extension into Sulawesi and 
Papua in recent years (see table 1.1 and fi gure 1.5).
Table 1.1. Areas of Oil Palm Plantations in Indonesia 16
Province Area (Ha.)
Sumatra
Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 222,389 
Sumatera Utara 1,093,033 
Sumatera Barat 489,000 
Riau 1,486,989
Jambi 350,000
Sumatera Selatan 416,000 
Bangka Belitung 112,762 
Bengkulu 81,532 
Lampung 145.619
Java
Jawa Barat 3,747 
Banten 17,375 
Kalimantan
Kalimantan Barat 349,101
Kalimantan Tengah 583,000
Kalimantan Selatan 391,671 
Kalimantan Timur 303,040 
Sulawesi
Sulawesi Tengah 43,032 
Sulawesi Selatan 72,133 
Sulawesi Tenggara 3,602 
Papua
Papua 40,889
Total 6,059,44117 
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In short, Indonesian government efforts to promote oil palm companies and expand 
plantings have been markedly successful. Within the last fi ve years, Indonesian production 
of crude palm oil (CPO) has increased rapidly from 5.38 million tons in 1997 to 10.6 
million tons per year in 2003, an average increase of 8.6% per year. Exports of CPO from 
Indonesia have likewise also signifi cantly increased, from 1.47 million tons, equal to US$ 
745.2 million, in 1998, to 6.33 million tons, equal to US$ 2.0 billion, in 2002.18 
1.4  Land Acquisition Projections
In terms of oil palm expansion, Indonesia now leads the world and based on current rates 
of planting is set to become the number one palm oil producer, overtaking Malaysia by 
2010, or even earlier.19  Like Malaysia, Indonesia is also experimenting with higher yielding 
varieties. According to the Department of Agriculture, eight new hybrid clones have been 
developed which are vaunted as increasing rates of production from the 3.5 tons of oil per 
hectare per year achieved today to as much as 6.5 to 8.0 tons/ha/year.20  
How much land does Indonesia plan to clear to achieve number one status? Straight line 
projections from passed plantings may be to under-estimate things. The government, 
both centrally and through regional plans, has set ambitious targets for new plantings. 
One of factors that is considered to favour the development of oil palm plantations in 
Indonesia is land availability. The Department of Agriculture in Indonesia argues that there 
are approximately 27 million hectares of ‘unproductive forestlands’ that can be offered 
to investors for conversion into plantations,21 out of a total of 143.95 million hectares 
of dry lands in the country as a whole.22 These ‘unproductive forestlands’ are forest 
areas considered to be degraded as a result of logging, cultivation and other activities. 
Moreover, a regional study conducted by the European Commission and Indonesian 
Forestry Department in 2001 concluded that of approximately 11.5 million hectares of 
wetlands in Sumatra, around 4,279,300 hectares were suited to conversion to oil palm 
plantations,23 a proposal disputed by environmental organisations.24  
Higher rates of oil palm expansion are also being planned by provincial and kabupaten 
governments eager to increase foreign exchange revenues now that, thanks to 
decentralisation laws passed between 1998 and 2002, they have gained greater control over 
lands, forests, budgets and planning. Putting together all the fi gures available on provincial 
land use plans, published in newspapers and various other sources, Sawit Watch has found 
that almost 20 million hectares of the national territory have already been proposed for oil 
palm development by local governments (Table 1.2).
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Table 1.2. Provincial Government Plans to Expand Oil Palm Plantations 25
Province Area  (Ha.)
Sumatra
Sumatra Selatan 1,000,000
Lampung 500,000
Jambi 1,000,000
Bengkulu 500,000
Sumatra Utara 1,000,000
Aceh 340,000
Riau 3,000,000
Sumatra Barat 500,000
Kalimantan
Kalimantan Barat 5,000,000
Kalimantan Selatan 500,000
Kalimantan Tengah 1,000,000
Kalimantan Timur 1,000,000
Sulawesi
Sulawesi Tengah 500,000
Sulawesi Selatan 500,000
Sulawesi Tenggara 500,000
Papua
Papua 3,000,000
Total 19,840,000
Nor do these fi gures take into account new plans announced by President Susilo Bambang 
Yudoyono in July 2005 to establish ‘the world’s largest oil palm plantation’ along the 
border in Borneo between Indonesia and Malaysia.26  Puffed as a way of securing national 
sovereignty and curbing illegal logging along the vulnerable frontier, the plan apparently 
involves inviting Chinese investors and Malaysian companies to establish as much as 1.8 
million hectares of oil palm plantations along the border, facilitated by support from the 
Department of Agriculture and provided with a workforce through further transmigration 
under the Department of Labour and Transmigration. The plan has however been critically 
27Introduction
received by the Department of Forestry,27 and roundly condemned by Indonesian non-
governmental organisations.28 Despite this criticism, the Ministry of State Planning 
(BAPPENAS) has continued to promote the project.29 However, this has not stilled 
opposition. In March 2006, the Regional Representatives Council (DPD) of Kalimantan 
spoken out strongly against the project, noting that while development along the frontier 
in terms of infrastructure, services and education was vital, the local people were not 
poor and the government should fi nd other ways to develop the area without clearing the 
tropical forests along the watershed.30
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Figure 1.5: Oil palm estates: current and projected 31
Also yet to be factored into these fi gures is the new global demand for so-called ‘green’ 
fuels. Crude palm oil is being heavily promoted as a source of ‘bio-diesel’ suited for 
countries like Japan and Europe, which have adopted renewable energy policies as part of 
their commitments to implement the Kyoto Protocol. The Indonesian government is now 
promoting bio-diesel from palm oil for both exports and domestic use.32  
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Potentially, these trends, plans and projections have major implications for Indonesia’s 
forests and forest dependent peoples. Forest clearance for oil palms is one of the main 
motors of deforestation in Indonesia and cause of destructive forest fi res. What though 
are the implications for local communities and indigenous peoples? Reporting government 
targets is one thing but predicting actual impacts is more diffi cult. As explored more 
carefully in Chapter 3, by law planters seeking land for oil palm in Indonesia are required 
to go through a complex process of planning and negotiation with several central and 
regional government agencies to secure access to lands and convert forests, a process 
which should also entail negotiated agreements with local communities. 
Moreover as explained in the following Chapter, efforts are being made by the oil palm 
industry and civil society organisations to promote more orderly oil palm development 
with respect for the law, human rights, environmental principles and good management. If 
these standards are adhered to oil palm development would be directed away from forests 
and valuable ecosystems towards degraded lands no longer of great value for biodiversity 
and local livelihoods, and where local communities would agree to such development.   
It may seem obvious that, even with a doubling of world demand for edible oils and rising 
demand for bio-diesel, it is unlikely that Indonesia will clear over 20 million hectares 
when to supply the market 5 to 10 million hectares of productive oil palm plantations will 
apparently suffi ce to meet the projected global demands of the next 20 years. However, 
the link between areas cleared for conversion to oil palm and global markets is not direct. 
Indeed, it is estimated that, in the past 25 years, no less than 18 million hectares of forests 
have already been cleared for oil palm in Indonesia yet only about 6 million hectares 
have actually been planted.33  The implication is that some 12 million hectares of forests 
were cleared in the name of oil palm development by unscrupulous developers who only 
wanted access to the timber and never intended to plant oil palms at all. 
A major driver of this land clearance is the high demand for timber, in a country where 
the installed timber processing capacity exceeds by about 6 to 8 times the annual allowable 
cut from natural forests and plantations. In 2001, the World Bank estimated that about 
40% of Indonesia’s ‘legal’ timber supply came from land clearance for conversion to 
plantations.34  Such land clearance can yield profi ts of as high as US$2,100 per hectare 
which can either be used towards the start up costs of new plantations,35  or else can 
represent an attractive income stream by itself. Some allege that the proposed ‘plantation’ 
in the heart of Borneo is really a ploy to get more timber, as the timber stocks in the area 
are considerable but the land is not well suited to oil palms, being too high, steep and 
remote for profi table production. 
Further expansion of oil palm plantations seems inevitable. The question remains: is this 
compatible with ‘sustainable development’? In the following chapters we unpick some of 
the complexities.
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Chapter 2 
Towards Responsible Palm Oil Production
2.1  What is the RSPO and Its Standard?
The Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) is an initiative of some of the major 
palm oil industries and conservation organisations, which aims to use market mechanisms 
to reform the way palm oil is produced, processed and used. The organisation was created 
to counteract the campaigns of environmental organisations which present oil palm as a 
major threat to tropical forests and their inhabitants. 
RSPO was established as a collaboration between leading actors in the palm oil sector, 
responsible for about one third of global Crude Palm Oil (CPO) production,1 and major 
conservation organisations, notably WWF as part of its ‘Forest Conversion Initiative’.2 
The business sector was keen that RSPO should counter accusations about the social and 
environmental damage of oil palm plantations, both by promoting the image of the palm 
oil sector as a responsible business and by setting standards for the industry to discourage 
these negative impacts. The RSPO is also explicit about its intention of encouraging a 
‘responsible’ expansion of the palm oil sector to meet an expected near doubling of global 
demand for oils and fats in the next 20 years, implying according to the RSPO the ‘need’ 
for an additional 4-5 million hectares of oil palm estates. 
Formally speaking the RSPO is an NGO incorporated in April 2004 under article 60 
of the Swiss Civil Law. RSPO is a membership organisation open to oil palm growers, 
processors and traders, manufacturers, retailers, banks and investors, environmental and 
conservation NGOs and social / development NGOs. RSPO is governed by an Executive 
Board which comprises:
4 oil palm growers (1 for Malaysia (MPOA), 1 for Indonesia (GAPKI), 1 for 
smallholders (FELDA), 1 for the ‘rest of the world’ (FEDEPALMA))
2 Palm oil processors: (Unilever / PT Musim Mas)
2 Consumer goods manufacturers (Aarhus / Cadbury Schweppes) 
2 Retailers: (Migros / Body Shop)
2 Banks/investors:  ( HSBC Malaysia / 1 vacant )
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
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2 Environmental NGOs: (WWF-CH / WWF-Indonesia)
2 Social/Development NGOs: (Oxfam / Sawit Watch).3 
RSPO aims to establish clear standards for the production and use of ‘Sustainable Palm 
Oil’ (SPO) and encourage trade in such to the exclusion of palm oil produced in more 
damaging ways. It seeks to this by:
Developing a standard for SPO 
Getting this accepted by all RSPO members
Encouraging RSPO members to reform practices of palm oil production and use, in 
conformity with the standard
The Board of RSPO expects adherence to the standards to be voluntary.
Claims to the production and use of SPO are to be monitored by accredited third 
party assessors.
The main activity of the RSPO to date has been to elaborate a standard of principles and 
criteria for ‘Sustainable Palm Oil’. The initial draft standard was put together following the 
fi rst Roundtable Meeting held in Kuala Lumpur in August 2003, by the interim board of 
the RSPO with the assistance of the UK-based forestry consultancy, Proforest, which was 
contracted by RSPO to help develop the standard. Proforest advised the Interim Board 
on the need for the establishment of a broader consultative body to develop the standard. 
The Board accordingly sought nominations to a Criteria Working Group (CWG), which 
was established in September 2004. 
The CWG was a formal ‘working group’ of the RSPO ruled by its statutes with the task 
of developing principles, criteria and guidance on the RSPO standards and advising on 
the means by which claims to SPO can be verifi ed. The CWG was made up of 25 persons 
(and their alternates) allocated as:
10 for palm oil producers (Pacifi c Rim Palm Oil Limited, IJM (Malaysia), IPOC 
(Indonesia), Unilever (UK), Unilever (Ghana), New Britain Palm Oil Ltd. (PNG), 
Agropalma (Brazil), CIRAD (France/Sumatra), FELDA (Malaysia), Dr Kee Khan 
Kiang (Malaysia)).
5 for supply chain and investors (Aarhus Ltd (UK), UniMill (Netherlands), Poram 
(Malaysia), PT Musim Mas (Indonesia), Daabon Organics (Colombia)
5 for environmental interests (WWF-Indonesia, WWF-Malaysia, Conservation 
International, WWF-US, Dr Gan Lian Tiong (Malaysia))
5 for social interests (Sawit Watch, Tenaganita, Oxfam, Partners with Melanesians, 
Zalfan Hohn Rashid (Malaysia).
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
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The 25 persons were selected from among 70 nominations by scoring the votes of 
members of the Board.  The CWG was numerically dominated by industry interests and 
excluded any direct representation of indigenous peoples, smallholders or trades unions 
or other organisations representing workers in the palm oil sector. Decisions at the CWG 
were by consensus, but a procedure existed for decision by voting in the case of contested 
decisions, by which decisions could be made by 3 out of 4 chambers having a majority in 
favour. The voting procedure was never used.
Following two meetings of the CWG and extensive public consultations, a second draft 
of the RSPO standard was made available for a further round of public comment during 
June and July 2005. The draft RSPO standard accepted the need for a ‘triple bottom line’ 
– social, fi nancial and environmental. 
Following the public consultations, a slightly modifi ed version of the standard was 
elaborated by the Criteria Working Group in September 2005. This was submitted to 
the membership for consideration and discussion at the Third Roundtable of the RSPO 
held in Singapore in November 2005. The standard  was then adopted at the Members 
Assembly by a vote of 55 in favour with only one abstention. The full text is set out in 
Appendix 1. 
At the Third Roundtable it was also agreed that the new standard should be tested over a 
period of two years before any public claims to the production of RSPO approved palm 
oil could be made.
The social criteria of the standard include provisions requiring:
Commitment to transparency
Compliance with the law including ratifi ed international laws and respect for 
customary law
Demonstrable right to use the land and absence of legitimate land confl icts
No diminishment or loss of customary rights without free, prior and informed consent 
(FPIC)
Documented and acceptable systems for resolving disputes and achieving negotiated 
agreements based on FPIC
Social assessments of the impacts of existing operations
Implementation of health and safety requirements
Open and transparent communications
Assurances of acceptable pay
Fair prices and appropriate training for smallholders
Recognition of the right to organise and free collective bargaining
Protections of child labour, women, migrant labourers and smallholders
No forced labour or discrimination
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
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Contributions to local development where appropriate
Participatory social and environmental impact assessments of proposed new 
plantings
No new plantings on indigenous peoples’ lands without FPIC
Fair compensation of indigenous peoples and local communities for land acquisitions 
and extinguishment of rights, subject to FPIC and negotiated agreements.
The RSPO Principles and Criteria have been designed to ensure that palm oil developments 
are done right. Among the main social protections in the draft standard, the following are 
the key ones that the study sought to investigate:
Criterion 2.1   There is compliance with all applicable local, national and ratifi ed 
international laws and regulations.
The study thus sought to identify what are the applicable local, national and ratifi ed 
international laws and regulations in Indonesia relevant to local people and land 
acquisition.
 
Criterion 2.2   The right to use the land can be demonstrated and is not legitimately 
contested by local communities with demonstrable rights.
Through the case studies and interviews, the study sought to establish the means by which 
local communities can contest land acquisition and demonstrate their rights.
Criterion 2.3   Use of the land for oil palm does not diminish the legal or customary 
rights of other users without their free, prior and informed consent.
Criterion 7.5   No new plantings are established on local peoples’ land without their 
free, prior and informed consent, dealt with through a documented system that enables 
indigenous peoples, local communities and other stakeholders to express their views 
through their own representative institutions.
Likewise the case studies investigated: the extent of communities’ legal and customary 
rights in land, what processes were taken to negotiate with the communities for the release 
of their lands to plantations and whether or not their free, prior and informed consent had 
been sought for such transfers. 
Criterion 7.6   Local people are compensated for any agreed land acquisitions and 
relinquishment of rights, subject to their free, prior and informed consent and 
negotiated agreements.
▪
▪
▪
▪
□
□
□
□
□
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Details about negotiated agreements were also investigated to establish what terms had 
been offered and whether these had been put into effect.
In sum, the study was designed to assess the standard to see if it offered adequate protection 
for communities and to contribute to an understanding of just how such a standard could 
be applied in Indonesia.
2.2  Indonesian Experiences with Including Human Rights in Certifi cation and 
Legality Verifi cation 
Indonesia is not new to the idea that forestry standards should show consideration for 
the rights of indigenous peoples and local communities. Indeed, it was substantially 
because of concern about the way logging was being carried out in Indonesia and Malaysia 
without respect for human rights that strong social criteria were included in the standards 
of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). FSC principles and criteria include provisions 
requiring that forest operations: respect communities’ legal and customary rights to land; 
ensure local communities control management on their lands; only delegate control to 
others with their free and informed consent; ensure there are effective mechanisms for 
resolution of disputes; protect sites of special social, cultural or economic importance; 
compensate indigenous peoples for use of their traditional knowledge; respect the rights 
of workers in accordance with the standards of the International Labour Organisation.4  
Indonesian timber operations have faced some major diffi culties complying with these 
standards mainly because the government has allocated concessions without regard for the 
rights of local communities and indigenous peoples. A study of the way the key principles 
and criteria relating to local communities and indigenous peoples apply in Indonesia, 
which was subsequently accepted by the FSC Board, found that the legal and policy 
framework in Indonesia makes compliance with the FSC standards very diffi cult. Custom 
and customary law are fundamental concepts in Indonesian law and are recognised in the 
Indonesian constitution and a number of laws. The laws however are contradictory and 
only hazily understood by most administrators. The study noted that:
The Indonesian State lacks measures for securing customary rights to land and 
forests. Moreover, it also lacks legal provisions that facilitate exercise of the right 
of free and informed consent. On the contrary, the prevalent development model, 
administrative system and legal framework deny customary rights, disempower 
customary institutions, and encourage top-down forestry, all in violation 
of internationally recognized norms. The current Indonesian forest policy 
environment is diffi cult for, even hostile to, certifi cation to FSC standards.5  
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Following up on prior research by ICRAF, the study carried out a compilation of 
forestry department records and found that only 12% of Indonesia’s forests had been 
legally gazetted. Forests have thus been designated as State Forest Areas and allocated to 
companies without the required procedures designed to exclude areas where communities 
have rights in land.6  Research also shows that even where forests have been gazetted, the 
legal requirement to get community endorsement of boundaries has not been fulfi lled, 
implying that gazettement is legally questionable.7  Subsequent research by ICRAF based 
on Ministry of Forestry data has likewise shown that only 8% of timber concessions in 
Indonesia have been fully delineated, meaning that most concessions are also technically 
forfeit. FSC principles have also been particularly hard to apply in Indonesia because the 
country has not developed a national interpretation of the FSC generic standard, meaning 
that no agreed verifi ers have been developed to clarify how unclear or disputed criteria 
should be applied in the Indonesian context.  
 
Indonesian civil society organisations have however developed a national system for timber 
certifi cation under the auspices of a constituency-based organisation, Lembaga Ekolabel 
Indonesia (LEI). The LEI system also incorporates social criteria into its labelling scheme 
but, for essentially the same reasons as those following FSC procedures, Indonesian 
certifi ers have only been able to identify a handful of forestry concessions worthy of 
certifi cates. Moreover there have been bitter disputes about several of the LEI certifi cates 
awarded, notably over the failure of LEI certifi ed operators to respect the customary land 
rights of local communities.
Internationally, there has been growing concern about the amount of illegal timber being 
sold in international markets leading to calls for more effective forest law enforcement. 
Comparisons of data on the amount of lumber being processed in Indonesia timber and 
pulp mills with the annual allowable cut, have shown that over three times as much timber 
is being processed than could be expected. The implication is that some 60% of recorded 
timber has been harvested without a cutting permit.8 
As part of a Memorandum of Understanding between the British and Indonesian 
Governments to promote forest law enforcement and combat illegal logging in Indonesia, 
and with funding from the UK’s Department for International Development (DfID), 
The Nature Conservancy (TNC) developed a legality standard for timber products 
from Indonesia.9 Based on a review of some 900 Indonesian laws related to forests, the 
legality standard requires compliance with a number of procedures designed to respect 
communities’ rights, notably to their lands, forests and resources and to free, prior and 
informed consent, in the processes of gazettement of forest areas, provincial land use 
planning, delineation of timber licenses, carrying out social and environmental impact 
assessments (AMDAL), developing management plans to exploit licensed areas and 
implementing legally required benefi t-sharing measures.10 So far not one timber concession 
has been identifi ed which can comply with these standards.
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A simplifi ed version of the TNC/DfID Legality Standard is now also being piloted 
by WWF-Indonesia as the fi rst step in its programme to promote Phased Certifi cation 
under the Global Forests and Trade Network, the local chapter of which is called Nusa 
Hijau. So far, Nusa Hijau has only been able to recruit a single member because most 
concessionaires are unable to demonstrate that their forests have been duly gazetted, 
concessions delineated and that communities have agreed to these boundaries.11 
In sum, most certifi cation procedures in Indonesia have sought to protect the rights of 
local communities and indigenous peoples to their lands and forests.12 However, major 
failures in Indonesian laws and policies, and in the application of these laws, have meant 
that only a tiny amount of Indonesian timber products are actually being certifi ed. Most 
timber harvesting operations in Indonesia are illegal and a major overhaul of forestry 
laws and institutions is required before these problems can be sorted out. Revision of the 
Forestry Law (UU 41/1999) is indeed part of the government’s legal reform programme 
(PROLEGNAS 2005-2009).
Indonesia’s experience with timber certifi cation and legality verifi cation has major 
implications for those now seeking to set standards for the palm oil sector. To be 
consistent with the requirements of the Indonesian Constitution and Indonesia’s treaty 
obligations under international law, standards have to recognise the customary rights of 
local communities and indigenous peoples. Yet, in practice, few concessions conform 
to these standards or to existing law, as much because of lax adherence to the law by 
government offi cials as because of omissions by the companies concerned.   
2.3  Problems for Inclusion of Smallholder Friendly Criteria
Of the 5.3 million hectares of land currently under productive oil palm in Indonesia, about 
one third are managed by smallholders, in Indonesia defi ned as those with holdings of less 
that 5 hectares.13 Such smallholders include independent land owners choosing to grow 
oil palm on their lands, community members contracted by companies to plant oil palm 
on their own lands and supply the products to the same companies and transmigrants or 
local people relocated to oil palm areas, where they are assigned lands in palm oil estates 
(PIR). Whereas farmers in the fi rst category can, notionally, choose to whom they sell 
their produce, typically, smallholders in the last two categories are tied into monopsonistic 
relations with the companies they supply. There have been persistent reports that such 
smallholders gain minimal remuneration for their produce, are trapped into debt to the 
companies, are often defrauded of their lands and suffer human rights abuses when they 
protest their circumstances.14   
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Smallholders face a number of major technical constraints which limit their autonomy as 
independent producers. Land preparation is onerous and often requires the installation 
of drainage canals, terracing and roads, usually best done by machines. Oil palm seedlings 
are costly and tend to be supplied by major oil palm companies. Palms only become 
productive after three to fi ve years and only become profi table after about eight. Oil palms 
often or usually require treatment with fertilizers and pesticides. Few farmers can afford 
these machines, investments and delays in income returns without taking out loans, usually 
from or through oil palm companies. Few smallholders can afford their own vehicles 
to transport fresh fruit bunches (FFB) of oil palm to mills. The quality of FFB rapidly 
declines if fruits are left unharvested. FFB need to be conveyed to and processed by mills 
within 48 hours of harvest if their yield and quality are not to decline. The establishment of 
palm oil processing mills requires lumpy investments. Mills are rarely economic without a 
minimum of 4000 ha. of productive oil palms, and most mills require between 10,000 and 
40,000 ha.15 Prices for Crude Palm Oil (CPO) on international markets can vary widely 
and overall have declined by two thirds since 1960.16 For all these reasons, smallholders 
tend to be tied, often by debt and by technical constraints, to large palm oil concerns, 
limiting their ability to negotiate fair prices or manage their lands according to their own 
inclinations.  
Smallholders also lack the time, skills and resources to develop and document the 
management plans required by independent assessors as evidence that they are looking 
after their crops and lands in conformity with standards. Smallholders can rarely afford the 
costs of independent certifi cation itself, while economies of scale make this investment 
proportionately much less daunting to large estates.
 
These circumstances make it unclear how RSPO standards should be applied to 
smallholders. Should it be those plantations and mills which buy from smallholders 
who should shoulder the costs and responsibilities of compliance and of audits, thereby 
intensifying the patron-client relationship between smallholders and large operators? Or 
should the smallholders shift for themselves? 
In the case of timber certifi cation, where the constraints of scale are not so marked, 
there has nevertheless been a widely noted tendency for certifi cation to favour large-
scale operators at the expense of small ones.17 Although the FSC has made a sustained 
effort to simplify compliance and reduce or spread the costs of audits, through techniques 
such as ‘group certifi cation’, assessments show that small-scale producers still face major 
obstacles meeting the requirements of the scheme.18  The reality is that certifi cation does 
favour economies of scale.
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Negotiating acceptable standards for palm oil suited to smallholders is thus not going to 
be easy. The situation is compounded by the fact that RSPO only issued translations of 
its draft standard in Bahasa Indonesia in July 2005, too late for Indonesian smallholder 
organisations to participate in the public consultations.19 Moreover, few smallholders are 
organised into representative institutions in Indonesia creating major challenges to those 
seeking to include smallholders in the standard-setting process.
In recognition of these diffi culties, at the RSPO Members Assembly in 2005, it was 
agreed that a Task Force on Smallholders should be set up with the major objective of 
reviewing the situation of smallholders, ensuring their effective participation in RSPO 
discussions and suggesting revisions to the RSPO standards and guidance to ensure they 
suit smallholders.
The case studies which follow, in Chapter 4, provide further insights into some of the 
problems faced by smallholders in Indonesia. However, much more still needs to be 
done if oil palm estates are to contribute to community development rather than become 
poverty traps.
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Chapter 3
The Normative Framework - 
Land Acquisition for New Plantings
The core of this study (section 4) examines the realities of land acquisition in Indonesia by 
looking at the operations of six different companies in three provinces. However, to make 
sense of this information it is fi rst necessary to explain in some detail the policies, laws and 
procedures by which lands are allocated and acquired in Indonesia by the State, private 
companies and local communities. This section thus summarises: the kinds of companies 
operating in the palm oil sector; the way government policies towards the oil palm 
sector have evolved; changing government policies towards indigenous peoples; existing 
measures to secure customary rights; procedures for acquiring lands for plantations and, 
fi nally; procedures for converting forest lands to estate crops. 
3.1  Types of Oil Palm Companies
There are several types of estate crop companies recognized in Indonesian law, which vary 
in terms of their size and the form of ownership. To complicate matters, as related later, 
the different types of companies also have different obligations, and have to go through 
different procedures, in the processes of land allocation and land acquisition.
Large-scale companies: Large-scale companies are distinguished by whether they are State- or 
privately owned. State-owned companies, referred to as Perusahaan Terbatas Perkebunan 
Nasional (PTPN), are para-statal companies, wholly owned by the State, which operate in 
all parts of Indonesia in the exploitation of a wide range of natural resource products, such 
as tea, cinnamon, cloves and palm oil. Palm oil is still the largest and the most profi table 
product produced by these state-owned companies. PTPN companies are run wholly on 
business lines and their staff are recruited on a professional basis.1 PTPN used to control 
the majority of oil palm plantation land in Indonesia, and it still has a total concession 
area of about 770,000 ha.,2 but its dominance has now been eclipsed by large-scale private 
operators. 
43The Normative Framework - Land Acquisition for New Plantings
There are two major types of privately owned companies operating in the palm oil sector 
in Indonesia distinguished by the form of their ownership.  
The fi rst kind are privately owned companies, in which more than 50% of the shares 
are owned by Indonesians. Some of these are listed on the Jakarta or Surabaya stock 
exchanges. Where there are foreign owners holding less than 50% of the shares, these 
are referred to as join ventures and are regulated through the national or local offi ces 
of BKPM (Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal - Investment Coordinating Board).
The second kind of companies are those which are more than 50% owned by foreign 
investors. Most of these companies are listed on international stock exchanges and 
operate as multinational companies.
As detailed in section 4 of this report, the study examined all three of the above kinds of 
large-scale companies, all of which operate on ‘State land’ and all of which are regulated 
through various permits both nationally and locally.
 
Medium-scale companies: There are also medium-scale companies, the number of which is 
now diminishing in Indonesia. These companies are also little researched, are subject 
to lighter regulation, and the details about them are not recorded in national bureaux. 
Such companies are formed as collectively-owned cooperatives or are owned by single 
individuals. These may operate either on ‘State land’ or on private land. Commonly these 
operations are established close to large-scale operations to which products are marketed 
for milling or transport. These medium scale companies tend to use the same oil palm 
hybrids and plantation management techniques as large-scale operations. 
Small scale plantations: Small scale plantations are those covering less than 25 hectares which 
are mostly owned by single farmer households. Small-holdings may be established by a 
number of means. Some are established as individually operated smallholdings, known 
as ‘plasma’, in association with large-scale operations which also contain extensive areas, 
known as ‘inti’, operated directly by the companies, and are known in English as Nucleus 
and Smallholder Estates (NES) and in Bahasa Indonesia as Perkebunan Inti Rakyat (PIR). 
There are a number of variations of the NES model, and some are supplied with human 
resources in form of migrants moved from central Indonesia to the ‘outer islands’ under 
the State-sponsored Transmigration programme (PIRBUNTRANS). Areas of extensive 
smallholdings can also be established directly through government credit schemes, as well 
as through farmers’ own initiatives (swadaya).
This study only examined the land tenure situation of smallholdings established as plasma 
alongside large-scale operations and did not examine the land acquisition processes of 
independent medium and small-scale growers.3 
1.
2.
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3.2  Government Policy on Palm Oil Development
Based on an analysis of the evolving legislation on plantations, it is possible to identify 
fi ve phases in government policies for palm oil development in Indonesia. We shall call 
these the PIR-Trans phase (up until October 1993), the Deregulation Phase (1993-1996), 
the Privatisation Phase (1996-1998), the Cooperatives Phase (1998-2002) and the current 
Decentralization Phase (2002-2006). It should be noted, however, that these phases were 
neither wholly discrete nor did the initiation of a new phase imply the ending of the 
previously launched processes.
PIR-Trans: Before October 1993, Government efforts to establish oil palm plantations 
were centred on taking over forested areas on the Outer islands and allocating these 
areas to PTPN operators, which controlled both inti and plasma holdings, supplied with a 
workforce and smallholders through the Transmigration programme. Laws were passed 
in 1986 and 1990 designed to ensure better coordination between government agencies 
and so speed up the process of permitting required to release forest lands for conversion. 
Control of forests remained centralized with regional forestry offi ces (Kanwil Kehutanan) 
only being authorised to release up to 100 ha. for plantations.4  
During this period, resident communities’ customary rights in land were often not 
recognised. Instead indigenous peoples were inserted into the Transmigration schemes 
either by being resettled as Transmigrant villages made up of local people (Translok) or 
by being slipped into mixed settlements (Transmigrasi sisipan) comprising local people and 
State-sponsored migrants from Java, Madura and Bali. Most PIR-Trans schemes allocated 
only 2 hectares to each Transmigrant family, half of which they were expected to plant 
with rice and half of which was to be developed as oil palm to supply the mills established 
alongside the nucleus estate. Migrants complained of sub-standard housing, low prices for 
fresh fruit bunches of oil palm (FFB) and long delays in the payment of wages, settling 
debts and transferring land titles.5  
Deregulation Phase: In October 1993, the government passed two laws as part of a National 
Deregulation Policy Package.6 The overall aim of the policy was to give local governors 
greater authority to promote regional development, while seeking to ensure that private 
companies had a long term commitment to the areas they were investing in. Under these 
laws, Governors could issue permits for the conversion of forest areas up to 200 hectares, 
while areas over 200. hectares remained the responsibility of the Directorate General of 
Estate Crops in Jakarta. Private companies applying for forest conversion permits, on the 
other hand, were not allowed to transfer ownership of leaseholds so secured.
Privatisation Phase:  The fi nal years of the Suharto dictatorship saw a concerted drive across 
several sectors, including estate crops, to privatise para-statal companies, encourage 
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private sector initiatives and facilitate foreign direct investment. A number of laws were 
passed designed to accelerate estate crop development in this way and ensure fair play 
between companies. The procedures by which companies secured permits for developing 
estates were clarifi ed – a temporary, one year, start-up permit (ijin prinsip), which could be 
converted to a permanent permit (ijin tetap) and to which an expansion permit could be 
added (ijin perluasan).7  Requirements were introduced to ensure that companies planning 
to convert forests fi rst secured the consent of any logging companies with logging permits 
(HPH) over the same areas.8  A new law also clarifi ed that forest lands cleared and planted 
with estate crops were to be classifi ed in Provincial Spatial Plans as agricultural lands but 
with no rights to plantation permits attached.9  
Cooperatives Phase:  The fall of the Suharto regime resulted in an era of reform (reformasi) 
which allowed politicians with alternative ideas about rural development to gain power 
temporarily. Efforts were made to encourage models of development that would allow 
local communities to benefi t more directly from lands and natural resources. While 
a law was passed prohibiting forest conversion in protected forests (hutan lindung), so 
harmonizing local and regional spatial planning procedures,10 a decree was passed to allow 
three-year plantation permits (ijin usaha perkebunan) to be granted to cooperatives for areas 
up to 1000 hectares by provincial Governors or up to 20,000 hectares by the central 
Ministry of Forests and Estate Crops.11  
Decentralization Phase:  The fall of Suharto also ushered in a period of radical political 
change in Indonesia, whereby far greater powers to control lands, resources and to 
administer regional budgets were entrusted to local governments and legislatures. Since 
2002, these changes have also had some impact on the development of the palm oil sector, 
while still limiting local authorities to encouraging medium-scale plantations. A new law 
allows district level regents (bupati) to issue permits of up to 1000 hectares, while any 
areas overlapping district boundaries remain the prerogative of Provincial Governors. 
However, authority to issue permits of over 1000 hectares was entrusted to the Ministry 
of Agriculture. Moreover, responding to concerns about the rate at which forests were 
being cleared for plantations even though vast areas of degraded lands were available for 
planting, in 2005 the Government passed another law establishing a moratorium on forest 
conversion for estate crops.12  
The moratorium was introduced following the signing of a letter of intent between the 
Government of Indonesia and the IMF, although this did not make clear for how long 
the moratorium should be maintained and whether it referred to a moratorium on actual 
conversion of forest cover or a moratorium on changing the status of forest lands to allow 
planting. In February 2005, the Ministry of Forests released two contradictory circulars to 
the local government. One stated that the moratorium was still effective, while the other 
stated that in order to optimise the use of forest land for estate crops the Ministry would 
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evaluate proposals for conversion on their merits. The same split views can be discerned 
in the way the Ministry has responded to the proposal to establish 1.8 m. ha. oil palm 
plantation in the heart of Borneo.13 
3.3  Government Policies Towards Indigenous Peoples’ Institutions
In Indonesia, there are continuing debates about the terminologies applied to self-
governing, customary law communities in the various government laws, which directly or 
indirectly regulate their affairs.14 Various Indonesian terms are employed to refer to these 
peoples such as masyarakat suku terasing (alien tribal communities), masyarakat tertinggal 
(neglected communities), masyarakat terpencil (remote communities), masyarakat hukum adat 
(customary law communities) and, more simply, masyarakat adat (communities governed 
by custom).15 The term ‘indigenous peoples’ is the closest term in common usage in 
international law and policy making to refer to these peoples. 
Ideally, the relationship between indigenous peoples and the State should be constituted 
through a balance of rights and obligations. Indigenous peoples transfer some of their 
authority to be self-governing to the State in order to improve their welfare, thus 
legitimating the right of the State to control indigenous peoples by established laws.16 
 
The basic regulations on indigenous peoples in Indonesian ‘positive’ laws have resulted 
from a compromise negotiated among the founding fathers of the Nation in drafting the 
Constitution. After protracted debates, the recognition of indigenous peoples was declared 
through Article 18 of the 1945 Constitution which recognised that Indonesia should be 
formed of the existing polities – large and small – including the special administrative 
regions previously recognised by the Dutch, with their customary rights.17 The explanatory 
note to this Article states that:
In Indonesian territory, there are ± 254 Zelfbesturende Landschappen and 
Volksgemeenschappen such as villages in Java and Bali, Nagari in Minangkabau, 
kampung and Marga in Palembang and so forth. These regions retain their 
original institutions and are thereby considered as special regions. The National 
Republic of Indonesia respects the existence of these regions and all these 
regions’ regulations that relate to their original rights.
The Constitution was amended in 2002, and the current Article 18b notes:
The state recognizes and respects special or specifi c local government 
institutions that are regulated by laws. 
1)
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The state recognizes and respects customary law communities with their 
traditional rights, as long as they still exist and accord with community 
development and the principles of the Unitary State of Republic of 
Indonesia, as regulated by law.
In 1979, there was a fundamental restructuring of the State’s relationship with these 
self-governing communities through the passing of the Village Administration Act.18 
The law imposed a Javanese model of village administration on all the communities of 
the whole archipelago and was passed by the New Order regime in order to unify the 
country and effectively assert the authority of central government. It resulted in customary 
institutions losing their authority and weakened the social ties that had bound together 
customary law communities until that time. Customary law systems of self-governance 
outside Java, accepted up to that time, such as Nagari in Minangkabau, Kampong in West 
Kalimantan, Negeri in Maluku, Lembang in Toraja and Marga in South Sumatra, were no 
longer recognised.
One of the important impacts of the Village Administration Act was that it subordinated 
all villages to a single common bureaucratic structure that was imposed throughout 
Indonesia. Villages were often regrouped and were all renamed by the Javanese term desa. 
Each desa was run by a village head (kepala desa) who was placed under the control of the 
head (camat) of the sub-district (kecamatan).  These changes led to widespread protests and 
demands for repeal of the Act.19  
With the fall of the militaristic New Order regime in 1998, there were strong public calls 
for a change in the system of administration. The new government responded by passing 
the 1999 Regional Autonomy Act,21  which initiated a radical process of decentralization 
in Indonesia. The Act specifi cally noted that the 1979 Village Administration Act was 
unconstitutional, failed to respect the rights of self-governing communities, and should 
be replaced, thus re-opening the possibility for indigenous peoples to govern themselves 
according to customary law and customary institutions. 
As Rikardo Simarmata has noted,21 some district legislatures have responded to the 
Regional Autonomy Act by passing district regulations (perda) that recognize the existence 
of desa, marga, huta, pekon, lembang, kampung, and other local structures. For instance, 
the Toraja district legislature, in South Sulawesi Province, enacted a perda in 2001, re-
establishing the traditional institution of the lembang as a self-governing authority.22 Some 
district legislatures in Central Kalimantan province have likewise taken similar initiatives 
to recognise the customary authority of kademangan. 
2)
48 Palm Oil and Land Acquisition in Indonesia
Moreover, although the Act emphasizes autonomy at the district level, the West Sumatra 
provincial legislature enacted a law re-establishing Nagari as self-governing entities.23 
Some of these new laws explicitly confer on indigenous peoples the right to control their 
natural resources. The new laws in West Sumatra, for example, recognise Nagari control 
of Nagari territory, Nagari governance and Nagari ‘properties’.24   
After being implemented for more than fi ve years, Law No. 22 of 1999 was replaced 
by Law No. 32 of 2004 regarding Regional Autonomy. The new Law was passed hastily 
without real debate or prior evaluation of what had been achieved under the law it replaced. 
The new law somewhat restricts the scope for community self-governance and has been 
interpreted as an attempt to re-centralize government authority at the village level by 
subordinating the authority of village-level representative bodies (Badan Perwakilan Desa) 
to the village head (Kepala Desa), in turn clarifying that they are subject to the district regent 
(bupati).25 Under this revised law, the village head and village secretary again become civil 
servants, but it is not clear how this law now relates to areas where the desa structure 
has now been replaced by customary institutions. Furthermore, although this law has 
subordinated customary institutions to the local administration, it does not question their 
existence. 
3.4  Laws Relating To Customary Rights In Land
The highest law regulating agrarian and natural resources management is Article 28H of 
the constitution which protects the right to property. Paragraph 4 notes:
Every person has the right to own property and this property can not be 
taken… from them by anybody. 
Moreover, Article 28I of the constitution specifi cally protects the right of customary 
communities. Paragraph 3 notes: 
The cultural identity and the rights of traditional societies shall be respected in 
accordance with this age of progress and human civilisation
 
These two articles can be understood as explicitly protecting the rights of indigenous 
peoples to their lands and resources but is in tension with Article 33 of the Indonesian 
Constitution of 1945, which legitimates the right of the State to regulate and manage 
natural resource use. Article 33 states:
Economic matters are managed as common efforts based on family 
principles.
1.
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Productive activities related to natural resources, which have importance to 
the State and signifi cance for the livelihood of the Indonesian people, will be 
managed exclusively by the State. 
The earth, water and natural resources are under the control of the State and 
should be utilized for the maximum welfare of the Indonesian people.
The national economic system should be conducted in accordance with 
the following principles: togetherness, equitable effi ciency, sustainability, 
environmental friendliness, independence, and balancing progress and national 
economic unity.
The implementation of this article will be regulated by further laws.26 
The Basic Agrarian Law (BAL) of 1960,27 accords with these Constitutional provisions. 
Thus, it seeks to reconcile rights to natural resources under customary law, commonly 
referred to as ulayat rights, with inherited colonial legal concepts related to land. Article 3 
of the BAL thus states:
… ulayat rights and other similar rights of customary law communities should be 
recognised, as long as these communities really exist, and [the exercise of these 
rights] is consistent with national and State interests, based on the principle of 
national unity, and is not in contradiction with this law and higher regulations.
Likewise, Article 5 of the BAL states that:
Customary law applies to the earth, water and air as long as it does not contradict 
national and State interests, based on national unity and Indonesian socialism, 
and also other related provisions of this law, in accordance with religious 
principles.28  
Based upon these provisions, the State justifi es itself as the single source of legitimacy 
for determining the ownership of agrarian and natural resources, in effect giving the 
government the authority to determine whether indigenous peoples still exist or not and 
to take over natural resources from indigenous peoples by extinguishing ulayat rights. 
The explanation of Article 5 of the BAL notes:
 
Firstly, application of this regulation should commence with the recognition of 
ulayat rights in accordance with this new agrarian law. Although in reality ulayat 
rights exist and have been taken into account in judges’ decisions, ulayat rights 
have never been formally recognized in law. Consequently, ulayat rights were 
often ignored in the application of agrarian laws during colonial era. The BAL 
recognizes ulayat rights, to ensure that these rights will be respected, so long as the 
2.
3.
4.
5.
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corresponding customary law communities continue to exist. For instance, the 
process of granting rights over the land (e.g. a business utilization right - HGU) 
to communities should start with a hearing process and they would be granted 
recognition, if [it is determined that] they have the right to receive it as ulayat 
rights holders.
Nevertheless, it is not acceptable for customary law communities to invoke 
ulayat  rights to oppose business utilization rights, since such concessions are 
granted in certain regions to serve the wider interest. It is also not acceptable for 
customary law  communities to use their ulayat rights to oppose development 
projects, for example opposing forest clearing for generating local income or 
resettlement programs. Indeed, in many regions, development programs are 
often hampered because of ulayat rights. These circumstances are the basic 
reason for the stipulations in the regulation (Article 3) mentioned above. The 
interests of customary law communities should be subordinate to national and 
State interests and the exercise of ulayat rights should also conform to the wider 
interest. Nowadays, customary law communities are not allowed to absolutely 
maintain their ulayat rights, as if they were isolated from other communities and 
other regions of the State. This kind of action is in contradiction to the main 
principle stated in Article 2 and will hamper big business development in support 
of the welfare of the people. As has been explained above, this does not mean 
that the interests of customary law communities will not be considered.29 
Since then the law, and the policy behind it, have been strongly criticised for failing to 
adequately protect the rights of customary law communities. Furthermore, few regulations 
have been passed to clarify how the State should recognise the ownership rights of 
indigenous peoples. On the contrary, subsequent regulations have only strengthened the 
right of the government to control and manage land and natural resources.30 
After the fall of Sukarno (1966),31 the New Order government consciously ignored the 
ulayat rights of indigenous peoples. The BAL was indirectly frozen, since it was not taken 
into account in developing the Basic Forestry Law (BFL) and Basic Mining Law and 
their implementing regulations.32 Neither of these two new laws recognizes indigenous 
peoples’ ownership rights. The BFL effectively treats forests as if they were empty, even 
where they have been occupied for thousands of years, and subordinates all use and access 
rights to forestry exploitation.33 To overcome local resistance to logging operations an 
enabling regulation was passed in 1970 according to which:  
The rights of customary law communities and their members to harvest forest 
products based on customary law may be exercised, so long as those rights still 
exist, but they should be regulated so the exercise of these rights does not hamper 
the exploitation of forest concessions.34  
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The Basic Mining Law likewise implies that, if there is confl ict over the land between 
local people and concessionaires, the people should give way, even in the case where local 
people have their own [small scale] mines. 
In 1999, after the fall of the authoritarian New Order regime, the government realized 
its mistake and responded to the demands of indigenous peoples for recognition of their 
rights by passing a regulation aimed at clarifying how ulayat rights should be recognised.35 
The regulation sets out three criteria according to which specifi ed lands can be classifi ed as 
ulayat land, namely that there is a legally defi ned community, which still observes customary 
law in its daily life, and has effective customary law institutions which regulate, control and 
use ulayat land. The regulation has been criticised for unduly limiting the circumstances 
under which ulayat rights can be recognised and for allowing ulayat lands to be acquired 
for ‘public’ purposes, such as the issuance land utilization rights (hak pakai) granted to 
individuals and business utilization rights (hak guna usaha) granted to corporations.36 The 
same year, the Basic Forestry Law was replaced but the new law, though it recognises a 
new category, ‘customary forest’ (hutan adat) defi nes these as areas within State Forest 
Areas, which are explicitly defi ned as areas with ‘no rights attached’.37 
The continuing lack of effective recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights in Indonesian 
land and natural resource laws remains a major source of controversy. During 2000-
2001, a strong mobilization of members of the legislature and supportive civil society 
organisations led the House of Representatives (MPR)38 to issue a Legislative Act calling 
for the revision of the Basic Agrarian Law, the Basic Forestry Law and other natural 
resource laws in order to offer communities security in land and lessen land confl icts. 
The Act explicitly recognizes and respects the rights of indigenous peoples over land and 
natural resources.39 Unfortunately, numerous laws passed since that date have failed to 
take this Act into account. New laws on Forestry, Land Reform and Natural Resource 
Management are still part of the government’s legal reform programme (PROLEGNAS) 
and, technically, should conform to the Legislative Act. 
3.5  Land Acquisition In Non-forest Areas
3.5.1  Basic Legal Principles for Land Acquisition
Land acquisition processes in Indonesian law derive in large part from legal procedures 
introduced in the colonial era to promote foreign investment, capitalist production 
techniques and international trade. Alongside the Cultuurstelsel system (forced planting) 
implemented by General Governor van Den Bosch in 1830, which obliged local people 
to labour in the colonial government’s plantations, the colonial government declared that 
all unclaimed land and forest areas were the domain of the State (domein verklaring). 
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Although the application of this principle outside Java was disputed by more liberal Dutch 
lawyers,40 within Java and a few other areas, like West Sumatra, the principle was affi rmed, 
whereby lands not under clear ownership were treated as unoccupied State lands.41 The 
law directly overrode customary systems of land ownership, according to which rights in 
fallow lands and secondary forests were retained by whoever had fi rst cleared the land, in 
favour of private plantation companies.42  
In applying the law in practice, the Dutch government in West Sumatra realized that their 
desire to annex lands was incompatible with Minangkabau realities. Considering the strong 
challenge from Minangkabau people toward the domein verklaring, the Dutch Government 
added wording to the amended decree acknowledging the right of people to open up land 
for their own needs. The law therefore also recognised that before acquiring such lands 
an interested party should negotiate with the penghulu (customary chief) of the Nagari 
(customary jurisdiction).43 However, the West Sumatra authorities could not completely 
block application of the colonial government’s policy.44 
The regulation thus achieved its goal. By 1938, there were 2,500,000 hectares of land in 
the Dutch East Indies under the control of 2,400 plantation companies. Most of those 
companies belonged to huge companies or cartels that coordinated their operations.45 
These agrarian policies of the Dutch systematically weakened the social and economic 
position of the villagers. Farmers who had owned land became labourers and landless or 
land poor peasants.46 Although the domein verklaring infl uenced subsequent Indonesian 
laws related to land acquisition, its legitimacy has been strongly contested.
A second controversial principle of Indonesian law concerns the ‘controlling right of state’ 
(Hak Menguasai Negara), a constitutionally endorsed power of the independent Republic 
of Indonesia to regulate and manage the country’s natural resources. First articulated in 
the 1945 Mining Act and echoed in Article 2 of the Basic Agrarian Law, the principle 
grants the State authority to regulate, operate, classify, utilize, reserve and preserve natural 
resources for the benefi t of the people, including deciding on and regulating the legal 
relations between people and natural resources.47 
In common with most other jurisdictions, which assert the principle of ‘eminent domain’, 
under Indonesian Law lands can be acquired in the public interest against the wishes 
of prior owners. In most countries, however, the laws distinguish clearly between 
lands acquired for public purposes, in which owners have the right to due process and 
compensation, and lands acquired for private purposes in which the owner also has the 
right to refuse sale. Under Indonesian land laws these distinctions are blurred because all 
land tenures are subject to the test of performing their social function. Tenures are thus 
relatively insecure and even development projects consonant with the achievement of 
government-set targets can be considered to be of ‘public interest’, even where the direct 
benefi ciaries are private corporations.48 Article 18 of the BAL states that: 
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Rights over land can be revoked, while giving adequate compensation based on 
procedures regulated by laws, in the public interest including the interests of the 
State and the interests of the Nation. 
Indeed, in the early years of Indonesia’s independence lands were appropriated for 
development with little reference to local opinion or rights, leading to considerable rural 
confl ict.49 In recognition of the ensuing abuses, laws regarding land acquisition have 
been progressively strengthened to ensure fair compensation, negotiated sales and local 
consensus. 
To clarify the application of Article 18 of the BAL, the government passed Law No. 20 
of 1961, on the ‘Revocation of Rights over the Land and the Goods above It’. This law 
is considered to be the fi rst regulation of post-colonial Indonesia aimed at facilitating 
land acquisition for development purposes, up until that time still regulated by colonial 
laws.50  
In General Explanation No. 4(a) of Law No. 20 of 1961 it is stated:
In general, according to Article 18 of the BAL, the revocation of rights may be 
executed for state businesses (central and local government) in order to serve 
public interest. However, this law opens the possibilities to revoke the rights 
for private purposes, based on agreement with the owner. The private sector 
plan should certainly have been agreed by the government and be in accordance 
with the national development plan. For example, the development of roads, 
harbours, buildings for industries and mining, houses and health care facilities 
and other national development projects.
The law gave authority to the President to revoke rights in land, and required interested 
parties to apply for application of the power through the Agrarian Ministry. However, 
after 12 years, the law was amended to try to deal with some of the problems caused by 
the misinterpretation and misuse of the notion of the revocation of rights over land in 
the public interest. Presidential Instruction No. 9 of 1973 accordingly stated that land 
revocation for public interest should be performed carefully through wise and fair methods. 
Development activities that could be included within the scope of the ‘public interest’ were 
activities related to: the State and the Nation’s interest; wider society’s interest; the people’s 
interest and; the development interest. The Instruction also determined that such public 
purposes included: defence; general public works; public facilities; public services; religion; 
science and art; health; sport; disaster management; social welfare; graveyards; tourism 
and recreation and; economic businesses for pubic welfare. In addition, the President also 
had sole power to decide what other activities could be included in the category of ‘public 
interest’.51 In effect, these laws gave the State unusually wide powers to expropriate rural 
properties in the name of national development and, since plans to expand plantations 
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were part of national development plans, paved the way for plantations to be imposed on 
community lands, even against the expressed wishes of local people.
Following an international controversy about the way Javanese peasants had been 
dispossessed to make way for the World Bank-funded Kedung Ombo Dam, in 1993, 
the government issued Presidential Decree No. 55 of 1993 on land procurement for 
development for public purposes. In place of the notion of revocation of rights over land, 
the decree clarifi ed that land acquisition procedures should apply to any activity to obtain 
land and should be accomplished by giving compensation to the land owner and by leasing 
or transferring rights over land to the new user. Compensation for such expropriations 
should be established by consensus. Meanwhile, the public interest was defi ned as the 
interest of the whole society. The decree narrowed the scope of land acquisition for 
public purposes, while making clearer that land acquisition for other purposes should 
be implemented through sales, exchanges, or other methods that were agreed between 
contracting parties. 
According to this decree, lands could only be so acquired for ‘public purposes’, if the 
development plan was in accordance with existing Land Use Planning. Development 
activities based on Presidential decree should be carried out by the government on a not-
for-profi t basis for activities such as: public roads, water channels, reservoirs and other 
irrigation facilities; public hospitals and other public health centres; harbours, airports or 
terminals; mosques, churches and so forth; schools or other education facilities; public 
markets; public graveyards; public facilities, dykes for fl ood and disaster prevention; postal 
services and telecommunications; sports facilities; television and radio stations with their 
supporting equipment; government offi ces; army facilities and; development activities for 
other public interests.
This Presidential Decree affi rmed the need for discussions with the community in order to 
lease lands for the common interest, according to a free exchange of views and expression 
of the positions of rights-holders and those who need land on a voluntary basis, with the 
aim of reaching an agreement on the form and amount of compensation.
Article 11 of the Decree specifi es that land procurement for development for public 
purposes should be conducted through consensus mechanisms with the following 
requirements: 
The consensus should be directly negotiated between the land rights holders and the 
Government Agency which needs the land, 
In case the land right holders are unlikely to reach an effective consensus, a Land 
Procurement Committee should be established. This committee consists of the 
Government Agency and the appointed representatives of the rights holders, who 
will act as their proxy, 
■
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The consensus should be led by the Chairman of the Land Procurement Committee, 
The consensus should be negotiated at a place mentioned in the invitation letter. 
These are the key laws governing most of the land acquisitions that have been the subject 
of the six case studies presented in Chapter 4. However, on 3 May 2005, the President of 
the Republic of Indonesia, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, signed Presidential Regulation 
No. 36 of 2005 on Land Procurement for Development for Public Purposes, which 
replaced Presidential Decree No. 55 /1993.
This new Presidential Regulation specifi es that land procurement is an activity to obtain 
land by giving compensation to those who release their rights over their land, buildings, 
plants, objects relating to the land or who revoke their right over the land. Pursuant to 
this decree, the releasing or revocation of the right over the land is an activity to release 
legal relations between the right holders and their controlling right upon their land, with 
compensation agreed by consensus. Exercise of this right is intended for the public 
interest, meaning the interests of the majority of the people.
Relinquishment of land rights should be carried out based upon a consensus between the 
rights holders and the government. However, if any dispute arises, the government may 
unilaterally set the compensation and entrust the compensation money to a district court. 
In addition, the consensus should be negotiated directly between the right holders, the 
land procurement committee, and Government agency or respective local government. 
In case there are numerous land rights holders who are unlikely to reach an effective 
consensus, then the negotiation should be conducted by the Land Procurement Committee 
and Government agency or regional government requiring the land and representatives 
appointed by the land rights holders, who act as their proxy. The appointment of the 
representative or proxy of the land rights holders should be written, duly stamped and 
acknowledged by the Village Head or by power of attorney drawn up before appropriate 
authorities.
There are various objects of public interest including: public roads, toll roads, railways 
(over land, above the land, or underground); water supplies, drainage and sanitation; 
reservoirs, dams, dykes, irrigation, and irrigation buildings; public hospitals and people’s 
health centres; seaports, airports, railway stations and terminals; houses of worship; 
education facilities or schools; markets; public funeral facilities; public safety facilities; 
telecommunications; sports facilities; radio and television stations, broadcasting equipment 
and supporting facilities; government offi ces, regional government offi ces, foreign 
representatives offi ces, United Nations buildings, and those of international institutions 
under the United Nations;  facilities for the Indonesian Armed Forces and the National 
Police of the Republic of Indonesia based on their main tasks and function; prisons; low 
price settlements; garbage disposal points; nature reserves and cultural reserves; parks; 
social institutions; and facilities for the generation, transmission, and distribution of 
■
■
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electricity.52 It is not clear that this new law applies to land acquisition on behalf of the 
private sector in accordance with State development plans, nor has the ruling yet been 
tested in the courts.
In sum, the regulations relating to land procurement for development for public purposes 
place severe limitations on community rights of land ownership. Where a public interest can 
be demonstrated, something that is widely interpreted in Indonesian law, ownership may 
be revoked and the community has no right to stop land acquisition by the government. It 
only has a right to fair compensation for the lands so appropriated, following a negotiation 
aimed at achieving agreement. 
3.5.2  Licensing Plantations in Indonesia
When the modern state of Indonesia was established, a large number of plantations 
established by colonial authority already existed. However, in accordance with Law No. 86 
of 1958 regarding Nationalization of Dutch Companies,53 these plantation companies were 
taken over by the Government as state-owned companies. The law was further regulated 
by Government Regulation No. 2 of 1959 regarding Law Enforcement Principles on the 
Nationalization of Dutch Companies. This government regulation set out criteria for the 
kinds of Dutch companies that should be nationalized and established the nationalization 
procedure.54 Further regulations were issued listing the companies thus taken over by the 
State. For example, pursuant to Government Regulation No. 2 of 1959, the government 
issued Government Regulation No. 4 of 1959 on Nationalization Criteria of Dutch 
Tobacco Agriculture/Plantation Company, which listed some 38 tobacco companies that 
should be nationalized.
Prior to the BAL of 1960, these plantation companies’ rights over land were defi ned by 
Dutch laws as rights of Erfpacht and Consessie. Under the BAL, however, Erfpacht rights 
were converted into maximum 20 year leaseholds on State lands, while Consessie rights 
holders could apply to confi rm their concession rights. If such rights were not applied for, 
or the applications did not comply with the requirements of the Agrarian Minister, they 
would lapse after a maximum of fi ve years.55 As far as this study could determine, there 
are no longer any plantations in Indonesia claiming rights in land under Dutch law. 
Most large oil palm plantations have been established in Indonesia under the BAL by 
which companies are awarded temporary rights of exploitation or cultivation for periods 
initially of 35 years extendable for 25 years. These tenures, known as Hak Guna Usaha 
(HGU), and corresponding HGB (Hak Guna Bangunan) for constructing buildings such as 
mills, are considered equivalent to leaseholds on State lands. Acquisition of these rights is 
regulated by a number of further laws, which set out the conditions and procedures under 
which HGU may be issued and plantations licensed. 
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Ministerial Decree of Agriculture No. 786/Kpts/KB.120/10/96 regarding the Licensing 
of Plantation Businesses fi rstly defi ned Plantation Businesses as cultivation activities and 
Plantation Industries as industries processing plantation products, both of which are to be 
regulated and developed subject to the authority of Minister of Agriculture. Under the decree, 
Plantation Businesses must acquire a Permanent Permit for establishing plantation crops 
or a ‘Permit of Plant Type Alteration’ if they decided to change the crop type. Plantation 
Industries require a Permanent Permit and an Expansion Permit. Authority to issue such 
permits was delegated by the Minister of Agriculture to the Directorate General of Plantations 
for all plantation licenses for lands covering more than 200 ha. However, for plantations that 
cover 25 to 200 ha., the authority to issue a permit was delegated to Provincial Governors.
All such licenses were issued subject to the companies fi rst securing initiation permits (ijin 
prinsip) for the preparatory activities required to set up plantations and plants. Once armed 
with these permits, companies may acquire the rights of utilization and exploitation of 
the land (Hak Guna Usaha – HGU) from the Agrarian Ministry. However, these licenses 
may be revoked: if the company fails to adhere to the regulation stipulated in the license, 
varies the location, changes the crop type, or expands the crop area without permission; if 
the HGU is revoked or expires; if the license is returned to the issuing authority or; if the 
company violates public orders or existing laws and regulations.
The Minister of Forestry and Plantations issued a revised Decree regulating plantations 
in 1999.56 The Decree set out further requirements for the management, control and 
development of human resources with the expressed aim of making plantation businesses 
more effi cient, competitive and sustainable, in order to increase planters' income and 
living standards, increase foreign exchange revenue, generate more raw material for 
industry, and promote employment. To assure the Ministry that companies had satisfi ed 
these requirements they had to comply with a complex series of permitting steps (see 
Figure 3.1). The Decree established new categories for plantation types as: small-scale 
plantations (UPBSK) covering 25-200 ha., medium-sized plantations (UPBSM) covering 
200-1000 ha. and large-scale plantations (UPSB) covering areas over 1000 ha.. The Decree 
also placed a ceiling on plantation size at 20,000 ha, being 10.000 ha. in most parts of 
Indonesia but twice that in the Province of Irian Jaya (now called Papua). All oil palm 
permits of whatever scale were subject to the Ministry of Forestry and Plantations. 
The Decree also imposed additional conditions under which permits could be revoked 
including: if the company had not established itself on the land after three year; had not 
started planting after four years; did not manage the plantation professionally, transparently, 
participatively, effi ciently and effectively; did not sustainably manage natural resources; 
failed to carry our impact assessments;57 did not collaborate with cooperatives and small 
& medium scale industries; carried out land clearing using fi re; failed to prepare a business 
plan and feasibility study; did not apply for permits to change crop types or expand the 
area or; did not report on business progress each semester. 
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Under Indonesian law, capital investment is distinguished between Domestic Capital 
Investment (PMDN) and Foreign Capital Investment (PMA). Domestic Capital 
Investment must be invested in compliance with Law No. 6 of 1968 regarding Domestic 
Capital Investment, as amended by Law No. 12 of 1970. Foreign Capital Investment 
should comply with the Law No. 1 of 1967 regarding Foreign Capital Investment, as 
amended by Law No. 11 of 1970.
In the context of plantation development, at the initial stage, entrepreneurs who have the 
intention of investing should fi rst gain authorization according to the provisions of these 
laws, before taking steps to get permits for plantations. The procedure is illustrated in the 
chart below (Figure 3.2):
Alur Perijinan Pembangunan 
Perkebunan di Indonesia
Permohonan Penanaman 
Modal Untuk  
Mendapatkan 
Surat Persetujuan 
Penanaman Modal 
dalam Negeri/Asing
(SK Meninves/
Kep. BKPM No. 38/
SK/1999) 
Ijin Perkebunan 
Berdasarkan 
Kepmentan No. 357/
Kpts/HK.350/5/2002 
Tentang
Pedoman 
Perizinan 
Usaha Perkebunan
Perolehan Hak Atas Tanah 
Berdasarkan Permenag/
Kep. BPN No. 2 Tahun 
1999 Tentang Izin Lokasi, 
Kepmenag/Kep. BPN No. 
21 Tahun 1993 Tentang 
Tatacara Perolehan Tanah 
Bagi Perusahaan Dalam 
Rangka PMA dll.
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Translation Section for the table above:
The Scheme of the Plantation Development Permit In Indonesia
Application for 
Investment in order 
to obtain Domestic/ 
Foreign Investment 
Approval
(Minister Decree of 
Investment/Head of BK-
PM No. 38/SK/1999
Plantation Permit is 
based on Ministerial 
Decree of forestry 
No. 357/Kpts/ 
HK.350/5/2002 
on Guidance 
for Licensing of 
Plantation Business
Right Acquirement on Land 
in Minister Decree/Head of 
BPN No. 2 /1999 on Location 
Permit, State Ministerial 
Decree/Head of BPN No. 21 
/1993 on Land Acquisition 
Procedure for Company under 
the framework of Foreign 
Investment, etc. 
Figure 3.2: Required sequence of permits for plantation development
Once the initial process regulating capital investment has been complied with, the 
plantation investor candidate should then follow the laws relating to securing plantation 
permits and rights to the land, as illustrated in the following chart (Figure 3.3 below).
On 23 May 2002, the Minister of Agriculture issued the Decree of Minister of Agriculture 
No. 357/Kpts/HK.350/5/2002 on Guidance regarding the Licensing of Plantation 
Businesses. The Decree is intended to clarify the procedures for permitting plantations in 
the context of Law No. 22 of 1999 regarding Regional Government and the Law No. 25 of 
2000 regarding Government Authority and Provincial Authority as an Autonomous Region. 
The decree differs from the previous Decree of the Minister of Forestry and Plantation in 
not stating the purposes supposed to be fulfi lled by plantation development.58  
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Figure 3.3: 
Plantation Business Permit (IUP) up to HGU Process
(Based on Ministerial of  Agriculture Decree 
No. 357/Kpts/HK.3511/5/2002)
IUP : Plantation Business 
Permit
P3KH : Principle Approval 
for Forest Land 
Reserve 
HGU : Business 
Utilization Right 
INVESTOR
(The applicant company)
The Notary Act and 
its amendments
NPWP
Domicile certifi cate
Workplan
Recommendation on 
land availability
Recommendation on 
land suitability
Land ≤ 20 000 ha
Development scheme
Land candidate map
AMDAL documents
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
Governor or Bupati
IUP
Governor Location Permit (Land Offi ce) Minister of Forestry
Forest Area
P3KH
Forest delineation
* Pre Survey
* Main survey
* Boundary delineation 
Committee B
Cadastre Measurement 
HGU
OPERATIONAL
Forest Area Release
(Minister of Forestry)
Other Utilization Area 
(APL)
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According to the Decree, to obtain a Plantation Business License, the investors must 
have a legal deed establishing the company, a Tax Payer Number (NPWP), a domicile 
certifi cate, a plantation work plan, a location permit (ijin lokasi) from the land affairs 
agency, a  technical survey of the boundary with forest areas from the forestry agency, a 
technical recommendation of land appropriateness from the Head Offi ce coordinating 
provincial, local regency/municipality plantations based on the macro plan, in accordance 
with the commodity region and the RUTR, a statement of land acquisition showing that 
the company or group of plantation businesses has not exceeded the maximum limit, 
a statement on the selected development system and, confi rmed by a notary’s deed, a 
location map with scale 1 : 100, and an agreement letter for the Environmental Impact 
Analysis (AMDAL) from the Regional Amdal Commission. Having compiled all these 
documents the application for a plantation business license is then submitted to Governor 
or Bupati depending on the scale of the operation. The chart (Figure 3.3) illustrates the 
complex permitting procedure, which  plantation companies must go through.
Under the new Decree, plantation permits can be revoked as an administrative sanction 
imposed on any plantation investors who fail to perform their obligations to: resolve 
the title to land within at most 2 years of the issuance of plantation permit (IUP); realise 
development in line with the national or regional macro plan for plantation development; 
manage the plantation professionally, transparently, participatively, effi ciently and 
effectively; conduct land clearing without fi re; manage natural resources sustainably; 
report any diversifi cation of the plantation business, for example into agro-tourism to 
the relevant agency and obtain a diversifi cation permit; establish and empower plasma or 
cooperative schemes; report the plantation’s business progress on a quarterly basis.
The key law relevant to plantations was again amended on 11 August 2004 through 
issuance of the Plantation Act, Law No. 18 of 2004, the country’s fi rst legislative act 
on plantations.59 With respect to the plantation business license, this Law specifi es that 
all existing rules regulating plantations remain valid as long as they do not contravene 
newly amended laws and regulations. Since no further plantation licensing regulations 
for implementing the Plantation Act have yet been issued, consequently the Decree of 
Minister of Forestry and Plantation No. 357/Kpts/Hk. 350/5/2002 and accompanying 
regulations remain valid. One of the main changes introduced by the Act is that it allows 
for a considerable extension of the period of the concession, notionally for up to 120 
years.60  
3.5.3  Land Acquisition for Plantations on State and Private Lands
As noted in Section 3.5.1, land acquisition for plantations is based on Presidential Decree 
No. 55 of 1993, as amended by Presidential Regulation No. 36/2005, and should be 
conducted through normal mechanisms of sale and purchase, barter, or other mechanisms 
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mutually agreed by the relevant parties. Meanwhile, the previous two laws and regulations, 
Law No. 20 of 1961 and Presidential Instruction No. 9 of 1973, opened the way for 
plantation companies to acquire land for plantations by arguing that the plantations are 
in the public interest. However, the details of land acquisition are a little more complex 
than this, as they depend on whether the lands that the company is seeking to obtain are 
considered to be State land or private lands under the direct control of third parties.61 
The concept of State Land was fi rst set out in Government Regulation No. 8 of 1953 
regarding the Control of State Lands. In Article 1a, this regulation states that State land is 
land which is fully controlled by the state. The General Explanation of this Government 
Regulation notes that 
According to domein verklaring amongst other things, as stated in article I of the 
Agrarisch Besluit, all lands, which are free from anyone’s rights (both those based 
on Indonesian traditional law and on Western law) shall be considered as vrij 
landsdomein that is lands fully owned and controlled by State. These lands are those 
which are referred to as “State Land” in this Government Regulation.
 
Meanwhile, based on the Article 1.3 of Law No. 24 of 1997 regarding Land Registration, 
State Land is construed as:
State Land or land directly controlled by the State that is land not encumbered 
with any land title.
Whereas the earlier law recognised customary rights in land as excluding lands from being 
considered State lands, the latter law can be interpreted as extending the concept of State 
land over lands encumbered with customary rights. This is because, as noted, the BAL while 
acknowledging ulayat does not treat it as a ‘title’ to land.62 Those lands that are encumbered 
with ‘titles’ are those with tenures explicitly recognised in Article 16 of the BAL.63 
Land acquisition should be conducted by a plantation company after the company has 
secured a ‘location permit’ (ijin lokasi) from the local Government, either the Regency 
(district) or Municipality. This should be applied for after the company has obtained an 
investment permit from the Head of BKPM (the Coordinating Board for Investment)-. 
According to a joint decree of the Agrarian Minister and the Head of the Land Agency,64 
location permits regulate capital investment in relation to land acquisition and are required 
for every capital investment in plantations whether national or foreign (PMA & PMDN).65 
Location permits are temporary permits which give the investor a short term temporary 
right in the land of between one and three years, depending on the size of the land sought, 
extendable for a further year if progress is being made, while the investment is agreed and 
lands are secured. 
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Article 8 of this decree states that, after a plantation company obtains a location permit, the 
company is entitled to acquire the land set out in the Location Permit, subject to release of 
the rights and interests of other parties in the land based on an agreement with the rights 
holders or concerned parties through selling and purchasing, giving compensation, land 
consolidation or other methods based on the existing regulations. 
Before the relevant land is acquired by the Location Permit holder, all rights and interests 
of other parties existing on the relevant land remain recognized, including the authority 
of the rights holders to secure land titles, to use and exploit the land for their personal or 
business interests, and to transfer the right to other parties. The Location Permit holder is 
obliged to respect the other party’s interests in the land until it is released. The Location 
Permit holder is also prohibited from closing or restricting community access to the land 
and must keep and protect public interests as well. Only after the relevant land has been 
acquired does the Location Permit holder have the authority to use the land in accordance 
with the purposes mentioned in the investment plan.
The procedures for land acquisition are set out in the Decree of the Agrarian Minister 
and the Head of National Land Affairs Agency No. 21/1994 on Land Acquisition 
Procedures for Companies in the Framework of Capital Investment. Article 1 requires 
that compensation is paid to any person who has a right to that compensation, based 
on negotiation and consensus. The company also needs to ensure that the title being 
transferred is equivalent to that to which it is entitled, either HGU or HGB. In the case of 
acquisition of private land, under hak pakai or hak milik for example, the company must 
then re-register the land as HGU or HGB with the land agency.
Lands for new plantations are fi rst transferred from communities or individual owners to 
the land agency, in the interest of the company, taking into account the location permit. 
The land title holders or the community’s proxy are required to sign a witnessed statement 
transferring or relinquishing their rights in land in the presence of the local head of land 
affairs by fi lling in a specifi c form. 
In arranging the land transfer, the head of the local National Land Agency (BPN) should 
hold a coordination meeting to explain to the district or provincial head that there is an 
obligation to consult with rights holders. The agency should also distribute information 
about the company’s investment plan, explain the scope of the impact and the land 
acquisition plan as well as measures for confl ict resolution related to land acquisition. He 
should also provide an opportunity to the rights holders to obtain explanations on the 
investment plan and seek solutions if any problems occur. The land agency should also 
collect relevant social and environmental data from the community and get the community 
to propose the amount of compensation.
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Upon the receipt of compensation, a formal written agreement on the transfer or the release 
of land title should be prepared by the land title holder. These two documents together 
transfer the community or individual properties to the State, or relinquish existing HGU, 
HGB or hak pakai (use right) to the State. By so doing, the original owners relinquish all 
rights in the released land. Thus unencumbered, the Land Agency may in turn transfer the 
land to the company as a HGU or HGB. The decree for a Land Permit should be signed 
by the District Head (bupati) or municipal mayor.66  
The result of the whole process, therefore, should be that the company acquires long term 
leaseholds on State lands for its estates (HGU) and mills (HGB), while any lands to be 
allocated to smallholders as associated plasma are likewise unencumbered and can be titled 
to them as individual property rights (SHM).
 
3.6  Policies Regulating Forest Conversion 
The formal process classifying national lands as ‘forest areas’ (Kawasan Hutan) and zoning 
these areas as various categories of forest was initiated in 1982, at a time when authority 
over forests was still entrusted to a small Directorate of Forests under the Ministry of 
Agriculture. The so-called TGHK process has, however, not been straightforward as the 
fi nal process of forest delineation and forest gazettement has been extremely slow, leaving 
the legal status of almost 90% of Indonesian forests unclear (see 2.2 above). 
Moreover, the Ministry of Forests (MoF) has had a hard time defending the Forest Areas 
under its jurisdiction from reallocation to other interests. As noted in Section 3.1, the 
passing of Inpres 1/1986 revealed how MoF was forced by other Departments to release 
land for other large-scale activities besides logging. Yet, MoF has always positioned 
itself as the key decision-maker over whether a piece of land was appropriate or not for 
establishing Estate Crops.67  
The TGHK process classifi ed more than two thirds of the land base of Indonesia as lying 
in the forest zone, in turn zoned into protection, production, conservation and conversion 
forests. The overall data from the 1982 process classed 141,774,427 hectares of Indonesia 
as forests, divided up as follows (see Table 3.1 and Figure 3.4). 
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Table 3.1: Indonesian Forest Area based on TGHK
No Forest Function Area (Ha)
    1. Nature Reserve and Tourism Forest 19,152,885
    2. Protection Forest 29,649,231
    3. Limited Production Forest 29,570,656
    4. Permanent  Production Forest 33,401,655
    5. Convertible Production Forest 30,000,000
 T O T A L 141,774,427
 
 33,401,655, 23%
 30,000,000, 21%
 19,152,885, 14%
 29,649,231, 21%
 29,570,656, 21% Limited Production Forest
Protection Forest
Nature Reserve and Tourism Forest
Conversion Forest
Permanent Production Forest
Figure 3.4 : Forest designation by total area and percentage
In the early stages of the development and expansion of oil palm in Indonesia, PIR-
Trans and the World Bank funded, PIR-SUS schemes were using communities’ lands 
outside areas then classed as part of the, as yet ill-defi ned, ‘forest zone’. Following the 
1982 zoning, the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) urged local governments to locate non 
forestry activities outside the newly declared forest zones. The same instruction urged 
that, if this was not possible, then estate crops should be allowed only in conversion 
forests, giving priority to fallow lands, areas covered by alang alang (Imperata grassland), 
scrub and secondary forests.68   
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This policy was reaffi rmed in 1993, through a further MoF decree, which limited applicants 
for forest conversion to only access the conversion forests.69 At this time MoF realized 
that some applicants were just seeking these conversion permits in order to acquire timber 
cutting permits (IPK) while never having any serious intention of engaging in the palm oil 
business. The decree therefore prohibited companies from transferring the cleared land 
until the conversion process was completed.
The permitting procedure for forest conversion faces a number of serious challenges. 
One of the most important from the point of view of this study is that the majority of the 
areas zoned by TGHK as Forest Areas have not yet been offi cially gazetted as State Forest 
Areas. This is because the fi ve-step process, for surveying, delineating and notifying forest 
boundaries to ensure that they do not overlap areas encumbered with rights, has not been 
run through by offi cials.70 Indeed Government fi gures released in 2004, show that so 
far only some 14 million hectares (12%) of ‘forest areas’ have yet been gazetted as State 
Forest Areas (Kawasan Hutan Negara).71   
In practice, through administrative oversight, forest areas are being treated as State 
lands and released for conversion before the zones have been gazetted. This is legally 
problematic, as the areas may well be encumbered with rights and therefore the state 
should not be allocating them to third parties. Indeed, already some 20 million hectares of 
forest areas have been converted to non forest zones, almost all in the name of conversion 
to oil palm plantations, though as we have seen only some 6 million hectares have actually 
been planted. This process is still happening.
 
There have been tensions between the Ministry of Forestry and the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Estate Crops ever since they were allocated their different jurisdictions. In 1998, with 
the beginning of the reform era, the Directorate of Estate Crops was moved from the 
Ministry of Agriculture to the Ministry of Forestry.72  However, this arrangement, designed 
to streamline inter-agency coordination, lasted only two years before the Directorate of 
Estate Crops was moved back to the Ministry of Agriculture in 2000.73  Throughout this 
tussle, however, the Ministry of Forests retained control over the issuance of permits for 
forest conversion.  
The Ministry of Forests has been under continual pressure from the private sector and, 
since decentralization, from local governments, to release forests for conversion. The 
main tool that local governments have used to facilitate this process is to revise their 
Spatial Plans, which as we have noted (see 1.4 above) have allocated some 20 million 
hectares for oil palms.
 
The ambiguous attitude of the Ministry of Forests in the face of this pressure is made 
clear by the fact that when it announced its moratorium on forest conversion in 2005, 
this was legislated by means of a government circular (Surat Edaran), the weakest legal 
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option available. The overarching law which regulates forest conversion thus remains 
unamended. For this reason, forest conversion has continued despite the instruction in 
the circular.74   
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Chapter 4 
Case Studies
As part of this investigation, fi eld visits were conducted to three provinces in order to 
understand how land acquisition was being carried out in practice and to assess the impacts 
of this process from community, company and government points of view. The fi rst study 
examines the situation of the coastal ‘Pesisir’ people of western Lampung in southern 
Sumatra where the company PT KCMU is currently seeking to expand its operations. The 
next four studies look at the operations of four companies (PT MAS, PTPN XIII, PT 
CNIS and PT SIA) which have acquired lands in the territories of various Dayak peoples 
in Sanggau district, the area of West Kalimantan (Indonesian Borneo) which has had the 
longest experience of palm oil development. The fi nal case study examines a more recent 
operation (PT PHP) on Minangkabau lands in West Pasaman district in West Sumatra. 
The six studies vary in terms of detail and analysis. This is mainly due to the very different 
amounts of information that the team was able to unearth about the different cases. In 
some cases, companies and government offi cials were forthcoming with information and 
documentation about these operations, in other cases they were not. Some offi cials were 
open to being interviewed, others declined. This has obviously affected the depth of our 
investigations. Another reason for the difference in the  depth of these studies is the 
variable extent to which members of our research team had carried out prior investigation 
in the areas examined. In some areas, team members already had a detailed knowledge of 
the local situation. In others, the company operations were entirely new to us. 
What all the case studies do have in common is that they are of operations that have been 
implanted on customary lands. Yet the studies show that the communities have been dealt 
with in very different ways in the different provinces. The legality of the procedures used by 
both the government and the companies to acquire lands is also extremely contentious.
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4.1  PT KCMU
4.1.1  The Pesisir People and Palm Oil Plantations:
 
The Pesisir people inhabit the extreme western part of Lampung province, the majority 
living between Pagar Bukit in the north down to Bengkunat in the south, along the 
narrow coastal strip between the Bukit Barisan Mountains and the Indian Ocean. This 
region, long recognised as being subject to customary rights, consists of sixteen customary 
jurisdictions, known as marga. Each marga is under the authority of a customary leader 
known as a Sai Batin, an inherited position. More recently, the coastal adat region has been 
divided up into fi ve administrative sub-districts (kecamatan).1  
These adat communities have a very diverse system of agriculture. They clear dry ground 
forests for subsistence crops, coffee and other fruit trees and in order to cultivate damar 
trees (Shorea javanica). They also maintain large irrigated paddy fi elds on low ground 
around their villages. Damar is cultivated for the valuable resin it yields, a practise that has 
been developed by the communities over the past 200 years when demands for the resin 
surpassed what could be obtained from natural forests. The resin has, in fact, been a major 
export commodity since the 17th century.2  
In the 1930s, the Pesisir agreed to lease part of their lands in the Bukit Barisan Mountains 
to the Dutch Government, to be assigned as a game reserve, to be named the Queen 
Wilhelmina Sanctuary. This agreement was reached after a long negotiation process and 
included recognition by the Dutch Government that the communities should maintain 
rights to tap damar resin and collect bird nests in certain parts of the reserve. The reserve’s 
boundary was marked by poles, and is locally still known as the ‘BW boundary’ (Boswessen 
or forest area). 
Intensive migration into two customary jurisdictions, marga Tenumbang and marga Ngambur, 
began in 1980s and started when three Balinese families were invited in by  one adat 
community to hunt the wild pigs that often destroyed community paddy fi elds and 
gardens. They were followed by Javanese, Batak, Sundanese, Semendo and Bugis settlers. 
Migrants, who now make up 60% of the overall population in these two marga, acquired 
the land by purchasing it from customary owners and these transactions were legalized 
by the issuance of Land Information Letters (SKT) by the Village Headmen (kepala desa 
– an offi cial position) but without the involvement of the customary leader, the Sai Batin. 
Unlike in marga Tenumbang and marga Ngambur, the Pesisir of marga Bengkunat still strongly 
follow adat law. There the Sai Batin still plays an important role in any land disputes. In 
general, land use and ownership status under adat law are based more on trust than formal 
agreements.
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In the 1990s, the coastal adat communities were shocked by the sudden extension of the 
Forest Area over about 40.000 ha. of their customary lands The Indonesian government 
designated the annexed areas as production and protection forests and granted parts of the 
area as a logging concession (HPH) to the Bina Lestari company. The permit allowed Bina 
Lestari to log natural forest, yet it prohibited it from logging damar gardens, locally known 
as repong damar. Later, the Indonesian government assigned PT Inhutani V to perform a 
forest rehabilitation program within the Bina Lestari concession, leading Inhutani V to 
distribute damar seeds to the customary  communities to restock the former concession 
area.
Another major shift of forest management within the land of the coastal adat communities 
took place around 1994/1995. The Indonesian government issued initiation permits 
(ijin princip) to two big oil palm companies outside the enlarged forest area. Panji Padma 
Lestari Limited Company (PT PPL) was granted a concession on the adat land of marga 
Malaya, while Karya Canggih Mandir Utama Limited Company (PT KCMU) was granted 
a concession overlapping the adat lands of marga Tenumbang, marga Ngambur and marga 
Bengkunat. Indeed, almost the entire proposed concession areas were already being 
intensively managed by the Pesisir communities as repong damar, as coconut small-holdings 
and as paddy fi elds.3  
In response to expressions of concern from local communities and NGOs, the Minister 
of Forestry developed a compromise, whereby almost the whole of the area of repong 
damar within the area designated as State Forest (but in fact managed by communities) 
was designated by Ministerial Decree as an Area for Special Purpose (Kawasan Dengan 
Tujuan Istimewa / KDTI). The decree suspended logging in the area and recognised the 
communities’ rights to continue their repong damar for an unlimited period. The decree was 
considered by many to be a breakthrough in forest policy-making, in that it granted public 
access to forests and recognised the benefi ts of community-based sustainable natural 
resources management.4 
Meanwhile, the persistent objections of the adat communities to the permits issued to 
the oil palm plantations also led to a response by local government, which revoked the 
permit of PT PPL. However, despite many problems in the PT KCMU area, the second 
company’s permit was not revoked, leading community representatives to the view that 
the local government was deaf to their repeated objections. 
4.1.2  Community Perspectives
In fact it was as long ago as 1984, that PT KCMU started its approach to the village 
of Pekon Marang located on the boundary between marga Ngambur and marga Tenumbang. 
Together with the camat (head of sub-district), the representatives of company visited the 
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adat community. They explained their plan to make the area into an oil palm plantation. 
According to the company, each participant in the plantation would obtain money as 
credit for seeds, tools and fertilizers. The representatives of company sought to persuade 
the community to participate in the plantation by promising signifi cant benefi ts.
This explanation raised the hopes of the Pesisir that they could get better incomes 
from their limited land. As a result, most of the members of the community registered 
themselves with the scheme and transferred on average 1 hectare per family - about one 
third of their land – to the company. The data also show that the indigenous people in the 
community registered and transferred a higher proportion of their land to the company 
than the newcomers, although the company valued the newcomers’ lands more than the 
indigenous  people’s land. 
In 1985, the bupati (district head) issued a decree regarding the land allocation for PT 
KCMU’s nucleus estate smallholder plantation, requiring that fully 40% of acquired lands 
should be allocated to the company for its nucleus estates (inti) while only 60% should 
be allocated to the community members registering on the scheme, as smallholdings 
(plasma). The decree also elaborated in some detail on the installments for the payment 
of credit to the farmers. The company was to loan IDR 7.4 million per hectare of land 
to the community. In the 7th year of the plantation cycle, project participants should 
start to pay off the loan in installments in the form of 30% of the takings from harvested 
produce. Payments should then be made every three months to the company-established 
smalholder cooperative. Moreover the company would only hand over titles to the plasma 
land to those project participants who had paid off all their loan. In effect therefore, the 
community members were losing 40% of their land to the company and only recovering 
their ownership rights to the remaining 60% if they could pay off their debts. According 
to interviewees, in practice the harvests have never been good, debts remain unpaid and 
in any case the company has been more interested in buying full rights to the land for use 
as inti than in maintaining plasma. 
When the communities understood the implications of the bupati’s decree, they expressed 
their resentment by holding a demonstration. Nine community leaders were arrested, 
sentenced to 3 months and 20 days and jailed. By this time, the Indonesian Legal Aid 
Foundation (YLBHI), a public interest NGO that supports the poor in litigation, was 
involved on behalf of the communities. YLBHI demanded the cancellation of the 40::60 
scheme stipulated in the Decree. This advocacy succeeded and in 2000 the company 
decided not to implement the system. But, instead of developing the whole of the 
acquired area as a smallholder estate (plasma), it changed its strategy to directly buying up 
community lands.
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In the New Order era, communities were not able to negotiate directly with companies 
since the government usually represented the companies in negotiations with communities. 
The government employed military offi cers to force the communities to accept company 
operations. After the fall of Suharto, however, the companies actively conducted direct 
negotiation with adat communities. But many indigenous peoples still question the 
relationship between the companies and the State. They feel that the State does not 
provide any support to communities to defend their rights. 
Testimony of Amrullah 
from Pekon Marang
The rapid migration from Sumatra and other regions into Pekon 
Marang has created huge pressure on the adat community. 
The uncertainties of land ownership and the high need for cash 
have forced the adat community to sell their communally owned 
lands to the newcomers. Today community members prefer to 
sell off their oil palm smallholdings instead of their rice paddies. 
There is almost no remaining communally owned land in this 
area. The smallholdings were sold to the company under SKT 
procedures. Based on the agreement between the company 
and the people, the National Land Agency (BPN) would be 
invited to survey the sold land. Subsequently, the land was converted from SKT into a land 
title. Nowadays, most lands have been surveyed. 
Most adat communities sold their oil palm lands due to their fear of being trapped in debt and 
due to lack of information about the value of their harvests. In Marang, POSKO REFORMASI 
(United Ad Hoc Task Force of Student and People for Land Reform) conducted a survey. We 
found that 700 hectares of land have been sold to the company. There are only 200 hectares 
of plasma left. Posko Reformasi plays an important role in advocating for a fairer process 
of land acquisition for oil palm plantation development, to ensure that communities gain 
suffi cient benefi t. In the initial phase, Posko Reformasi had many members. However, there 
are now only 100 families left who still keep up their membership with Posko Reformasi. 
We have demanded that the company be more accountable and asked the government 
to ensure an open dialogue with the Pesisir adat communities. Posko Reformasi has also 
demanded that there are clear agreements between communities and the company before 
they start a partnership. In response, the company set up KPPS (Oil Palm Plantation 
Farmer Cooperative), a farmers’ organization meant to advocate their interest vis a vis the 
government and the company. 
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Testimony of Herdi, 
PMPRD offi cer
PMPRD (Repong Damar Farmers Union) is an organization of 
farmers from a wide area, from the sub-district of North Pesisir 
down to the sub-district of Bengkunat. From the beginning, 
PMPRD considered oil palm plantations to be a threat to the 
survival of repong damar. As the farmers’ organization that was 
set up by repong damar farmers to counter market intrusion, 
we view repong damar not only as an economic tool to improve 
the economic condition of community. For PMPRD, repong 
damar is also a symbol of one’s social status and identity. The 
Pesisir adat communities respect someone, if that person can bequeath repong damar to his 
oldest son. By contrast, the plantation company has broken its promises to communities to 
give them better life and has converted their repong damar into oil palm plantations. 
We may take as an example the interaction between the Pesisir adat communities and the 
company in the area of marga Tanumbang. The company forced the Pesisir adat community 
in that area to transfer their land to the company and promised to build a road to help 
community carry out gravel and ballast mining. The company used many tricky ways to 
acquire the community lands for the oil palm plantation development purpose. They showed 
a false GIS map that misinterpreted young repong damar areas as community agricultural 
lands. They also used local agents to seduce community members into signing agreements 
to transfer their lands for road building. In the end those lands were actually used for oil palm 
plantation purposes. Therefore, mechanisms for ensuring free prior and informed consent 
are strongly needed against which to evaluate the performance of the company, particularly 
to determine whether the company upholds its obligations or not. 
In 1997 [in one area], supported by military forces, the company cleared away repong 
damar and pepper gardens in the middle of the night. The community reported this case 
to the district government but received no response. There were strong indications that the 
district government supported the company more than the people. Nowadays, this kind of 
oppression cannot be exercised anymore. Nevertheless, the company still has many ways 
to manipulate the community [by providing false information]. It is diffi cult for the government 
to prove the existence of false documents. If the company frankly informed communities 
concerning production costs, risks and benefi ts, farmers would be unlikely to develop their 
own oil palm plantings.  The value of oil palm plantings is about IDR 1 million per hectare 
of land, which is far below the value of repong damar. In addition, repong damar yields a 
greater variety of products than oil palm plantations.
From my point of view, PT KCMU’s performance shows that it does not respect adat rights 
and it clears repong damar without the consent of the communities. However, not every 
Sai Batin feels able to bravely defend the rights of their adat community. The company 
argues that it has paid compensation to BPN (the local agrarian offi ce). However, BPN has 
rejected this claim. Team Eleven5 is handling this problem at this moment. They reported this 
case to district parliament (DPRD) of West Lampung District. The company has promised to 
solve the problem, yet it seems the communities cannot stand it any longer. Some plantation 
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project participants, who have not sold their land, have cut down their oil palm trees and 
replaced them with orange trees that have better market values. Afterwards, the company 
reported them to the police, who later took them to prison. This shows how hard it is for 
the communities to get justice. The government does not provide any assistance to the 
communities. From the government’s point of view, PT KCMU has not violated any rules or 
regulations. We always wonder, what has the company done to the government so that the 
government shows such loyalty to the company? 
Testimony of Pun Syahril Indra Bangsawan, 
Sai Batin of marga Bengkunat
The situation was completely different in 1985. At that time, 
there were many pressures from the State. If we refused 
to transfer the land to anyone who had been chosen 
by government, the State would grab it! The State could 
do anything that it wanted. I still remember there was a 
military Bupati who originally came from Lampung, Colonel 
Punawirawan Umpusinga, a close friend of General (Retd.) 
Hendro Priyono. He invited his military friends with their 
full set of army weapons and large amounts of food to 
Bengkunat. I think he wanted to show off his power to the 
adat communities. I was so sad to see a Bupati, who was also of Lampung origin, having 
to threaten us with such oppression. There was a similar incident in the development of 
shrimp ponds on the east coast area of Bengkunat. They just grabbed the land from the 
communities. 
 
I still remember the statement of the then Camat when PT KCMU started its operation in this 
area. For me, his statement has sown deep feelings of hatred, as a farmer proud to make 
his living from the land. He said, “Every indigenous person should transfer their land to the 
oil palm plantation company and move to Kota Agung or Krui to become satay hawkers”.6  
Subsequently, people resisted by holding demonstrations and this led to a special committee 
being set up in Tanjung Parang.7  It seems that these demonstrations to the district legislators 
of West Lampung in Liwa were successful. The mass media and the district government 
paid a lot of attention to this case. Although PT KCMU has obtained a permit to operate in 
marga Bengkunat territory, they have failed to acquire much land from the adat community. 
Therefore, the company has concentrated its activities in Ngambur, Ngaras & Tenumbang.
However, the company has continued to approach adat communities in the south part of marga 
Bengkunat. The company has strategically employed local agents and local government 
offi cials to convince adat communities to transfer their lands to the company. These local 
agents informed communities that they lands would be transferred to the company so that they 
could join as plantation project participants. The adat community was eventually convinced 
that the company could perform well and would yield benefi ts to the people. By deploying this 
method, the company successfully acquired land from communities. Local communities sold 
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their lands at a very low price, at about IDR 500,000 per hectare. Sometimes, local agents 
acted as brokers, buying up individual parcels of lands and selling them on to the company 
for the nucleus estate.
Nonetheless, the use of force and intimidations by company has not led the company to 
acquire all the land it needs for a nucleus estate. In 1998, the company involved the adat 
community as plasma with unclear arrangements. Later, the benefi t-sharing mechanisms 
were set under 40::60 model. Instead of negotiating with adat leader (marga Sai Batin), 
the company negotiates all land acquisition processes with the village head. BPN and the 
village head, supported by the Camat, conducted land surveys and measurements. As the 
Sai Batin, I fi rmly rejected the presence of oil palm plantations in my adat community area. 
But unfortunately I could get hardly any support from other Sai Batin. This has weakened our 
position vis a vis the company. 
Testimony of Mahyudin 
in Talang Padang, Bengkunat
My work is cultivating pepper, coffee and clearing fi elds for 
dry land agriculture (ladang). In my opinion, the information 
concerning PT KCMU and its offers have always been unclear. 
They have never provided any clear information regarding the 
area that the company planned to acquire and the boundaries 
of the nucleus and plasma plantations. The company interacted 
with adat community on an individual base. In our Pekon, 
approximately 60 percent of the plasma has been bought by the 
company informally (without following the legal procedures).
There is a forest conversion area (HPK) in Bengkunat with 
uncertain boundaries. Most of the area had, in fact, already been converted to mixed farms, 
including repong damar managed by community members. Half of these community members 
even paid the annual land tax in the form of SPPT (the Letter of Notice for Annual Land Tax 
Payment) to the village  government. The main problem is, not all of adat communities agree 
with the idea of designating the area as HPK... We have not agreed to forest conversion 
unless there is a consensus in the local community. We are really suspicious that PT KCMU 
has an interest in this forest conversion going through (so it can acquire the land). We often 
see PT KCMU offi cials and their offi cial cars in the proposed conversion area. I think PT 
KCMU is planning to convert the area into an oil palm plantation.8 It is important to remember 
that all lands in this place belong to the adat community. So, if the company wants to invest 
in these lands, they should negotiate directly with the owners.
In my opinion, I don’t think the area should be handed to a company with a bad reputation, 
like PT KCMU, whether it is community land or conversion forest. The company does not 
have its own mill. They also have not resolved land disputes with communities. I will not 
lease my land to a company with such a reputation! 
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Testimony of Mr. Ajan, 
from Ngaras, offi cer of 4th Division of KPPS
There are 3300 families of local transmigrants in this area who have still not obtained the 
land that they should receive (1 hectare per family). Therefore, it is ironic to see the ‘double 
burdens’ faced by these people. On the one hand, they still struggle with the land distribution 
problem; while on the other hand they face the aggression of the oil palm plantation company 
which now wants to acquire what land they have obtained. 
Still the lure of the oil palm plantation company has been so tempting. Many people have 
been attracted by the company’s offers. In addition, adat community members who have 
rejected the company have been evicted from their land by the company and by army offi cers 
who have responsibility for controlling the community (Babinsa). There was no room for 
negotiation or demanding compensation. The adat community members who were evicted 
comprise 132 families and among them, there are 72 families who join KPPS. Their demands 
have included:
Compensation for destroyed crops in their fi elds, an issue that has never been 
resolved.
Banning the implementation of the 40/60 scheme in Ngaras. This demand was 
fulfi lled with the eventual passing of the decree of Bupati but now needs to be 
implemented.
Government should fulfi l its obligation to provide promised lands to local 
transmigrants. 
Finally, the government granted a small cow (worth IDR 300,000) to 3,000 families as  
compensation for these lands. In other words, one ha. of land was valued at IDR 300,000. 
Local transmigrants view this as very low compensation. Moreover, over more than 9 years 
of operation, there has been no written agreement between the oil palm plantation company 
and the landowners. The company harvests plantation products without informing the 
landowners. The company has also determined a very low price for the oil palm plantation 
products. Payments are made every 6-8 months. The average payment has been IDR 83,000/
ha/month,9  which is very low price for productive land.
The requirements of the plasma members are the following: 
Submission of a written statement to each plasma member acknowledging the lease 
of his or her land. 
Where the transferred land is marga land, they should get a recognition letter from 
the Pratin (village head). 
In fact, not everybody owns title to their land. To obtain a recognition letter from a Pratin, a 
landowner should provide testimony from their neighbours recognizing their claim and show 
boundary markers implanted in the respective land. These practices prompt manipulations. 
Many lands were leased to the company by non-landowners who secured a letter of 
recognition letter from the Pratin. This has led to increasing land disputes and fragmentation 
■
■
■
■
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within communities. Sometimes, a Pratin also abuses his power and manipulates deals to his 
own benefi t. Many disputes about communal lands remain unresolved.
The company should resolve land disputes as soon as possible by giving compensation 
to land owners through clear land surveys. They should also provide a written agreement 
to secure the position of adat communities. If they cannot fulfi l our demands, we want the 
company to return our lands. If not, this can be classifi ed as an illegal land acquisition. We 
never leased our land. We want to develop our own oil palm plantation so that it will bring 
more benefi t to us.  
 
4.1.3  Permitting and Negotiation: 
In researching the chronology of permitting and the various strategies deployed by PT 
KCMU, the team conducted a careful scrutiny of all the offi cial documents relating to the 
process. The analysis fi nds that the permitting and land acquisition process did not uphold 
the principle of free, prior and informed consent and did not adhere to due process of 
law. 
Following up on a survey conducted by PT KCMU on 20 October 1993 of prospective 
plantings in the North Pesisir sub-district, the bupati of Lampung Barat issued a letter 
allocating an area covering 25,000 ha. to the company. This area was to be comprised of 
10,000 ha. in Bengkunat subdistrict (between Way Ngaras and Way Curung Bengkunat), 
7,500 ha. in the local transmigration area and 5,000 ha. in areas designated as State 
forests.10    
On 22 November 1993, several community leaders and village heads (now referred to 
as Pratin) wrote a joint statement agreeing to lease marga lands for the planting of oil 
palm by PT KCMU, according to the ‘company supported partnership’ model. These 
village heads included those of Pardasuka, Pagar Bukit, Tanjung Kemala, Suka Marga 
Penyandingan, Kota Jawa and Raja Basa. The letter was certifi ed by the bupati of West 
Lampung (HS. Umpu Singa), and the camats of the South Pesisir sub-district and Bengkunat 
sub-district. Eighteen community leaders representing these communities leased 25,000 
ha. of their lands (without land maps) to the district government. The statement included 
the explicit provision, in paragraph 3,11 that, if the land was not managed by a village 
cooperative unit (KUD) within one year, then the land would automatically become marga 
land again. This became the basis for the permits issued by the government. Did those 18 
community leaders obtain mandates from community members to lease their lands? Did 
these community leaders have the right to grant these lands to other parties and sign the 
agreement of land acquisition? Were they justifi ed in writing that all of the community 
members had agreed to sign the letter (as asserted in point 1c)? 
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On 10 December 1993, the land offi ce (BPN) in West Lampung District issued a location 
permit to PT KCMU for establishing 10,000 ha. as a nucleus estate (inti) and 15.000 ha. 
as smallholdings (plasma). The location permit was granted with several conditions: fi rst, 
that land acquisition should be fi nished within 12 months, but could be extended on 
formal request for another 12 months (point 7); secondly, that land acquisition should 
be negotiated directly with the landowners through land sales or by leasing land, based 
on the existing regulation (point 1); thirdly, that land acquisition should include paying 
compensation to farmers for yielding up lands, crops, and so forth (point 2); fourthly, 
that ‘enclaves’ should be created around people who refused to relinquish their lands and 
houses (point 3). A map was also attached with a detailed description of the nucleus area 
(in the south of the area) and of the plasma area (in the north).12  
The signing of the written agreement was followed by the issuance of letters by the  District-
level Head of BPN,13 that provides  guidance on how villagers should be informed about 
the mechanisms for securing compensation for acquired land. According to these letters, 
compensation is only payable for community lands to which ownership title (SHM) can 
be shown. Untitled lands held as marga or negeri, or under communal ownership (ulayat), 
should be treated as State land. In other words, BPN interpreted the law as meaning that 
those community members who hold the land according to customary tenures and not as 
titled lands were not entitled to get any compensation. For these untitled lands, the investor 
should only pay a certain amount of money, as a transfer fee, to the District Government, 
which money should be used for the public interest. Finally, the letters stipulated that the 
amount of compensation payable should be negotiated directly between the landowners 
and the investor.14 
In response to this letter, the bupati of West Lampung announced that, within two 
months, BPN should conduct a land survey to measure out the lands for PT KCMU. 
The district head asked landowners and workers to show their land boundaries (point 
3), sign the minutes of meetings and the forms summarising these land surveys (point 
4) and show proof of their land ownership rights to government offi cers (point 5). He 
also suggested that camats should initiate land dispute resolution processes through open 
dialogue (musyawarah).15 
 
However, after these surveys were completed, the investor found that he would not get as 
much land as expected. Only about 8,500 ha. were thus mentioned in the initiation permit 
(ijin prinsip) issued by the Director General of Plantation of Agricultural Department 
to PT KCMU Company.16 In July 1994, the bupati of West Lampung wrote a letter to 
the Governor of Lampung Province suggesting additional sites for PT KCMU, while 
expressing his agreement with the plan to develop an oil palm plantation.17 The bupati asked 
the governor to take into account the diffi cult topography of the area and the presence of 
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communities’ repong damar in the buffer zone.18 The district head recommended the use 
of former production forests covering 6,000 ha. in West Lampung district.19 The district 
government also allocated a further 2,100 ha. of HPK (conversion forest) as a further area 
for  PT KCMU.20   
Figure 4.1 Overlapping HPK allocation for PT KCMU (in blue colour)
By this time the project was generating increasing resentment among the local communities. 
Representations were made by the people of Pekon Bengkunat to the Provincial Legislator 
about the plans of PT KCMU to open an oil palm plantation on their lands.21 In response, 
the provincial legislature appointed an investigative commission which visited Pekon 
Bengkunat on 26 July1994. They held a dialogue with PT KCMU, with the adat community, 
as well as with key local government offi cials in Pekon Bengkunat.
The report to the provincial legislature of Lampung asserted that the hesitancy of the 
adat communities to get involved in the oil palm plantations stemmed mainly from the 
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fact that the compensation being provided by the oil palm plantation company was lower 
than the farmers could generate themselves from cocoa, coffee, and damar. To resolve the 
disputes, PT KCMU should compensate farmers for all crops and lands being absorbed 
into the nucleus estate, based on existing regulation’s (point 4). The district government 
was appointed to mediate the dispute resolution process. 
The report noted that people had the choice either to: 
Be involved in the plasma by yielding two hectares of land to the scheme, for which 
they would then be registered to get land titles. These farmers would then become 
members of PIR co-operatives. In the fourth year, they would be granted a loan to 
develop oil palm on their smallholdings 
Accept the 40::60 inti:: plasma scheme 
Receive alternative land outside the plantation area for land given up to the plantation 
Have their lands designated as enclave areas within the plantation.
The fi nal report stated that the provincial legislature’s fi eld visit had resulted in the 
agreement by local communities to accept the plantation. Local communities withdrew 
their lawsuit,22 but they asked the district government to resolve land disputes and to take 
care that other parties having preferential access to those handing out land transfer letters 
(SKT) in Bengkunat did not engage in land speculation.23    
Based on the letter of recommendation of the bupati of West Lampung District, the 
Governor of Lampung then sent a letter to PT KCMU authorising it to extend its  land-
leasing process into the forest area. The provincial forestry agency recommended issuance 
of a lease to the former production forest (6,000 ha.) and conversion forest (2100 ha.).24 
However, the provincial forestry agency required PT KCMU either to provide employment 
for 500-1000 families of ‘forest squatters’ or involve them as plasma farmers. Meantime the 
oil palm plantation had expanded its extent to 8,100 ha. by taking over an adjacent area 
leased to the EAK Company for a 3,500 ha. hemp plantation.25 
Nevertheless, before opening the land, the company was required to coordinate with 
related government agencies and discuss the plan with local communities.26 Subsequently, 
the head of Suka Marga village sent an agreement letter to accept the plantation project 
by leasing 40% of their land for the nucleus estate and reserving 60% of the land for 
plasma.27 About 17 other villages then sent similar agreement letters, which were certifi ed 
by camat Abdul (Jalil, BA), as support for the government’s program to develop oil palm 
plantations managed by PT KCMU. They demanded that the plantation programme 
should be materialized.28   
■
■
■
■
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In effect, there were several changes in the land acquisition process, since the plantation 
was fi rst mooted. Land areas that were acquired for the plantation area included: communal 
land and private land, land included in conversion forest (HPK) and a former production 
forest (logging) area (HPT). Despite all the changes, the government persisted with its 
target of establishing an oil palm plantation of 25,000 ha. made up of 15,000 ha. of  plasma 
and 10,000 hectares of nucleus estate. 
4.1.4  Land Consolidation: 
Although permitted to go ahead and expand its estate, the company still faced the 
challenge of negotiating land sales with the communities, thereby consolidating both its 
inti and plasma areas. However, these land consolidation processes could not precede easily 
because of the uncertainty of land compensation. The consolidation process impacted 
on land rearrangements including the extent, boundaries and positions of lands that 
were mentioned in the various forms of interim land ‘title’ that had been obtained by the 
community (SHM, girik, SKT, SPPT etc.).29  
In the meantime, a meeting with three community representatives from Pagar Bukit was 
held in order to achieve ‘justice’ (point II.2). It was agreed that compensation should be 
paid to community members at a rate of IDR 250,000/ha. for their land. For crops, the 
compensation would be based on the regulations and on the fi ndings of fi eld surveys to be 
carried out by the government WASDAL team, (though this would not involve the people 
in the decision making process).30   
To smooth the land leasing process, the bupati issued a letter declaring that in the fi rst 
phase establishing 4,000 ha. oil palm plantation, land allocation to candidates in the plasma 
scheme should prioritise those who had leased over 4 ha. of land.31 In addition, the district 
head also designated 17 villages in South Pesisir sub district, covering 25,000 hectares, as 
potential participants in the 40::60 scheme for plantation development. However, this 
scheme could not be applied in the former HPT area.32 Village government offi cials then 
issued letters endorsing this process.33 These letters declared the people’s agreement with 
the 40::60 scheme and demanded that the company implement the project with ancillary 
facilities such as main roads, estate feeder roads and plantings of oil palms without 
requiring any further compensation.34  
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Figure 4.2  Map of Kampung & Adat area vs. KCMU Company area
The statements of the village heads also noted that they were responsible for smoothing 
out land leasing processes and promised that the villagers would be given fi xed 
compensation rates certifi ed in these statements. PT KCMU also declared that it  would 
pay compensation of crops and would not expropriate unregistered damar plantations 
owned by local communities.35 Meanwhile, fi ve farmer organizations declared that they 
would not destroy or cut oil palm plantatings and would support the West Lampung district 
government program.36 Subsequently, a bupati decree (SK) on the need for payment of a 
land tax was issued. The decree required the plantation company to pay IDR 48 million 
for the 2,400 ha. that it was securing as a nucleus estate (Rp.20,000/ha.).37 
In the land consolidation process, the district BPN offi ce issued a location permit to 
PT KCMU which included the stipulation that farmer participation in the 40::60 scheme 
could not be made obligatory (point 10), and the company should take responsibility for 
any impacts that its activities might incur (point 3). However, the attached map did not 
show which area should be for plasma and which for the nucleus estate.38   
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Indeed, land use in the area covering 25,000 ha. proposed for the estates was already noted 
to be highly complex and included shrimp ponds, irrigated paddy fi elds, and transmigration 
settlements (3,683 hectares). However, there were also local settlements, the people’s own 
productive plantations of crops, such as damar, coffee, pepper etc., as well as areas of 
unfertile land (see table 4.1). 
Table 4.1.   Land Use in the Working Area of KCMU Company 39
Land Use Extent (ha.) Explanation
Transmigration and other 
government programs 
3,683 Paddy Field, Trans SP II-VI
Hamlets 1,887 Non Transmigration
Productive plantations 3,345 Damar, coffee, and pepper
Swamplands and dry rice fi elds 1,109
Unsuitable land 462 Steep
Bush and scrub lands with 
potential for oil palm plantation 
6,578 Under confl ict with local 
communities.
Other land with potential to be 
opened as oil palm plantation
2,000
Land opened by KCMU 5,936 Have been planted 5,088, 
ready to be planted 848. This 
process involves 843 workers
Total 25,000
From this table, we can conclude that BPN Lampung offi ce’s designation of plantation 
area included 5,806 ha. for the nucleus estate and 8,708 ha. for plasma (and if the potential 
land is added, the total area would increase to 14,514 ha.). However, the designation of 
nucleus and plasma lands became disaggregated,40  as shown in Figure 4.3.41 
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Figure 4.3 Map of Plasma & Nucleus Area of KCMU Company
An environmental impact assessment (ANDAL) study for the PT KCMU operation 
carried out in 1996, reveals that a high percentage of the people were concerned about the 
establishment of the oil palm plantation. Their main fear was that the oil palm plantation 
would destroy the people’s damar gardens. They were also concerned that the company 
would determine prices of oil palm fruits and undermine the communities’ businesses in 
coffee, pepper and damar. Also, some of the adat community who did not own land were 
afraid that they would lose opportunities to get wage labour on local farms because of 
the establishment of oil palm plantations. The impact study also described the popular 
unrest in the face of the land acquisition and land consolidation processes based on 
concerns that this could lead to land scarcity in the future. For these reasons, many adat 
communities wanted to fi rmly reject the establishment of the plantation. The report wisely 
recommended that the company should provide the communities with clear information 
on: the goals of the project; their plans to enclave the lands of any community members 
that chose not to be involved in the project; and how they would pay appropriate prices 
for harvested products from the plasma plantation.42 
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The smallholder programme went ahead. On 11 April 1995, the Lampung government 
sent a letter to support the partnership between PT KCMU and the plasma farmers’ 
cooperative (KUD), named Karya Mandiri, authorising loans at a rate of IDR 6,619,537 
per hectare but allowing the farmers to grow mixed crops in their plantations.43 On 8 May 
1995, an agreement was signed between PT KCMU, KUD Karya Mandiri and the main 
investor, the PT BDN Bank, to implement the development and management of oil palm 
plantation project in the South Pesisir sub-district of Bengkunat. The justifi cation for this 
partnership was the location permit issued by BPN in 1993 that was extended in 1995, the 
initiation permit issued by Director General of Plantation, the Decree of bupati of West 
Lampung District concerning socialization and boundary establishment in 1994, and the 
Decree of the bupati of West Lampung District concerning oil palm plantation issued in 
1993 that authorised the establishment of a plantations covering 10,000 hectares of plasma 
and 15,000 hectares of inti.44  
4.1.5  Changing Government Policies
After the fall of Suharto, many adat communities in West Lampung expressed their 
resentment of the company and revoked their letters of agreement supporting the 
establishment of PT KCMU plantations on their lands. Clearly, those letters had been 
signed under duress. In addition, both the nucleus and plasma areas were changed (See 
Figure 4.3). It seems that both the incoming district heads of West Lampung (the fi rst 
was I Wayan Dirpha, while the current bupati is Erwin Nizam, MSi ) inherited similar 
problems, but they viewed the problems differently, especially after 1998 with the fall of 
Suharto and the beginning of the reform era.   
The policy of the fi rst new bupati of West Lampung, Lieutenant Colonel (Retd.) I Wayan 
Dirpha, who replaced HS Umpusinga in 1998, was to promote a partnership between the 
company and the people and encourage the company to take oil palm produce from the 
people’s plantations. Accordingly, he attempted to facilitate a dialogue between the local 
community, who were demanding the return of their land, and the plantation company.
Some of the land into which PT KCMU was seeking to expand was actually classifi ed 
as forest land. This area got caught up in a complex administrative and political struggle 
over land that developed in Lampung province in the post-Suharto era. In response to the 
nation-wide moblisation of communities by then reclaiming land rights, the Governor of 
Lampung Province, H. Oemarsono, proposed a re-arrangement of the province’s forest 
area. He encouraged the Forestry Department to release to (technically) landless people a 
substantial area of production forest (HPK), totalling 145,125 ha. for the whole province, 
most of which had in fact already been converted and consisted of settlements, agricultural 
land, river banks and swamps. He based this proposal on the principles of ‘justice, equality, 
and sustainable environment’.45 The aim was to show that the government was responding 
to the demand of local communities to get land titles. Included in this proposal were some 
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6,260 ha. of land in Bengkunat. Likewise, in 1998, a forestry reform team demanded that 
the provincial government of Lampung implement a programme of community based 
forest management, which involved leasing forest area to farmers.46  
Subsequently, the Ministry of Forestry did send a letter to re-allocate these forest areas in 
Lampung province, including the proposed area in West Lampung. The Ministry agreed 
that these areas no longer fi t with forest criteria and so should be re-classifi ed as non-
forest lands.47 The 6,260 ha. in West Lampung District (in the sub district of Bengkunat) 
were considered by the local peoples to be part of marga Bengkunat, which they were already 
using, but this was also an area that PT KCMU was trying to develop.48 Indeed, as noted, 
the local communities had long ago rejected the classifi cation over this area as State forest 
in 1980, as this implied that these were State lands. Instead the community had demanded 
that the government designate these areas as private lands, as they were encumbered with 
customary rights. 
Table 4.2 shows land use by the villages in the HPK area, in 2000. As we can see from 
fi gure 4.3, the HPK area overlaps the area allocated to PT KCMU. Yet the data show that 
people already use and manage almost all this HPK area as fi elds, gardens and settlements. 
Meanwhile, the BPN offi ce in West Lampung had granted a permit to PT KCMU Company 
to 2,100 ha. within the HPK area and a further 1,236 ha. outside it, though the locations 
and boundaries of these areas continued to be a matter of dispute.
The community was suspicious about the allocation of this land to PT KCMU because 
based on the governor’s letter, the same area was being redistributed to them.49  In a 
meeting with the research team on 14 July 2005, the head of BAPPEDA in Lampung said 
these suspicions were unfounded and he confi rmed that these former HPK areas were to 
be allocated to the communities.
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Table 4.2 Land Use in the HPK area in Bengkunat sub-district.50 
N 
o
Sub district Pekon 
Hamlet 
Land 
holder 
(Number 
of people)
Amount of land parcels and extent of 
land based on land use
Settlement Farmland
Amount 
(parcels)
Extent 
(ha)
Amount 
(parcels)
Extent 
(ha)
1 Pesisir Selatan & 
Bengkunat
A. Sukamarga
1.  Srimulyo 110 78 24,610 32 102.3
2.  Sukoharjo 90 41 11,920 49 118.7
3.  Sumberagung 240 51 174,00 189 743.3
4.  Jambat 208 63 22,340 145 604.7
Sub Total 648 68 232,870 415 1569.0
B. Penyandingan
1.  Sumber Rejo 125 68 19,390 58 218.3
2.  Penyandingan No data No data No Data No data No data
Sub Total 125 68 19,390 58 218.3
C. Tanjung Kemala
1.  Tanjung Kemala 128 79 20,120 49 162.1
 2.  Tanjung Raja 529 Tad Tad 529 2622.6
Sub Total 657 79 20,120 578 2784.7
D. Kota Jawa
1. Sidomulyo 97 47 13,640 50 203.4
2. Sukanegeri 118 60 22,130 58 174.2
3. Talang Beringin Jaya 96 11 4,500 85 235.6
Sub Total 311 118 40,270 193 613.2
E. Pagar Bukit
1. Pagar Bukit 529 42 25,050 487 1075.0
Sub Total 529 42 25,050 487 1075.0
Total 2270 375 337.700 1731 6260.2
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4.1.6  Land Redistribution: Marga Recognition or Plantation Expansion?
Notwithstanding these reassurances, the tension between provincial policies to 
redistribute land to the people and allocate land for oil palm development continued. To 
promote the land redistribution programme, the governor issued a further decree and the 
district government of West Lampung issued a provincial regulation to regulate the land 
distribution process.51 Surveys conducted by the University of Lampung in 2002 revealed 
that most community members (99.4%) favoured the change of these areas’ status from 
forest zones into non-forest zones (APL). Yet, this research also highlighted that people 
were worried about the unclear boundaries between their lands and the remaining protected 
forest, as well as the overlap between redistributed areas and lands claimed to be owned by 
customary marga. Most people did not posses land titles, leaving them vulnerable to being 
appropriated by more powerful interests, thereby risking further land confl icts.52  
In some areas, the land redistribution programme did take account of marga rights. In 
Central Lampung district, for example, 16,870 ha. were redistributed and compensatory 
fees, referred to as adat fees, of IDR 500,000/ ha., were paid by the recipients of the land 
to the Way Rumbia marga.53  However, some land users later on rejected paying adat fees, 
based on their interpretation of District Regulation No. 6 of 2001. They also rejected the 
obligation to pay tax to the Central Lampung district government (IDR 100,000/hectare). 
The district government argued that the agreement between adat communities and land 
users had legal precedence over other regulations. Accordingly, they argued that land users 
should pay adat fees (IDR 500,000/hectare), a land tax to the district government (IDR 
100,000/hectare), adjudication fees (IDR 50,000/hectare) and the fees to ascertain the 
land status (IDR 100,000/hectare). Others disagreed (see endnote for further details).54   
Confl icts over the administration of land were increasing. On the one hand, people 
rebuffed elements of the programme to redistribute areas that had been classifi ed as forest 
land. At the same, the different State agencies held different data about the lands, with the 
provincial head of BPN and Forestry Agency have discrepant views about the extent and 
boundaries of the former HPK area. Villagers expressed considerable confusion about this 
situation. Once the records were properly examined it was found that there were no clear 
boundaries and there was a lack of minutes showing that previous forest boundaries had 
been agreed by local communities. This posed a major obstacle to the land redistribution 
scheme. What land could be redistributed to whom? Only in 2004, almost fi ve years after 
the proposal to release the forest area, were the forest boundaries fi nally agreed by both 
the Ministry of Forestry and BPN. 
Another problem was then found in Article 18 of Provincial Regulation No. 6/2002. This 
article allowed for State lands to be distributed to anybody who needed it, but did not allow 
the return of these lands to the original owners. No wonder the locals, mainly indigenous 
people, were unenthusiastic about registering their land with BPN, even though it had set 
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up sub-offi ces in each of the fi ve villages in the ex-HPK area in West Lampung.55  
Figure 4.4. Satellite Images Interpretation : Oil Palm Expansion 
All this time, PT KCMU continued expanding its plantation, without considering the 
disputes over the land’s status and possession (see fi gure 4.4). The company appeared 
to believe that whatever the eventual status of the land, it could acquire it, one way or 
another, either through voluntary land acquisition in the new land markets that should 
develop once the lands were titled, or using the old tricks of  force and manipulation.
4.2  PT MAS
4.2.1  Development Policies in Sanggau District
Sanggau district is one of eight districts in West Kalimantan province (the westernmost 
province of Indonesian Borneo). It has a strategic position having direct access to 
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international transportation linking it to Malaysia and the wider world by road and through 
the port in the regional capital, Pontianak.  Comprising 8.8% of the province, the district 
has an area of about 1.3 m ha. and is divided up for administrative purposes into 15 
sub-districts (kecamatan), 6 municipalities (kelurahan), 159 villages (desa) and 586 hamlets 
(kampong) with a total population 372,489 people. The population density is about 29 
people per square kilometre and average population growth over the last ten years is 1.23 
percent per annum. The majority population in Sanggau district is made up of various 
Dayak indigenous peoples who make up about 64% of the total, while Malays (23%) and 
other ethnic groups (13%) make up the rest. Offi cial statistics show that Roman Catholics 
make up 51%, Muslims 33%, Protestant 16%, Buddhists 1%, with very small numbers 
professing Hindu or other faiths.56   
The government of Sanggau district envisages that by 2010 it will become a centre of 
agribusiness and agro-industry, based on fast-growing trading activities and environmentally 
friendly mining, all with the aim of improving local incomes. This is considered to be 
realisable because the district is already an important trade centre and hosts the largest 
extent of oil palm plantations in West Kalimantan province.57 To ensure that investment 
is signifi cantly increased in the future, the local investment coordinating board has a vision 
of Sanggau district being ‘open to local, national and international investments through 
faster, cheaper and easier service systems’.58 
Table 4.3 : Forests in Land Use Plans for Sanggau District 59  
No. Descriptions Total (ha) %
1 Protected forests 160,912.00 12,51
2 Limited production forests 73,200.00 5,69
3 Conversion production forest 27,810.00 2,16
4 Production forest 393,230.00 30,51
5 Plantation/seasonal crops 464,368.00 36,12
6 Mining areas 36,400.00 2,83
7 Dry/wet farmlands 130,860.00 10,18
Total 1,286,780.00 100,00
The main emphasis of Sanggau district’s investment strategy is to expand and diversify 
plantations of oil palm and other commodities such as cocoa, pepper, traditional coconut 
and hybrid coconut. The government facilitates domestic and foreign investments by 
providing abundant land banks, withdrawing inactive companies’ location permits, and 
changing the use of forest areas through converting their status. 
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In Sanggau district in 2004, oil palm plantations produced over 1 million tonnes from 
about 120,000 ha. of productive oil palm plantations. 
 
4.2.2  Tinying Dayak Land Tenure and Governance
The original people who are living in and around PT. Mitra Austral Sejahtera (PT. MAS) 
oil palm plantation concession and development area are Dayak indigenous people. 
Centrally, those living in Seribot village are members of the Dayak Tinying tribe, comprising 
approximately 115 households with around 565 inhabitants. Besides the Dayak Tinying 
tribe, there are also others tribes of Dayak indigenous people like Mayao, Ribun and 
Pompakng, as well as Malay people and other newcomers. The majority of the newcomers 
are company workers.60 The Dayak Tinying indigenous people have been living in the area 
since about 300 years ago when their ancestors of Dayak Jangkang tribe fi rst came and 
established the settlement which was later named Seribot village. They trace their ancestry 
back to the Jangkang Engkarong area.61  
The Dayak Tinying’s customary system for governing land is broadly similar to that of 
other Dayak tribes in Borneo, a system that has been applied to their lands for many 
generations. Land ownership is not ordered through individual titling but is proven, fi rst 
through demonstrable planted crops or cultivated farmlands, which show that there 
are people already cultivating and using lands, and, second, through being recorded in 
the memories of village elders and respected members of the community. Regulations 
regarding land transfer and allocation are passed down orally from generation to 
generation. Boundaries are not physically blazed but derive from known natural signs 
such as prominent trees, clumps of bamboo, river courses and hills. According to adat, 
collective or communal lands comprise protected areas, reserved areas, sacred sites, land 
for burial locations, and other collective land uses. Within this territory, lands are allocated 
for farming to individuals and their families, who secure their rights through clearance and 
cultivation for their subsistence and income generation. 
4.2.3  Oil Palm Development in the District
Oil palm was fi rst introduced in West Kalimantan by a State-owned company, which 
established the fi rst oil palm plantation in Parindu sub-district of Sanggau district in 1979. 
The company further expanded its plantation areas further south in the Pontianak area in 
Landak sub-district in 1980s. At that time, the development of oil palm plantations was 
slow and limited to quite small parts of indigenous peoples’ lands in the two districts. The 
main economic activity at that time was logging, with almost the whole district  being 
allocated to primary forest logging. The result was widespread forest degradation with 
companies paying little attention to their responsibilities to manage forests for the long 
term and carry out reforestation. Palm oil only became the main emphasis for investment 
and business expansion in the 1990s.
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The government of Sanggau district argues that oil palm plantations now make a 
signifi cant contribution to district revenue, amounting to some 17% of annual ‘regional 
domestic income’ in 2002.62 Therefore, the government of Sanggau district provides policy 
incentives to create a climate conducive for oil palm plantation investments. This has 
been done through establishing an Integrated Economic Development Region (Kawasan 
Pengembangan Ekonomi Terpadu – KAPET), set up in 1998.63 Sanggau district is also one of 
several districts, others being Sambas, Bengkayang, Sintang, and Kapuas Hulu districts, 
implicated in President Susilo Bambang Yudoyono’s policy to develop the world’s largest 
oil palm project along Indonesia-Malaysia border areas in West Kalimantan and East 
Kalimantan.64 
4.2.4  Establishing the Operations of PT Mitra Austral Sejahtera
During the economic and fi nancial crisis of 1998, almost all business entities including oil 
palm plantation suffered from their heavy debt burdens and many came close to bankrupcy. 
Many of those fi nancially unable to survive were taken over by the government or taken 
over by more robust or fi nancially healthy businesses. Besides implementing such an exit 
strategy, the government of Indonesia also encouraged oil palm companies to build up 
business partnerships with both domestic and foreign investors. 
An immediate result of this policy was that, in 1998, fi ve Malaysian enterprises signed 
agreements for joint ventures with private Indonesian companies to build up plantations 
and processing facilities in West Kalimantan. The Pahang Estate Development Corp 
partnered with PT Bakrie & Brothers; Austral Enterprise with PT Ponti Makmur Sejahtera; 
Lam Soon Bhd also with PT Bakrie & Brothers; Golden Hope Overseas Plantation 
Sdn Bhd with companies of the Benua Indah Group; and Suka Chemical Bhd. with PT 
Kalimantan Oleo Industry.65 These joint enterprises implied Malaysian investors investing 
substantial capital in some major oil palm companies in Indonesia.66 PT Mitra Austral 
Sejahtera (PT MAS), the subject of this case study, was one of these fi ve, a joint venture 
between Indonesia and Malaysia which merges two companies Austral Enterprises Berhad, 
Malaysia, and PT Ponti Makmur Sejahtera (PT PMS), Indonesia.67  
The PT MAS plantation is established in an area already dense with oil palm plantations 
and industrial tree plantations concessions (HTI). It is bounded by the PIR-TRANS 
plantation of PTPN XIII in the northern part in Kembayan sub-district, parts of PT 
Finantara Intiga industrial trees plantation (HTI) to the east, PT Sime Indo Agro oil palm 
plantation in the south, and another PIR-TRANS plantation of PTPN XIII in Parindu 
sub-district also to the south. The western edge of the PT. MAS estate lies alongside the 
main road connecting Pontianak to Kuching (Sarawak Malaysia).68 
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PT MAS also has the biggest Crude Palm Oil (CPO) mill in West Kalimantan with an 
installed capacity capable of handling 30-60 tonnes of fresh fruit bunches per hour. The 
huge plant cost IDR 80 billion to establish, includes waste disposal ponds, and is claimed 
to be the best CPO mill in Sanggau district. The mill was fi rst put into operation on 
February 7, 2004, after being inaugurated by the governor of  West Kalimantan H Usman 
Ja’far.
4.2.5  Land Acquisition
Through its merger in 1998, the PT MAS joint venture took over the lands already being 
acquired for plantations by the Indonesian partner PT PMS. This company had begun the 
process of land acquisition in 1995. In common with other companies in the district, land 
was acquired from local communities according to the 7.5 model by which the community 
members, if they wanted to be involved and be assigned small-holding in the plasma scheme 
each had to contribute 7.5 hectares of land. They would then be entitled to an allocation 
of 2 ha. for their share of the plasma with the rest of the land being allocated for company 
use as inti (nucleus estate) and infrastructure.69  
As explained to the communities in 1995, the PT PMS scheme was envisaged as a 
‘resettlement programme’ (pemukiman baru) the requirements being that:
The farming people should together surrender their lands, including existing village 
sites, so that the plantation could become an uninterrupted planted landscape;
Those farming people living in scattered settlements should accept being regrouped in 
the resettlement area based on the company’s and the Sanggau district spatial plans; 
The farming people should accept being relocated to a suitable area where the 
company wants to set up the new settlement with all the planned facilities and 
infrastructures.70 
 
The land being acquired by PT PMS was categorised as APL (Areal Penggunaan Lain – 
an area of ‘other uses’) according to PT PMS’ interpretation of a decree of the West 
Kalimantan governor.71 After completing a survey, the National Land Agency in Sanggau 
District (BPN) granted a location permit (ijin lokasi) to 30,000 ha. of the original 35,000 
ha. proposed (see table 4.4 below).72  
After the merger, more detailed surveys were carried out and although PT. MAS was 
formally given a land allocation 30,000 ha., it only planned to actually develop 20,000 
ha., the remaining 10,000 ha. being allocated as ‘enclaves’ to communities for settlement, 
wet rice farmlands, customary forests (tembawang73 ), roads, infrastructures, and other 
supportive facilities.74 
■
■
■
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Table 4.4: Land Use of Proposed PT PMS Oil Palm Estate.75  
No. Code Types/Uses Total (ha) %
1 Pd. Original people’s settlements (villages) 142.41 0.40
2 Ld. Farmlands/cultivated lands 184.64 0.52
3 K. Rubber gardens 4,172.95 11.92
4 K2. Oil palm estates 500.00 1.42
5 Sb. Secondary/idle forest areas 25,266.31 72.21
6 Ra. Grasslands (alang-alang) 4,733.69 13.53
Total area suitable for planting oil palm 30,000.00 85.74
4.2.6  Local People’s Perspectives of PT MAS
In 1995, a research team from PT PMS came to conduct a fi eld survey in order to follow 
up on the preliminary fi ndings of their previous feasibility study. Then in 1996, PT PMS 
carried out a ‘socialisation’ programme, fi rst at the district level together with pertinent 
government bodies, customary leaders, and other community leaders and, in a second 
phase, village by village to inform the people about the planned plantation. 
In the ‘socialisation’, the company promised local people that it would build housing 
for community members, establish a clinic, install clean water facilities, school buildings, 
provide employment opportunities and a meeting hall and made other similar promises. 
According to the communities, these promises have yet to be fulfi lled. The company, 
without prior consultation with local communities, made out documents for ‘agreements 
of land acquisition’ and gave these agreements to the local people to sign. The exception 
was the people of Seribot village itself, who claim that until now they have still not signed 
any agreement to release their land to PT MAS. 
The presence of PT MAS and its needs for land for planting oil palm generated many 
different reactions in the communities. It came as a shock to their cultures, ways of life and 
customary systems of land management. There were heated debates about opportunities, 
costs and compensation and these led to divisions among the local communities and with 
both the government and the company. There were also divergent interpretations of the 
signifi cance of the land negotiations entered into.
According to the company the money passed to the community as adat derasa amounted to 
payment for transfer of the land, so that in effect the community members had sold their 
land to company.76 The company also held a customary ritual called adat ngudas although 
this was done without permission from the communities. After this ritual, the company 
registered the land acquired from the communities, village by village, while at the same 
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time the company began clearing the surrendered lands, setting up nurseries and planting 
seedlings for its own plantation. According to the village leader of Seribot, the company 
did also pay compensation to local people for any losses such as cultivated lands at a rate 
of between IDR 25,000 and IDR 45,000 per ha. for immature or non productive local 
crops, and IDR 80,000 for productive crops, like rubber. To enable land clearing to run 
smoothly, customary leaders gave directions to PT MAS about which land should be 
opened up.77  
Community members mention a number of unresolved problems related to land acquisition 
and the status of acquired lands. In the fi rst place, they note that the government of 
Sanggau district and PT MAS are not transparent in their dealings with the local people in 
and around their oil palm plantation. Secondly, the planted lands seem only to advantage 
and generate substantial profi ts to the investors. For their part the communities only got 
an average of 1.2 hectares of oil palm per family, less than the 2 ha. that were promised at 
the outset. Finally, local people were given no information about the status of the leased 
lands (Hak Guna Usaha - HGU) and what would happen to the land once the leasehold 
had expired. 
 
In 1997, villagers of Seribot demanded payment of ‘derasa’ by the company. For failing to 
negotiate with the community in advance for getting access to land the company was fi ned 
45 taels78 under customary law (adat ngidoh ngopis mpet nlunyak nya ompouk bonua).79 PT MAS 
did indeed pay the fi ne and confessed to misbehaving. Later while clearing acquired lands 
for its plantation the company was caught bulldozing across, and illegally encroaching 
onto, the lands of neighbouring Terusan village. In December 1999, Terusan villagers 
demanded compensation for these losses  which had been incurred with without any prior 
consultation or informed consent.
4.2.7  Impacts of the PT MAS Oil Palm Plantation
 
Overall, the PT MAS operation has had both positive and negative impacts on the local 
communities and their surroundings. The physical operations have brought about serious 
changes to the natural ecosystems and have cleared areas of planted crops and other 
vegetation. The villagers note that these changes in the vegetation cover have caused 
changes in species’ distributions and have led to uncontrolled pests booming. Land 
clearance using fi re to dispose of debris and dried cut down vegetation has caused air 
pollution and haze, with consequent problems for human health and to animal species 
and natural vegetation.
Benefi ts are also noted. Those who did get smallholdings have improved their incomes, 
though less than they expected, while road-building has also helped other farmers in 
previously isolated villages getting access to nearby markets such as Bodok, Bonti, and 
Sanggau district town. 
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These changes have also had their costs however notably in terms of social and cultural 
changes in the local communities. Even though tuak80 drinking is common in rituals and 
traditional festivals among the Dayak, villagers now note a worrying increase in alcohol 
abuse.  Many older people and parents worry that their children and youths are getting 
addicted to alcohol, causing them to become lazy and leave school early. People complain 
that individual profi t seeking has replaced traditions of communality, solidarity and 
the customary, more collective, mode of life. This change to a more individualised and 
capitalistic ways of life, is leading to everything being measured only in economic terms.
 
‘Stealing In Our Own Homes’81 
Where is her husband? “My husband is in prison, my father and mother passed away, I don’t 
even have a brother and sister,” a young mother Mrs. Ata, told us. Why is her husband in 
prison?
Thomas Ata was detained at Sanggau Penitentiary due to problems with PT MAS. At that time, 
July 14, 2003, he together with seven other colleagues harvested oil palm fruits from their 
smallholdings but because the fruits harvested from their 1.2 hectares plots were not enough to 
make up their daily needs, Thomas together with Libertus Sukiat, Thomas A, Elisius, Klaudius 
Piam, Antonius, Yulius Yuh and Sipir also harvested fruits from the nucleus estate. 
“Not much. Only sixty-nine bunches. And the fruits were later given back to the company,” 
said Mrs. Jumina who is experiencing the same problems. She testifi ed that their husbands 
had done this because the income generated from normal harvesting is not enough for their 
subsistence.
According to those imprisoned and interviewed by the Kalimantan Review, that was their fi rst 
action. Unfortunately they were spied by two security and two mobile brigade personnel. In the 
afternoon they were caught and early in the evening sent to and interrogated at Bodok sector 
police offi ce. After spending some days on bail, between September and December 2003, they 
were formally detained by the Sanggau Attorney. 
“What dissatisfi ed me is that the company came in and is utilising the customary lands of our 
people here, who are still practising customary law. So, why did they directly apply State law 
(to this case), they should have tried to resolve the issue in the customary manner fi rst,” said 
Mr. Anton, a customary leader of Tantang B village.
Since September 2003, those seven fathers never knew their families, wives and children. “My 
children repeatedly wanted to meet their father. Day by day it becomes harder. And I want my 
husband back home soon. But I still don’t know, how to get them released” said Jumina miserably. 
As explained by Mr. Anton, and other villagers, both Tantang B and Sebombo villagers accepted 
the presence of oil palm because they wanted roads. A road from Parindu toward Tantang B  
had been established by the local government, but it was ill maintained beyond Engkayuk 
village (10 kilometres from Parindu). Therefore, the community members were hoping to be 
able to use the company’s roads to get to Parindu and nearby villages.
101Case Studies
‘I soon realised the sawit system would not benefi t the Dayaks.  
They were just being exploited as a labour force, not being treated as 
landowners. I was quite idealistic at that time. I wanted the Dayaks to be 
treated as landowners,’  said Mr. Donatus
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4.3  PTPN XIII
4.3.1  Background to PTPN XIII
The oil palm plantation under the management of PTPN XIII82 in the Sub District of 
Parindu is important in this research since it is one of the oldest plantations in Sanggau 
District. The plantation, one of the country’s fi rst Nucleus Estate Smallholder schemes 
(Perkebunan Inti Rakyat – PIR), illustrates many of the problems associated with plantations, 
particularly with respect to legal, social, cultural and economic matters.83  
Some people had predicted these problems from the beginning. They worried that these 
problems would be create a time bomb for the future. One of these was Mr. Pelandus, 
who was the Head of Section (Kasi) of the Rights over the Land of National Land Agency 
(BPN) of Sanggau District. According to his information, he had warned the then Head 
of BPN of Sanggau District that the expansion of oil palm plantations under the PIR 
scheme in Sanggau district was in contradiction with the land ownership system and land 
regulations of the Dayak communities living in Sanggau. 
He had explained that the proposed expansion was bound to create confl icts over land and 
cause socio-cultural problems, since land is one of the most important matters in Dayak 
customary law.84 Mr. Pelandus’s worries have indeed become a reality. The presence of 
PTPN XIII with its oil palm plantation project has destroyed the customary legal and 
socio-cultural systems, and has generated both latent and manifest confl icts some of 
which have led to violence.
The establishment of PTPN XIII in West Kalimantan was organised according to a pre-
planned programme established by the central government.85 The plan envisaged local 
government merely implementing the policy adopted by the central government without 
any fl exibility to adjust it to suit local realities. Such an approach was  strongly advantageous 
for PTPN XIII, in starting a business in West Kalimantan based as it was on taking over 
community land according to a process that entirely lacked any commitment to principles 
of transparency, equality and justice. 
PTPN XIII even used intimidation and terror tactics in order to accelerate the take over 
of Dayak community land. One of the members of Dayak Pandu tribe, Mr. Matius Anyi, 
explained how the ‘socialization’ process of the plan of oil palm establishment usually 
involved military persons, who often threatened any members of the Dayak community 
who intended to oppose the plan by accusing them of being  members of the banned 
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).86 
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4.3.2   PTPN XIII - PIR SUS Parindu
Since 1979, PTPN XIII87 has become a pioneer of oil palm plantation management in 
West Kalimantan, establishing its fi rst oil palm plantations in Sub Districts of Meliau and 
Parindu. Unlike the oil palm plantation in Meliau,88 the oil palm plantation in Parindu 
was developed as a PIR project according to the 3::2 formula.89 Established with World 
Bank support, the PIR oil palm plantation project in Parindu Sub District was designed 
to complement a Program Transmigrasi Swakarsa (Voluntary Transmigration Program) to 
which 80% - 90%90 of the project land was allocated. The remaining 10-20% was to be 
allocated to the local community, who would in return transfer their land to PTPN XIII. 
The local community strongly protested this policy. They could not accept the fact that 
not only had they had to give up their land to the transmigration scheme but that, while 
the transmigrants would then participate directly in the oil palm scheme as smallholders, 
they could only participate by giving up further land to PTPN XIII under the 3::2 formula. 
Although the Government then tried to overcome community objections by various 
means, the community continued to voice its sense of injustice and rejected the scheme. 
In the face of these persistent objections the Government fi nally changed its policy 
by carrying out a PIR oil palm plantations project exclusively for local community 
smallholders but with no transmigrants. Yet the damage had been done and the bad 
relationship between the government (including PTPN XIII) and the local community 
persists. As a consequence, any consultations now carried out by PTPN XIII never get a 
serious response from the local community. 
Administratively speaking, in 1980 and 1982, PTP VII [now PTPN XIII was allocated a 
reserved area of 48,000 ha. in the Sub-Districts of Parindu, Tayan Hulu and Tayan Hilir, 
in Sanggau District to develop its operations.91 Afterward, PTPN XIII was awarded a 
further 13,220 ha. of land to expand its estates.92 Based on these allocations, in Parindu 
Sub-District the company then set aside 2,862.32 ha. as its nucleus estate (inti) while 
allocating 3,635.2 ha. to smallholdings (plasma), 392.5 ha. for farming and 337 ha. for 
housing. Altogether 1,364 houses were established in the PIR area as well as 2 elementary 
schools, 4 teachers’ houses, 3 community health centres (so called Puskesmas), 1 clinic, 1 
public hall, 4 religious buildings and roads. While the company and local government has 
now also issued 934 land titles for housing plots and farmland, these have not yet been 
issued for smallholdings, where the 221 participating farmer families are organised into 44 
smallholder groups.93
4.3.3  Legal Status of PTPN XIII Nucleus Plantation in Parindu
Based on the information we have been able to obtain, PTPN XIII has never completed 
the legal procedures for operating an oil palm plantation in Parindu. Although, as noted, 
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lands were allocated to the company to set up its operations, since those Governor’s 
decrees were issued, no application to acquire a Business Utilization Title (Hak Guna 
Usaha-HGU) has been submitted by PTPN XIII as required in these decrees. The research 
team also could not fi nd any initiation permits (ijin prinsip), location permits (ijin lokasi) nor 
letters from the Head of the District recognising the use of the designated forest reserve 
land by the Forestry Bureau of West Kalimantan or BPN of West Kalimantan. 
From a legal point of view, therefore, PTPN XIII lacks authorisation to use the land as 
an oil palm plantation and its current arrangements appear to constitute a violation of 
Law No. 5 of 1960, the Basic Agrarian Law. In accordance with the BAL, any person 
or institution wanting to establish a plantation should get a HGU issued by the relevant 
government agency (today the BPN but before 1988 the Ministry for Internal Affairs). 
With regard to this situation, the Head of Sanggau District (Bupati) sent a letter to the 
President on 7 June 2000 declaring that PTPN XIII’s lack of a HGU implied a serious 
fi nancial loss to the State, particularly in terms of the lack of payment of  taxes and fees 
payable for the ‘Acquisition of Land Rights and Buildings’ (BPHTB).94 
4.3.4  The People of Parindu 
The Sub District of Parindu currently contains some 62 villages (kampong). each 
predominantly made up of a single ethnic group.95 Until the transmigration programme 
commenced, two ethnic groups inhabited the region being Malays (Melayu) who lived in 
Balai village and Dayak peoples, made up of six ‘clans’ in the villages of Pang Podan and 
Kodan, Taba, Mayau, Ribun, Pandu, and Dosan. The term Parindu is a composite name 
made up of the fi rst or last syllables of the names of some of the main Dayak tribes living 
in this sub district.96   
The territory of Parindu Sub District covers some 59,390 ha., most of which is today 
converted into nucleus and plasma oil palm plantations. Today the Dayak people live in 
model linear settlements built alongside the roads, mostly far away from the clean water 
sources alongside which Dayak villages were usually established to fulfi l daily needs for 
washing, cooking, cleaning and transport.97 
Like most Dayak groups the land tenure system of the peoples in Parindu is based on 
communal ownership, regulated by customary law. Individual farmers acquire land rights 
within this collective territory through land clearance and cultivation, originally through 
swidden agriculture although this system has almost ceased due to land shortage caused by 
the expansion of oil palms. According to community members, individual holdings within 
the adat lands are inherited and can be transferred to their children. Although records are 
not kept of the extent of individual holdings the boundaries of all holdings are well known 
and agreed to between neighbouring farmers.
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In accordance with adat, land rights are respected by other members of the group. 
Infringements of adat can be  punished pursuant to customary mechanisms for adjudication 
and sanction. Such fi nes are referred to as tahil by the Ribun people and and real by the 
Pandu.98 A tahil is equal to 20 small (singkap) ceramic bowls (singkawang), 7 large ceramic 
bowls,  one local chicken with a minimum weight of 1 kg., three bottles of tuak (fermented 
rice wine) or three kilogram of sugar and three ons (equal with 1/10 of 1 kg) of coffee.
The chicken should be replaced by a pig in cases when the penalty for an infringement 
exceeds three tahil or more. In the case of a three tahil charge, the pig should be equal with 
5 takah [1 takah = 5 kg of pig]. If the person has been charged before, the adat penalty may 
be increased. The most severe punishment is 16 tahil which can be imposed for planned 
or unplanned murder, also called as adat pati. In the case of a battering or a fi ght, the 
punishment is referred to as adat setengah (half) pati.99  
 
This customary law is also applied to land confl icts, for instance in the case of land 
trespassing or occupying the land of other people. The amount of the adat fi ne will depend 
on the decision of an adat council (dewan adat). The adat council has  authority to administer 
justice through an adat court. In a hamlet (kampong), the adat council would consist of the 
head of sub village, the head of RT (Rukun Tetangga – Neighbourhood Council) and RW 
(Rukun Warga – Citizenship Council), elder people familiar with adat and an adat leader. 
At the village level (desa), an adat council would consist of the village head, the head of a 
hamlet, some people who are familiar with adat, headed by a temenggung. 
Despite this charge and punishment system, the main dispute settlement mechanism under 
adat is to generate consensus. Reconciliation as a form of dispute settlement will usually 
be implemented and obeyed. Indeed, the functions of customary law are: to protect the 
public interest among clan members; to maintain order and peace among ethnic groups 
and among all human society and; to maintain their religions and systems of belief.100 
However in case there is a dispute between communities and both parties argue that they 
are in the right, then a customary law system for proving guilt, based on the peoples’ 
beliefs in the action of supernatural forces, can be invoked. In one test, referred to as sidi, 
both contesting parties are asked to dive under water in a sacred place, while local elders 
recite an incantation. The person who remains longest under water is judged to be in the 
right. Another mechanism is oath-taking, similar to the Javanese tradition of sumpah pocong. 
People will be saved from the oath if he/she is in the right but those who are guilty will, 
after a period of time, die in unforeseen ways, such as through accident or illness. 
4.3.5  The Legal Process of Land Acquisition
According to Governor’s Decree No. 187 on 28 June 1982, PTPN XIII may acquire 
any lands within the Parindu PIR SUS area that have been obtained by a third party, 
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through the required process of land acquisition as set out in the relevant regulation 
(Permendagri).101 Therefore, legally speaking, PTPN XIII had an obligation to follow the 
regulations summarised in chapter 3. 
In PTPN XIII documents on PIR SUS Parindu project, the implementation of the project 
is described as consisting of three phases. The fi rst phase consisted of a preparation and 
development phase, that included fi nalising the legal process, acquiring land, determining 
capital sources, carrying out a feasibility study, establishing the plantation, building the 
settlements and other facilities and choosing participants from among the candidates. 
The second phase, was described as a conversion phase, and included transferring the 
ownership of plasma lands from the plantation company to the participant farmers; 
transferring credit from the government to the farmers and transferring responsibilities for 
managing the plantations to the operators. The fi nal phase, termed the ‘post conversion 
payment phase’, included establishing a payment mechanism for the credits that had been 
received, capacity building of the participant farmers and actual production. 
To accord with the Permendagri, land acquisition for private purposes, with due 
compensation, should be monitored by the local government. The land acquisition should 
have been carried out directly with the interested people and the compensation should be 
decided based upon the agreement of interested parties.
The contracts between PTPN XIII and the PIR SUS Parindu farmer participants sets out 
the ensuing obligations of both parties. These include:
Obligations of PIR-SUS participants: 
Transfer ownership of their lands that have been designated as part of the 
plantation project, 
Performing hard work in the plasma plantation, 
Inhabiting and taking care of the housing provided by the company, 
Using and taking care of facilities provided by the company, 
Obeying and implementing the rules in the project area, 
Maintaining order in the project area, 
taking care of agriculture and plantings in the project area, 
Signing an agreement to manage the oil palm plantation, 
Signing the loan agreement documents provided by the bank, 
Obeying all rules related to the signed agreements as well as other technical 
plantation rules.
The rights of project participants: 
Relocation costs
●
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
●
1.
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Obtaining ID, 
Receiving living allowances, 
Receiving facilities and equipment in the project location when they arrive in the 
project area, 
Receiving land that covers 0,25 ha land for settlement and 0,75 ha for agriculture 
land, 
Receiving on oil palm plantation that covers 2 ha, which is ready to be managed, 
Receiving education and health facilities as well as other community development 
assistances, 
Receiving training and other technical assistance on plantation and diversifi ed 
agriculture, 
Obtaining training and technical assistance for agriculture business, 
Obtaining a copy of land ownership certifi cate, 
Obtaining secure market access for their plantation products.
In addition participants are prohibited from selling their lands.
4.3.6  Community Experiences of Land Acquisition
Members of the Dayak Parindu members interviewed during this study asserted that, in 
the reality, the Dayak people have been tricked by PTPN XIII.102 They affi rm that all of 
the company’s information and promises given to the community have been proven false. 
In general, the Dayak people who participated in PIR SUS Parindu project complain that, 
on the one hand, PTPN XIII demanded that people fulfi l their responsibilities, while, on 
the other hand, the company did not provide what participants should receive. 
The following inconsistencies in the performance of PTPN XIII were noted:
37 families who transferred lands to the company in 1982/1983 have still not received 
any parcel of land for oil palm plantation, agriculture area or settlement from the 
company,
Some people received smaller parcels of land for oil palm plantation, agriculture and 
settlement than had been agreed by the company (3 ha. each), 
Some lands have still not been converted to oil palm to this day.
The land acquisition process for PIR SUS Parindu project, as experienced by the 
interviewees was as follows:
 
In the 1980s, agents of the local government (Village and Sub District) informed the 
people of the plan to develop an oil palm plantation,
PTPN XIII [previously called as PTP VII] developed a pilot project of oil palm 
plantation in the Sub District of Meliau, 
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
▪
▪
▪
▪
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PTPN XIII invited some adat leaders of Dayak Parindu to come and see the pilot 
project of oil palm plantation in the Sub District of Meliau. There was suspiciousness 
that this invitation was a strategy of PTPN XIII to use the said adat leaders as their 
campaigners to promote the project in PIR SUS Parindu.
Afterwards, the said adat leaders from Dayak Parindu who had returned to their 
village informed the people, in village meetings, of their experiences. Some people 
who served in village administration (the head of RT, RW, sub village, village, and 
temenggung) also attended the meeting.
The said adat leaders were then invited again by PTPN XIII to see an oil palm plantation 
in Pematang Siantar, in North Sumatra, that was known as Kebun Bah Jambi. PTP 
covered their accommodations and living allowances for a month. It was unclear what 
the activities of adat leaders and PTPN XIII were during their stay in the plantation.
After returned to their village, those adat leaders attempted to persuade Dayak Parindu 
people to participate in PIR SUS Parindu project by transferring the ownership of 
their land that covered 5 ha. There was no other information provided except the 
requirement of the said land transfer. 
According to the informants, the company intentionally provided unclear information 
concerning the project and its participation requirements to the Dayak Parindu 
people. PTPN XIII persuaded Dayak Parindu people by giving them the expectation 
that if they participated in the PIR SUS Parindu program, they would become rich. 
They asserted that ‘you could earn enough money from one oil palm tree to buy a 
cow, by owning two oil palm trees you could send your children to university, so why 
don’t you transfer the ownership of your land to the company for oil palm plantation 
project!’ In this kind of situation, it was very hard for Dayak Parindu people to reject 
the plantation project since the lure of the project was so compelling. As the result, 
nobody rejected the project.
Thereafter, there was a registration for the Dayak Parindu people who wanted to 
participate in PIR SUS Parindu project. The registration process was conducted 
by plantation company staff [PTPN XIII] in collaboration with the heads of each 
sub village. There were some requirements that should be fulfi lled by participant 
candidates, including providing of citizen ID, pictures and family card (Kartu Keluarga). 
In fact, some people who could not fulfi ll the requirements still got to participate in 
the project, such as those who had not married. There was just one meeting held for 
the ‘socialization process’. As a result of this limited transfer of information, there was 
a lack of comprehension among the Dayak Parindu people concerning the project. 
The next process was land clearing that was initiated as a village festival. Some 
participants, saw this ceremony as a ploy by the company to show that the Dayak 
Parindu people had agreed to the PIR SUS project. The land clearing process involved 
employing people as low paid workers at a rate of IDR 1,200 per day.
The next activity was planting oil palm seedlings in the cleared land. This activities 
was organized by contractors who employed local people as their workers
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
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Up to this point no information was provided to the communities about any compensation 
for any lands acquired from the Dayak Parindu people and transferred to PTPN XIII 
and which had then been converted into the PIR SUS Parindu plantation project. Our 
conclusion is that no such compensation was ever paid by PTPN, which instead merely 
implemented the 3::2 formula, which the community had originally rejected.
The following is the chronology of events as recalled for the post seedlings cultivation 
phase: 
During the fi rst harvest, three years after planting, the company claimed that all the 
fresh fruit bunches were owned by the company [PTPN XIII as the nucleus]. The 
company also argued that the harvested fruits were not yet mature.  
PTPN XIII then designated which part of lands that should be given to PIR SUS 
Parindu participants as smallholdings (plasma). This was a process that took quite a long 
time, in some cases 3 years, in others 5 years. However, there are some participants 
who have not acquired parcels of land from the company until now. Another problem 
is that many people received less than 3 hectares of land.
When the Dayak Parindu people questioned PTPN XIII about this matter, the 
company argued that the reason why some people received less than 3 ha. of land was 
because these people had transferred less than 5 ha. at the beginning. The problem was 
that the company never informed people about how much land had been transferred, 
nor clarifi ed who had supposedly transferred less that 5 ha. 
The harvesting process was carried out by the farmers’ groups and the fruits were 
delivered to the company for sending to their mill.
4.3.7  Social and Environmental Impacts of the Plantation
In reviewing their experience with PTPN XIII, community members highlight the 
following problems resulting from the imposition of the plantation in their lands:
Some Dayak parindu adat leaders, who have allied themselves with PTPN XIII, have 
used they positions to obtain personal benefi ts from the company both for themselves 
and members of their families, including getting privileged access to  smallholdings,
Customary law and cultural traditions have been marginalized by the infl ux of 
outsiders,  
New social inequalities have been created and traditions of sharing and collective 
benefi t have been lost, 
Outside workers have undermined sexual mores and encouraged the emergence of 
prostitution, 
Subsistence economies have been undermined, not least by the loss of land, and have 
been replaced by cash-based household economies,
▪
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Smallholder families are not able to meet their minimum daily needs due to the low 
prices of oil palm.
People have become unduly dependent on the oil palm plantation and the company, 
weakening both their wider autonomy and their ability to demand fair prices,
There are uncertainties about how farmers will afford replanting once their oil palms 
become overmature, 
Extensive areas of forests have been cleared, biodiversity lost, hydrology disrupted 
and the overuse of fertilizers noted, 
These environmental impacts have in turn reduced the quality and diversity of people’s 
livelihoods, in terms of reduced opportunities for hunting, fi shing, gathering, use of 
forest products and access to clean water. 
According to some PIR SUS Parindu participants, the Dayak Parindu people now realize 
that they were tricked by PTPN XIII, as they have never enjoyed the benefi ts that PTPN 
XIII had initially promised.
4.4  PT CNIS
4.4.1  Communities and Oil Palm Estates in Mukok
The oil palm estate of PT CNIS is located on the customary lands of the Bidoih Mayao. 
The Bidoih Mayao people, who live in this area, are descendants of the Macan Balok 
of Kelompu, Upe and Lanong. According to the latest available offi cial statistics, from 
1997, the Bidoih Mayau sub-tribe is made up of 422 families under the authority of the 
customary leadership of the Tumenggung (hereditary chief). He supervises several Let Pocaros, 
who have the responsibility to lead village level decision-making during the meetings of 
adat leaders (rapat tua tua adat), as well determining adat sanctions.103 The Bidoih Mayau 
have been settled in this area since the 18th century and more recently they have been 
joined by other settlers from Java, who were moved into the region in national and local 
transmigration programmes.
Five transmigration sites have now been established in the area amounting to as many as 
25,000 people. This big population of transmigrants and the large area of land they cover 
have made the region into a demonstration area for transmigration. Both local and central 
government have held several national events in the region, like celebrations of National 
Reforestation Week, and capacity building workshops for youth, party activists and social 
organizations. Furthermore, myriads of training workshops for farmers have also been 
conducted in this transmigration area. There are strong indications that the government 
created this transmigration region as a model project site to be visited for government 
offi cials and farmers’ groups from other parts of  Indonesia. A large proportion of the 
▪
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transmigrant groups, in particular those who now live in Engkayu and Engkode kampong, 
came from Delangu in Central Java, known as a centre of rice production and famous for 
its Rojolele rice variety. By choosing people from Delangu, the government hoped to use 
the transmigration programme to turn the area into the ‘rice barn’ of the whole of Sanggau 
District. 
According to the Regional Spatial Plan (RTRW) of Sanggau District, Mukok sub-district 
consists of forest areas and dry-land agricultural fi elds. The forest areas are largely 
allocated for production forest, especially as timber plantations (HTI - Hutan Tanaman 
Industri), whereas the dryland agricultural areas are allocated for transmigration, with the 
expectation that they can be developed as paddies for wet rice farming.
Figure 4.5 Map of Mukok Sub-district 
4.4.2  PT CNIS in Mukok Sub-district: the Testimonies of Local People
 
One of groups of transmigrant farmers who rejected the transfer of their land to PT 
CNIS is the farmer group of Sadang Baru of Trimulyo Village, in Mukok sub-district. In 
one of research team’s meetings with them, this farmer group showed us a photo album 
that illustrates their long trials in establishing themselves as transmigrants in the region. 
In one photo, showing the initial phase in 1983, the farmers can be seen wearing the 
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transmigration uniform, with passionate faces indicating their hopes of getting a better life 
in this new place. By contrast, the latest part of the album illustrates their recent condition. 
The following testimonies, from farmers who chose to retain anonymity, explain their 
story.
 Tesimony of a Transmigrant 
We came from Tanjung Village, Klaten, Central Java. We were 58 familes who joined 
the national transmigration program and went to Mukok sub-district to pursue a better 
life. According to information provided by the Head of Delangu Village and transmigration 
instructors in Delangu, we were chosen mainly to develop food crops, particularly the 
cultivation of paddy. In this place, we met 43 families of local transmigration people from 
Tokang Jaya. Their original tribe is Bidoih Mayau. They still have land in their home village 
in Kedukul, which is located on the edge of the Kapuas river. They planted rubber, dry rice 
fi elds and tembawang (customary agroforests of useful timbers, fruit trees and medicinal 
plants). 
In the beginning, the transmigration offi ce promised to provide us with three types of land 
parcels for cultivation. The fi rst parcel would cover 1/4 ha. as house and home garden, 
whereas the second parcel would covers 3/4 hectare for cultivation. The third parcel for one 
hectare is for further cultivation  Nonetheless, we had bad experiences on arrival in this place. 
We did not obtain any land ready to cultivate as the transmigration offi cer had promised. We 
only obtained a house each with ¼ hectare of cleared land as a home garden.
The situation got worse as we had no money to meet our needs and the produce of the land 
in our home gardens could not meet our daily needs. The daily rations for transmigrants 
(jadup104) were soon used up. I still clearly remember the day we organized a demonstration 
to demand that the government fulfi l its promise to provide the two cultivable plots of land 
on Pon,105 July 1, 1986. At that event, we shaved off our hair and marched to the technical 
implementing unit of transmigration offi ce SP 1-5 (UPT Transmigrasi SP 1-5) and presented 
our demands to the Head of UPT, Mr. Suryono.
Six months later, the UPT offi ce provided the fi rst land parcels to us (3/4 ha. per family), but 
these lands were still not ready to be planted. We were told we should clear the fi elds fi rst 
before cultivating the lands. Fortunately, a foreign agency, CRS, supported us by giving 
jadup in the form of rice to fulfi l our need for another half year. Not all transmigrants were 
patient enough to wait for the full allocation process of the fi rst parcel of land and given 
all the uncertainties related to the second land parcel. Some of them decided to sell their 
lands and returned to Java or went to fi nd other jobs outside their villages. Others sold 
their houses and lands and became traders in Sanggau. I decided to leave our family in the 
transmigration settlement of SP 1 and went to work as an estate worker in another region of 
West Kalimantan. 
The second parcel of land (1 hectare per family) has still not been distributed to us right up 
to the present, due to land confl icts with adat communities of Engkosi. Although these lands 
are still occupied by the adat communities, the National Land Agency (Badan Pertanahan 
Nasional/BPN) offi ce has issued land titles for a part of these lands to the transmigrants. 
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Therefore, in reality we only possess one hectare of land (3/4 hectare for agriculture land 
and ¼ hectare for home gardens). Some of us hold land title for the second parcel of land 
(1 ha) without any access to that land because it is controlled and occupied by the adat 
communities of Engkosi.
 
Frankly speaking, we really need irrigation, seeds, fertilizer, cows, and so forth for improving 
our agriculture activities. However, the situation in Mukok is different. There are no such 
things here. We learned a lot from the adat Bidoih people about how to plant rice and open 
fi elds in the forests and practise shifting cultivation. 
In 1999, we were offered the chance of participating in oil palm projects. However, we 
rejected the offer to join the oil palm plantation and release our land. Let the oil palm be 
planted in other villages. Before we came to this place, we already knew about how to 
plant and take care of oil palms. We have even been have involved as oil palm estates 
workers, in cultivating the oil palms in places like Kelompu, Ngabang, Kembayan, 
Semuntai and so on. Oil palm is not the reason why we came here. We came here to 
plant food crops!
 
Our ancestors and our patrons (government institution that sent transmigrants in this place) 
as well as our transmigration mentors taught us not to sell our land but to cultivate it in 
order to fulfi l our needs. Therefore, our mentors advised us to cultivate food crops. We have 
struggled to acquire this land though long negotiation processes and demonstrations. 
Therefore, it is not that easy to take the land from us!
Testimony of another Transmigrant
From our point of view, it is not wise to transfer the land given to us. Both in Java and here, 
the land that is available to farmers is very limited. Based on our farming experience, the oil 
palm estates will not create signifi cant benefi t. The land needs us, the land needs our care 
and sweat  to feed us. PT CNIS offers us compensation of IDR 500,000 for ¾ hectare of land, 
but we can get better prices when we barter with the local communities (adat communities 
surround the transmigration area). As a comparison, ¾ hectare of transmigration land is 
equal in value to three parcels of shifting cultivation land outside the transmigration area. 
Honestly, I would prefer to barter my land to somebody else and get more land than sell it to 
PT CNIS. I would prefer to get shifting cultivation lands and obtain a land title for it. Later, I 
would cultivate a mixed rubber garden on it. Currently, I have three parcels of mixed rubber 
gardens that will be inherited by my three children. I have obtained land titles for these three 
parcels of land. This situation is much better than participating in plasma oil palm plantation in 
which there is unclear distribution between the company, the co-operatives and the farmers. 
My experience shows that the benefi t from the mixed rubber gardens is better than we can 
get from oil palm estate. I learned how to build up mixed rubber gardening from the Bidoih 
adat community, so called tembawang.
May I comment on the TWH Cooperative here? I heard that the members’ annual meeting in 
2005 was not run well. Too many outsiders are involved in the cooperative, like government 
staff, company personnel and so on. I think the cooperative is only a puppet cooperative.  
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Testimony of a third Transmigrant
I do not want to grumble about the lack of facilities in this place, since that is my destiny 
as a transmigrant. In Mukok, we obtained many facilities compared to other transmigration 
programs. In 1986/1987, we were granted cows by the President of the Republic of Indonesia 
(sapi banpres). These were collectively used based on the revolving cow system (digaduh). 
Honestly, I wish I could have my own cows but unfortunately, this place is not suitable for 
raising cows. In the end all the cows died. A similar story occurred when the government 
granted us Bali Merah (Red Bali) cows.
In 1988/1987, the Plantation Offi ce introduced Arabica coffee seedlings. Due to its preference 
for high ground, the coffee could not grow well here. A similar thing happened when the 
government give us rambutan klotok seedlings. So many outsiders came and held trainings 
here. Government offi cials even came to distribute boots, uniforms, and saplings in this area. 
But there are also problems of manipulation by some government offi cials. In the morning, 
they would distribute the fertilizers to the farmers, yet in the afternoon they would take it back 
from them. There was so much intervention by the central and local government in the area. 
Since the transmigration project was handed over to the local government to administer, no 
such assistance has been given to us. But I do not mind, since all the previous assistances 
did not actually benefi t us signifi cantly. However, the second parcel of land that belongs to 
us has not been transferred until this day! We did not make unreasonable demands of the 
government. We only defend our rights and demand our land as transmigrants. 
In 1999, PT CNIS came and asked transmigrants as well as the local people to transfer their 
lands into a benefi t sharing model under which four parts would be for the company and six 
parts for the local community. Most of transmigrants released their ¾ hectare parcel of land 
and some of them handed over as well the land certifi cates to the 1 hectare parcel of the 
land, even though that land is still occupied physically by the adat community of Engkosi. 
All the papers relating to the land (land titles etc) were handed over to the company. The 
company gave us receipts, a small piece of paper. However, only a few of us have held on to 
these receipts. In the land transfer process, the hamlet head acted as the company’s public 
relations offi cer. Other lands located outside the transmigration area that were transferred 
to the company were mostly untitled adat lands. The company would accept fi ve hectares of 
the untitled adat lands and give back two hectares of the land to the adat farmers with credit 
for setting up oil palm.
Currently, only half of the lands released to the company have been planted with oil palm, 
but the boundaries between the lands owned by nucleus estate and that for plasma, and the 
boundaries between the lands for transmigrants and members of the adat communities have 
never been made clear. We never had a ‘black and white’ agreement with the company. As 
a consequence, we never know who is the owner of the oil palm estate’s produce that they 
are transporting by company tractors to the mill everyday.
Like other villagers (adat communities of Bidoih), we are more confi dent about developing 
our own businesses by planting mixed rubber and food crops. Moreover, ICRAF staff in 
Sanggau have trained us and collaboratively implemented the program with us. I want to 
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quote you a sentence that I have written in my photo album in  1 July 1986, the date we 
received our land from long process of negotiation as my refl ection as a transmigrant: I can 
only give my sweat and mattock as my contribution to my beloved country. 
Once again, it is not about relinquishing our land but about cultivating our land to feed 
people!
4.4.3  The Permitting Process
The Jakarta-based company PT CNIS was established in 1998. The company is a subsidiary 
of a holding company focused on export-import, real estate, transportation services and oil 
palm estates set up in Pekanbaru, Riau.106 Based on documents reviewed by our research, 
it seems that the government now realises that the Mukok Transmigration Program has 
failed. One of the reasons for the program’s failure was the high rate of out-migration, 
by which many impoverished transmigrants, unable to make a decent living in their new 
settlements, left the transmigration area. This was typical of many early transmigration 
sites, which attempted to replicate Javanese systems of agriculture based on irrigated rice 
farming, in areas with very different soils and economies.107 Therefore, as long ago as 
1979, the government decided to allocate 20,000 hectares of the transmigration area to oil 
palm estates.108  
It seems that this government plan was later used by PT CNIS to obtain a recommendation 
from the Head of Sanggau District and the Head of Regional Offi ce of the Ministry of 
Transmigration and Forest Squatters (Kanwil Deptrans & PPH109) to convert parts of the 
former transmigration areas into oil palm estates in 1998.110 This request was based on the 
assumption that there was no land market or bartering in the area. It was almost certain 
that approval of this request would have negative impacts on both the transmigrants, 
who would have to sell the lands they had been allocated by the government, and the adat 
communities, who consider much of the area to be customary lands owned and occupied 
by them. 
In response to this request, in 1998, the Head of the Regional Offi ce of Ministry of 
Transmigration and Forest Squatters issued a note stating that of 20,000 ha. allocated for 
transmigration in the  Kedukul Mukok area in 1979, 9,035 ha. had been set aside for 1,807 
transmigrant families. Therefore, Sanggau District Government could allocate the rest of 
the land, covering 10,985 ha., as an oil palm estate.111  
Following the recommendations of the governor, the district head and the head of regional 
offi ce of the Ministry of Transmigration and Forest Squatters, PT CNIS then proposed 
to the Regional Offi ce of Ministry of Forestry and Plantations of West Kalimantan to 
increase the extent of allocated land to 20,000 ha.112 However, this was contrary to a 
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widely publicised Decree of the Minister of Forest and Plantation, according to which, all 
matters on forest relinquishment should be decided by the central offi ce of the Ministry 
of Foresty and Plantation.113  
 
A technical review by the Regional Offi ce of the Ministry of Forestry and Plantation 
showed that the 1982 exercise in consensual forest use planning (TGHK) had divided the 
20,000 ha. area into 19,300 ha. of ‘Other Utilization Area’ (Areal Penggunaan Lain/APL) 
and 700 ha. of Limited Production Forest (Hutan Produksi Terbatas - HPT). However, the 
Provincial Spatial Planning exercise (Rencana Tata Ruang Wilayah Propinsi - RTRWP) of 
West Kalimantan carried out in 1994, noted that there was 7,469 ha. of dry land agriculture 
in the area (pertanian lahan kering/PLK), while common production forest (hutan produksi) 
covered 12,535 ha. (made up of 1,750 ha. of limited production forest and 10,781 ha. 
of production forest).114 Thus, from the provincial government’s perspective, it was 
technically feasible to develop oil palm estates in this area. 
Figure 4.6  Map of  Land allocated for  PT CNIS
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The Plantation Offi ce thus supported the issuance of an initiation permit (ijin prinsip) 
to develop the oil palm estate. Yet, the amount of land allocated in this support was 
20,000 ha. instead of the 10,985 ha. recognised as available by the Regional Offi ce of 
Ministry of Transmigration and Forest Squatters.115 However, the General Director of 
Plantation from Ministry of Forestry and Plantation sent a letter to PT CNIS informing 
it that its plantation business permit (Ijin Usaha Perkebunan - IUP) could not be issued yet, 
as the company had not fulfi lled all the requirements for permitting. Nevertheless, the 
Directorate General of Plantation never questioned the difference in the extent of the 
allocated land issued by the Regional Offi ce of Ministry of Transmigration and Forest 
Squatter and Plantation Offi ce of West Kalimantan Province.116  
Later on, the Ministry of Forestry and Plantation did issue the IUP to PT CNIS for the 
20,000 ha. in Mukok and Sekadau, sub-districts. The IUP required PT CNIS to form a 
joint venture relationship with the community-owned TWH Co-operative by allotting 65 
percent of all its shares to the co-operative (see below).117    
4.4.4  Land Consolidation
On October 23, 1999, the Head of Sanggau District issued the location permit for PT 
CNIS covering 17,500 hectares. There are several important clauses in this location 
permit,118 as follows:
The Sanggau District required PT CNIS to give appropriate compensation and or 
provided alternative settlement areas for land owners, as well as involving them as 
‘business adopted sons’ of the company.
PT CNIS should recognize the civil rights of adat communities to be involved in the 
business, a phrase which became a justifi cation for PT CNIS to acquire lands directly 
from the land-owning communities and consolidate these lands as an oil palm estate. 
As for compensation, the villagers asked the company to establish a village land fund 
in the interest of the villagers living within the location permit area. 
The company should also enclave some areas that had been allocated for the existing 
government programs such PPKR, reserved forest, village lands, PRPTE, etc.
PT CNIS should establish the oil palm estates within three years at the latest (by 
October 2002).
BPN and the Monitoring Team on Land Acquisition for Private Purposes should also 
be involved in the land acquisition process.119  
It is important to note that PT CNIS only got a recommendation to build the oil palm 
factory instead of to establish the oil palm estate, from the administration in the Mukok 
Sub-district and the Kedukul Village.120 
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
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The Environmental Impact Assessment (Analisa Mengenai Dampak Lingkungan - AMDAL) 
for the PT CNIS operation did note several potential social problems associated with the 
establishment of the oil palm estate. It noted that there was popular resentment about 
the lease of land to the company, concern about the  payment of inappropriate prices for 
the land, and that the adat community (as the fi rst party) still claimed rights over the area. 
Joint ownership with the local co-operative (Tut Wuri Handayani) was proposed as a kind 
of ‘panacea’ to meet the people’s demands. The EIA also emphasized the need for PT 
CNIS to communicate effectively with local adat leaders.121  
4.4.5  Credit for the KUD and Benefi t Sharing 
As one of the requirements to obtain credit from the Bank, PT CNIS arranged a partnership 
agreement with the Co-operative of Tut Wuri Handayani (Kop.TWH) that was located in 
the Village of Sungai Mawang, Mukok Sub-district. In this agreement, the Co-operative 
was represented by Mr. Suko as the co-operative head and Mr. H Abdillah M Daud as 
the treasurer.122 According to the amended Notary Act of the company in 1999, the Co-
operative is now the majority share holder (60%) in PT CNIS.123  
Initially, PT CNIS and the Kop. TWH proposed securing credit from the BDNI Bank. 
The credit provided by the BDNI Bank for establishing the oil palm estate in Mukok, 
was based on assurances that the company and the co-operative would fi nish planting 
the estate within four years. In fact, however, this was not even completed within six 
years. The company and the co-operative then renegotiated for additonal credit from the 
Permata Bank based on an assuarance that they complete the planting within a further 8 
more years.
The Head of the Plantation Offi ce of Sanggau District admits that the replacement of the 
BDNI Bank with the Permata Bank as principal creditors has, indirectly, disadvantaged 
participating farmers. As a consequence of these deals, the Permata Bank doubled the credit 
burden of the plasma farmers from the former agreed amount IDR 7 million per hectare 
to approximately IDR 15 million per hectare. Repayment rates increased proportionately. 
Unfortunately, there was no written agreement between the company and the farmers 
when the deal with PT CNIS was initiated.124   
There was a similar lack of clarity in the initial arrangement between PT CNIS and the 
plasma famers over the process of benefi t sharing from the nucleus and smallholder oil 
palm estate. Local people argued that benefi t-sharing should be calculated by Kop. TWH 
using the 6::4 model, by which the farmers would get 6 portions and the company would 
get 4 portions.125 There was also lack of clarity about how profi ts should be shared between 
the productive parts of the plantation, the unproductive parts and those parts still being 
developed. This situation was made even worse by the lack of progress in developing 
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the plasma estate. The farmers alleged that the company had prioritized the development 
of the nucleus estate, at the expense of making comparable inputs to the plasma scheme. 
The overall result was that the farmers were tied to the parent estate and its creditors by a 
heavy debt burden while their productive assets were not being well developed. This has 
magnifi ed their sense of grievance.   
Recently, PT CNIS was acquired by PT Indofood, the biggest public food processing 
company in Indonesia. One of the biggest shareholders of this company is a Hong 
Kong-based company, First Pacifi c Co. Ltd, which holds 48 percent of the shares of PT 
Indofood. A gigantic company like PT Indofood should not shirk the  responsibility it has 
inherited to lessen the excessive credit burden currently being shouldered by the plasma 
farmers. The irony is that neither the central nor the local government, both of which have 
made recommendation to the oil palm company to address this issue, can do anything to 
force the company to take responsibility for its failure to develop the oil palm estate for 
more than four years. More importantly, the government should take responsibility for its 
allocation of adat land to transmigrants, relying on inaccurate surveys, which has resulted 
in the immiseration of the adat community.   
4.4.6  Government Perspectives 
The confl icts over lands and benefi t-sharing associated with oil palm estates in Sanggau 
are now well known to the local administration and the local legislature and are also issues 
of active debate at the provincial level. These confl icts do not only incur costs for the 
communities and companies but reduce revenues to the district and may, in the longer term, 
discourage further investments in the province. Although the decentralization process, in 
the longer term, should bring greater transparency to land acquisition and benefi t sharing 
processes, in the short term it has opened up or exacerbated gaps in coordination between 
the various line ministries, making both compliance and monitoring more diffi cult. 
In order to address these problems, the administration and the legislature have therefore 
begun to mobilise district teams to deal with them. As the following interviews illustrate, 
some of these teams are still using a very top-down approach framed by the administrative 
traditions of the Suharto era. It may be some time before a more grounded and bottom up 
approach to plantation development, that respects the rights of indigenous peoples and 
local communities, can be put into effect.  
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Offi cial in the Provincial Regional Planning Agency (Bappeda)
of West Kalimantan
The spatial planning approach is defi nitely needed to ensure that allocated lands do not 
overlap in the development of oil palm estates. At least, that is the best that my offi ce can 
do. Afterwards, we should conduct detailed verifi cation, for example to check whether the 
permits and the land information documents conform with the District and Provincial Spatial 
Plans. If there had been a good coordination between all government agencies, information 
about overlaps should have become clear when PT CNIS was arranging the land information 
permit.  
Based on the input of related government agencies, Bappeda prepares a provincial natural 
resource balance, which shows the development potential of natural resources and whether 
resources have been over exploited or not. Such a balance is really needed to create a good 
plan, since it shows the amount of assets in stock, how much that stock has been allocated 
and is being managed, and in which locations there should be no further expansion.
According to the Provincial Natural Resource Balance of West Kalimantan Province, the 
greatest number of Business Utilization Rights (HGU) has been issued in Sanggau District. 
The review shows that 44 percent of the area is free State land, 3 percent is fresh water, 
like lakes and so on, while 53 percent is State land encumbered with rights (including adat 
land).
In order to obtain the actual facts, the government should not work alone. The participation 
of the local people is needed in order to understand the potential benefi ts as well as the 
potential confl icts in land allocation. A partnership between the government and the people 
should be promoted and manifested in direct action such as the regional development plan 
which is the basic development plan of the provincial and district governments. 
However, in the regional autonomy era, none of these synchronizations run smoothly. In 
some sectors, the district government is handing out location permits instead of this being 
done at higher government levels. However, the district governments rarely report such 
initiatives to the relevant higher level agencies. 
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Mr. Bujang AS, S.H., 
Head of National Land Agency (BPN) of Sanggau District
BPN strongly welcomes initiatives to develop oil palm estates, since they are compatible 
with the Sanggau District development plan, which emphasises in particular the promotion 
of the development of agribusiness. Basically, the District Government of Sanggau has 
set up the 40::60 models as a benefi t-sharing mechanism in oil palm estate development. 
Nevertheless, this model is negotiable. If the land acquisition with benefi t-sharing model is 
considered inappropriate by the oil palm estate company and the plasma farmers, they can 
apply a shareholding model. However, we should be aware that changing agreed benefi t 
sharing models in established oil palm estates is not easy. 
In the context of decentralization, the recommendation of a bupati (District Head) becomes a 
key instrument in regulating many matters, including those related to forestry. Nonetheless, 
the proponent oil palm company should still obtain agreement from the Ministry of Forestry 
to access forest land. In addition, the project proponent company should obtain an IUP and 
that is usually a long procedure. After obtaining all of these licenses and permits, the Jakarta 
offi ce of BPN will issue a HGU for the respective Oil Palm Estate. The Representative Offi ce 
of BPN at the district level cannot issue a HGU. The other important thing is that all the 
documents related to the project proponent company are not open to public. The public can 
only view the licenses and permits.
 
The State has appointed a Plantation Management Team, led by the Head of Plantation Offi ce, 
to mediate any confl icts and coordinate any technical assistance related to the operational 
activities of oil palm companies. The team use NJOP126 (taxable value) to calculate rates for 
land compensation.
The working area of PT CNIS is a transmigration area that is considered to be State land and 
not a forest area or erfpacht land. These lands are often claimed as adat land. I have heard 
that adat land should be proven by showing its existence, as recognized in certain district 
and government regulations. To be honest, I have never seen the regulations setting out 
these requirements.127 
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Mr. Ir. Pontas Sihotang, Head of Plantation Offi ce in Sanggau District,
Basically, all oil palm estate models should be agreed by the community. We, as the government 
representatives, only play a role as a mediator. Our work is carried out, in accordance with 
local regulations and associated operational guidance, by implementing units at the District, 
Sub-district and Village levels. In their operation, the implementing units should involve the 
participation of related stakeholders.
We believe that the oil palm estate has a good multiplier effect. The fi nancial benefi ts from 
oil palm estates are by farmers on the estates, through wages for employment, as well as 
through the opportunities for the community to conduct business around the estate. These can 
contribute signifi cantly to the development of the area. We are aware that the development 
of oil palm plantations can also impose high social and fi nancial costs. Nonetheless, we still 
feel we are more fortunate compared with other districts [without oil palm]. Due to the lack of 
fi nancial support for [alternative] agricultural activities, particularly from the commercial banks, it 
is really hard to develop the agriculture sector in Sanggau District. Therefore, the most feasible 
activities that can be conducted in Sanggau District are plantation activities especially oil palm 
estates.
     
The development of oil palm estates does still have its own problem in the fi eld. The government 
did not involve itself much in the process of arranging credit agreements, such as the agreement 
between Kop. TWH and PT CNIS. I do not really understand the rules of the game for these 
processes. I think the Co-operative Offi ce of Sanggau District has more authority and knowledge 
concerning those processes. There is another model of oil palm estate development, in which a 
company comes with its own capital or a part of their capital is guaranteed by the bank. In this 
case, the plasma farmers will not be burdened by an obligation to repay the bank for the credit. 
[However] as a consequence, such a company will offer a cheaper price for a farmer’s parcel 
of land. To be honest, the farmers do not pay much attention to these differences between 
schemes. The most important thing for them is how much money they can obtain.
The focus of the District Government particularly the Plantation Offi ce is to review to what 
extent the company has fulfi lled its requirements. The result of this review will signifi cantly 
infl uence the future extension of the permit. For example, there are some requirements in the 
issuance of the location permit, which includes the obligation of carrying out an Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) that should be fulfi lled by the company within a certain period of time. 
So, we check with the company to see whether they have forwarded their EIA to the Ministry of 
the Environment and whether the EIA has been approved. And so forth.
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Mr. Yan Yohanes, Head of Government Section of Mukok Sub-district
PT CNIS is located in four villages including Sei Mawang, Trimulyo, Layak Omang and 
Engkosi. Currently, there is an overlap of the territory of the adat Engkosi people with the 
transmigration area. This problem has not been solved ever since the transmigration program 
came to this area. The Ministry of Transmigration has promised to solve this problem but 
nothing has been done up until now. As a result, many transmigrants never acquired their 
second parcel of land.  
The presence of PT CNIS has led to land confl icts. Another problem is the way they increased 
the credit burden on the land from IDR 14 millions into IDR 30 millions per two hectare plot. 
Kop. TWH is meant to solve this problem. Actually, the Sub-district Government hopes that 
the company could implement a plasma plantation without nucleus plantation. However, as 
we know, how can the company implement plasma plantation without nucleus plantation?
The Sub-district Government is involved in the confl ict resolution process related to land 
problems at the sub-district level. The mediation team is led by the Head of Sub-district. 
The members consist of sub-district government offi cers and involve the Babinsa (village 
level police)128 and other police offi cers. Whereas at the village level, the implementing 
units consist of the Village Heads, the Hamlet Heads, community and religious leaders, the 
Babinsa and some offi cers from the Koramil (district level army units).129 
Mr. Paulus Hadi, District Legislator of Sanggau District
I used to be an agricultural extension trainer for various collaborative projects here in West 
Kalimantan, especially in this district. Therefore, I do understand the problems encountered 
by both adat communities and transmigrants in getting access to land. After we had had 
several discussions, we developed a special committee (pansus) on PT CNIS to address the 
increased debt burden that should be paid off by the farmers. More specifi cally, there is no 
special committee dealing with land problems because the government argued that all the 
land was State land. However, we all know that the area is adat land, really.
 
It is not fair if the company burdens the farmers with so much debt. Who will guarantee 
that the company does not use the credit given in the name of the community on other co-
operative interests or in prioritizing other activities such as developing new nucleus plasma? 
We all understand the way the companies used to obtain and re-invest credit! 
Many legislative members assumed that oil palm estates contributed to district revenue 
generation. Based on the calculation of our Draft District Revenue and Budget Allocation 
(RAPBD) of Sanggau District, we now see that many oil palm estates have not paid in 
their contribution to the district’s revenue. So when the Central Government asks District 
Government to pay in its share from the district revenues, the District Government has to 
cover the portion that should come from the oil palm estates from other budget allocations. 
 
At the district level, there is a confl ict resolution team that is based in the plantation area. 
The team includes members of the executive but does not involve legislative members. 
Therefore, the resolution of problems relies very much on the perspective and paradigm 
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of executive members. In this situation, the position of communities remains weak. This 
condition will get worse if the communities do not organize themselves and clearly state their 
demands. With regards to oil palm estates in Sanggau, we need to conduct a moratorium, 
stop new investment, and restructure the existing oil palm estates. 
We should promote a discourse on independent plantations which should be implemented 
on the ground. In addition, we need to limit the role of military and police offi cers in the land 
relinquishment processes. 
At the present, Sanggau District has a District Regulation regarding oil palm estates that 
provides benefi t-sharing according to the 40::60 model. The small benefi ts that accrue to 
farmers under this model should be rejected and should not be facilitated by the government. 
I am sure that the district regulation is not yet perfect, particularly in comparison with the 
criteria and indicators of RSPO. 
However, [having these principles] could help initiate plantations that do conform to the 
principles and criteria of RSPO, for instance, local regulations could provide guidelines 
related to decision-making processes and the actual recognition of adat communities in 
accordance with (draft) principles 1 and 7. Then, any investors who wanted to invest in 
Sanggau District would not be those thinking only of their own benefi ts, but investors who 
want to work collaboratively with the people, and the District Government. 
Still, the processes will take a long time. Hopefully, the criteria and indicators could help 
legislative members to develop appropriate district regulations. However, to date, strong 
patrons are needed to convince the government. In addition, community organizations 
should be strengthened in order to challenge the mental block that companies have about 
negotiating with communities. 
 
Dr. Piet Herman Abiek, DPD member from West Kalimantan
It seems that bureaucrats have false views about [the benefi ts of] oil palm estates. They 
usually take the example of the adat communities in Parindu. They compare the condition 
of Parindu communities before oil palm plantation, when the community did not own any 
satellite TVs and motorcycles, with that after the oil palm estate came to the area, noting that 
community members now own well-developed houses, motorcycles and satellite TV. This 
simplifi cation is misleading. People’s welfare has increased not because of the oil palm estate 
but because of [their own] rubber plantations. Even though Parindu community members do 
own oil palm smallholdings, many of them own rubber plantation that has proven to be much 
more profi table.
Actually, the factor to be blamed is not the presence of oil palm estate but the mechanism 
by which lands are leased and by which benefi ts are shared. It is clearly unfair. Thus, there 
is a need to develop a district regulation on adat recognition, in order to protect their land 
from occupation. If local communities resist the oil palm estate, please fi rmly state the 
rejection. I am ready to fi ght in their interest when needed. Honestly, the permitting process 
is very complicated and rapidly changes. As a consequence, it is very hard to monitor these 
processes. However, we should do that if we want to struggle for people’s sovereignty. 
Coordination diffi culties are not an acceptable reason. We should solve these problems.
125Case Studies
4.5 PT SIA
4.5.1  Background to The Company
The Sime Indo Agro Limited Company (PT SIA) is a foreign direct investment company 
from Malaysia. It has established a nucleus estate, with associated smallholdings and mill, 
in Parindu Subdistrict, Sanggau District, West Kalimantan. The total oil palm estate of 
PT SIA covers 14,000 hectares and includes two units for milling and processing fresh 
fruit bunches. PT SIA developed the estate in stages, with 2,000 ha. being acquired in 
1996-1997, 4,000 ha. in 1997-1998, a further 4,000 ha. 1998-1999 and a fi nal 4,000 ha. in 
1999-2000. The company commenced installation of the processing factories on the edge 
of Senggoret River in 2000. The two mills have a production capacity of 60 tons and 30 
tons of CPO per hour.
According to the Environmental Impact Assessment, submitted by PT SIA for the 
permitting process, the investment value of PT SIA is approximately US$ 81,476,720, 
made up of US$ 9 million of private capital and US$ 72,476,720 of loans, all paid by a 
Malaysian company, Consolidated Plantations Berhad. As required by Indonesia law, after 
15 years of commercial production, PT SIA should lease a share of their company to the 
Indonesian public. On August 28, 1995, the President of the Republic of Indonesia issued 
a letter approving PT SIA’s investment plan.130 PT SIA, thereby, obtained an investment 
permit for 30 years starting from the date of commercial production of palm oil.131 
PT SIA obtained the land allocation letter from the West Kalimantan Governor after 
going through these legal procedures for approval of foreign direct investment at the 
national level. The Governor’s letter allocated PT SIA land covering 14,000 hectares in 
Sanggau District.132 The letter required PT SIA to conduct a location survey as a basis for 
applying for an initiation permit from the Ministry of Agriculture. 
This was followed up by the National Land Agency (BPN) of Sanggau District, West 
Kalimantan, which issued a location permit for 14,000 ha. on October 3, 1995.133 PT SIA 
also obtained an extension of its location permit in 1996. The location permit came with 
the following requirements:
Land acquisition should be conducted directly by interested parties through trading or 
title relinquishment conducted by the Offi cial Land Register Offi cer (Pejabat Pembuat 
Akta Tanah - PPAT) and with specifi ed compensation.
Compensation over land, plants and or buildings and other goods should be given 
directly to the owner of the mentioned goods without any mediator.
Compensation and confl icts over lands should be dealt with within 12 months of the 
issuance of the decree.134 
▪
▪
▪
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The company successfully acquired 11,395 ha. of lands in 1996.
4.5.2  Land Acquisition and Social Impacts
The area over which PT SIA obtained a location permit for developing its oil palm estate 
in Parindu and Bonti Subdistricts, Sanggau District overlaps the customary lands of the 
Dayak Mayau and Dayak Hibun indigenous peoples. Before the establishment of the 
oil palm estates, all land in the area was held under customary law, with different land 
categories being recognised by different terms according to their function. These terms 
were also different for each ethnic group. For instance, the Dayak Mayau recognise a 
category of collectively owned agro-forests by the term tembawang, which the Dayak Hibun 
refer to as temawoang.
Tembawang or temawoang are former settlement sites which have been planted with fruit 
trees which have re-established canopy forest cover. By custom, such areas cannot be 
managed or owned individually, but are held in common by the whole community.135 
There are many other land tenure categories in the customary law system. Most farm lands 
are allotted to individual farmer families, as heritable usufructs, while the underlying title 
remains with the community as a whole.
According to our interviewees, the inability of government offi cials to recognise the 
special status of tembawang or temawoang as a key part of adat territory was the main issue of 
contention between local people and the government in discussions about land acquisition 
for PT SIA’s oil palm estate. Seeing the tembawang or temawoang as areas covered by trees, the 
government tended to regard these areas as ‘State forests’ and thus felt entitled to allocate 
these for commercial purposes, such as estate development, without compensating the 
customary owners.
After obtaining a location permit in 1995, PT SIA was facilitated by the local government 
to conduct a meeting with the local people of Parindu and Bonti Subdistricts. In this 
meeting, the company representatives explained their plan to develop its oil palm estate 
in the two locations. Together with the government, they asked the local communities’ 
agreement to lease them their lands.
The local communities expected that the initial meeting would include a discussion  of the 
potential positive and negative impacts of oil palm estates and involve them in the decision 
making process. However, in this meeting, the company only one-sidedly presented the 
plans for the oil palm estate without giving any of the expected information to the local 
communities. Neither were they involved in the decision-making process. 
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In the meeting, the company representatives only presented the benefi ts of the oil palm 
estate in order to convince the people to participate in the estate development plan. 
Subsequently, local people were compelled to become involved in the plantation, on the 
grounds that it would improve their welfare. The Bupati (District Head) introduced the 
‘7.5 model’, which meant that each farmer should relinquish 7.5 ha. of land, which PT SIA 
would then allocate as 5 ha. for the nucleus estate, 2 ha. for plasma holdings for community 
members, with the remaining 0.5 ha. being allocated for infrastructure development such 
as roads, and so forth.
The local communities rejected the 7.5 model offered by the Bupati. They proposed a ‘5 
model’, in which each farmer would lease 5 ha. of their land to PT SIA to be allotted as 2 
ha. for the nucleus estate, 2 ha. for plasma and the remaining 1 ha. for infrastructure. PT 
SIA did not accept this model, as it already had the agreement of the provincial government 
to implant the 7.5 model.
In imposing the 7.5 model, the communities felt that PT SIA and the government had 
effectively rejected their existence as a people governed by customary law and had ignored 
their customary rights in land, and was simply taking over their land for their own interests. 
What the company should have done, in the view of interviewees, was to involve adat 
communities in decision-making about the development of the estate, but instead they 
had ignored the local people even when they had rejected company and the government’s 
proposals.
The company continued to implement its estate plan in Parindu and Bonti Subdistricts 
based upon the 7.5 model. As a result, not every family in Parindu and Bonti subdistricts 
got plasma land and those who did get plasma allocations found it was far from enough to 
fulfi l their needs.
Finding that the estate model being implemented by PT SIA did not benefi t local 
communities, the communities sought to withdraw from the scheme and they sought 
clarifi cation from the government that once the HGU of PT SIA expired their land would 
revert to them.  The bottom-line was that the local communities demanded that the 
company re-negotiate its commitments to them. 
According to local community spokespersons,136 for its part PT SIA considered the 
process of land relinquishment by adat people in Parindu and Bonti sub-districts to be a 
conventional land transfer. Therefore, it assumed that local people did not have the rights 
to demand the return of their lands after the company’s HGU expired. In the tripartite 
meeting between the company, the government and the local people, the company stated 
that problems related to land were the affair of the government. 
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Local people strongly rejected the company’s argument. They felt that they had neither 
sold their land nor accepted any land as compensation. The local people considered the 
small amount of money that they had accepted to be payment of derasah, which is payment 
for their ancestors’ efforts in opening the forest to create new fi elds. In contrast, the 
company considered the money to be payment for the land itself.
The case reveals stark differences in the understandings of the company and of local people 
of the nature of land transactions with respect to the signifi cance of the cash paid to the 
people. In positive law, the money given to the local communities was to compensate the 
people for relinquishing their land for the development of the nucleus estate. From this 
point of view, land rights have been transferred from local people to the government for 
the use of the company. The government then a granted business utilization title (Hak 
Guna Usaha) to this land to PT SIA. However, based on adat law, the money given to 
people was only to acquire use rights over these adat lands and  there was no transfer of 
ownership rights to the government or company.  The situation is aggravated by the fact 
that the local population has been increasing rapidly and intensifying confl icts over land 
can be anticipated.
 
4.6 PT PHP
4.6.1  Introduction: Self-governance and Administration
The fi nal case study examines the situation of the Minangkabau people of the community 
of Kapar in West Pasaman District near the coast in the province of West Sumatra. The 
Minangkabau are a numerous, hierarchical people originating in the highlands of West 
Sumatra, whose customs of self-governance as ‘kingdoms’ were recognized during the 
Dutch colonial period. Although their customary system was later suppressed during the 
eras of ‘Guided Democracy’ under Sukarno and Suharto’s ‘New Order’, it was partly re-
established during the current reform period.
Minangkabau oral history recognizes an area of origin (darek) in the highlands, consisting 
of three sovereign regions (luhak), Luhak Agam, Luhak Tanah Datar and Luhak Limo 
Puluh Kota. As the highland populations expanded,137 Minangkabau of each of these luhak 
extended into lowland areas known as rantau. Those from Luhak Agam expanded into the 
rantau on the west coast area into the current districts of Pariaman, Air Bangis, Lubuk 
Sikaping and Pasaman, those from Luhak Limo Puluh Kota expanded into the rantau that 
now includes the districts of Bangkinang, Lembah Kampar Kiri, Kampar Kanan, Rokan 
Kiri and Rokan Hilir, while the Minangkabau of Luhak Tanah Datar established their 
rantau in what are now the districts of Kubuang Tigo Baleh, Pesisir Barat, Pesisir Selatan, 
Padang, Indrapura, Kerinci and Muara Labuh.138 
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In what is now Pasaman district, part of the ancient rantau of Luhak Agam, governance 
was based on the customary rule of the king supported by a hierarchy of  adat leaders. As a 
rantau area, Pasaman was under control of the ‘king’ of Alam Minangkabau, administratively 
centered in Pagaruyung. Locally, governance of this part of the kingdom was controlled by 
the Daulat Yang Dipertuan Parit Batu, the council which oversaw the customary jurisdiction, 
Nagari, of Lingkuang Aur-Simpang Empat, in West Pasaman. The area was organized 
into several semi-autonomous sub-jurisdictions, also referred to as Nagari, which were 
regulated by twin customary institutions. The Tuan Kadi were responsible for religious 
matters, while the Hakim Nan Sambilan (the Nine Judges) were responsible for Nagari 
governance. The Daulat also appointed four other offi cials to manage the Nagari.139 
Further extension led to other Nagari being established including the community visited 
in the case study, Kapar, traditionally referred to as Lubuak Pudiang, which was ruled by 
a customary institution referred to as the Gampo Alam (explained below).  
Currently all of the adat territories of the Daulat Yang Dipertuan Parik Batu have been 
restructured as administrative Nagari in West Sumatra Province under the control of 
Republic of Indonesia. Nevertheless, the customary ties between the Minangkabau people 
and their Nagari are still strongly maintained. 
Pasaman was established as an administrative district simultaneous to the establishment 
of West Sumatra as a province. In the initial stage of the district’s formation, the Nagari 
remained as the lowest level of government administration. However, with the imposition 
of the 1979 Local Administration Act, Nagari were gradually replaced as an administrative 
unit by the desa system. Furthermore, the West Sumatra government issued a provincial 
regulation which further limited the functions of Nagari.140 The Nagari were thereby 
reduced to cultural units, while the desa into which they were reformed were under the 
direct control of central government, and their powers of self-governance according 
to customary law were very attenuated. Nevertheless the units remained and Pasaman 
District, on which the case study focuses, was organized into 49 Nagari.141 In 2003, 
Pasaman District was formally divided into two districts, the area of study becoming West 
Pasaman District.142  
4.6.2  Customary Laws and Land Allocation in Kapar
Similar to other Nagari in West Pasaman, in the 1980s  Nagari Kapar was determined by 
the Provincial administration to be an area suitable for estate crop development. However, 
with the repeal of the Local Adminstration Act, and following the issuance of Provincial 
Regulation No. 9 of 2000, the three villages of Kapar desa were reconstituted as a formally 
recognized, single Nagari covering 3,500 ha. of land and forest, with a population of about 
5,000 people.
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Under the still vigorous customary system, the Gampo Alam consists of two main 
institutions, namely the ninik mamak Ampek Didalam and ninik mamak Ampek Dilua. The 
former has a  duty to manage natural resources management (Panaani Sako), while the 
latter have a duty to protect the honour of  the Gampo Alam and to enforce criminal as 
well as civil adat law (usually called Panyambah Tuah).
Based upon the adat law still prevalent in Nagari Kapar, natural resources particularly ulayat 
lands are managed under the concept of Babingkah Adat.143 This concept divides ulayat 
land into two categories. The fi rst, ulayat yang sudah diulayati, are lands belonging to named 
clans with clear boundaries, the lands within which can be allocated to clan members 
(anak kemenakan) or retained as the communal property of the clan. The remaining ulayat 
land is considered communal property of the Nagari as a whole and is called ulayat Nagari. 
This land is governed by ninik mamak Ampek Didalam,144 who also have a role in managing 
natural resource management. If adat community members in Nagari Kapar need the land 
to fulfi ll their daily needs, ninik mamak in the Ampek Didalam would arrange a meeting 
with all community members to discuss the distribution of the lands. By custom ulayat 
Nagari land can never be sold, a notion captured in the adat proverb: ‘although expensive 
it cannot be bought, although cheap it cannot be asked for’ (mahal tidak dapat dibeli dan 
murah tidak dapat diminta).
In Nagari Kapar, whereas ulayat Nagari lands cannot be transferred to others, being held 
for the benefi t of future generations, clan lands (ulayat yang sudah diulayati) can be leased 
or mortgaged to third parties. Clan members considering entailing their lands in this way, 
should fi rst discuss the matter with their mamak jurai.145 Usually, a mamak jurai would 
approve such an arrangement, as long as the person taking over the mortgaged land is 
a relative. However all such deals should be conducted based upon the consensus and 
agreement of all the parties involved. 
If no agreement can be reached, then the disputing parties can bring their dispute to the 
head, the mamak kaum, of the lineage (kaum) to which their clan belongs. If mamak kaum 
fail to solve the dispute, disputing parties can bring the dispute to the members of the full 
ninik mamak Ampek Didalam. Subsequently, the Gampo Alam could take over to fi nd the 
best decision to resolve the dispute. In every level of negotiation or confl ict resolution, 
anak kemenakan, have the right to be involved in decision- making, (Pancang Silao). Their 
involvement is designed to ease the process of confl ict resolution.
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Picture 2. Scheme of Adat Confl ict Resolution
Most of the ninik mamak in Nagari Kapar have the authority to take decisions to resolve 
problems faced by their own anak kemenakan, the exception being those ninik mamak who 
become members of the body representing the daulat referred to as ‘ninik mamak yang 
tagaknyo indak tasundak, duduaknyo indak tapampeh’ (Datuak Sutan Majo Lelo and Majo Lelo). 
If a problem arises within a clan, only members of ninik mamak Ampek Didalam have an 
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authority to decide. In some cases, the Daulat Yang Dipertuan Parik Batu, which has a higher 
position than the local ninik mamak can play a signifi cant role in solving ulayat disputes, a 
role performed by the Hakim Nan Sembilan.  Generally speaking, there is no justifi cation 
for anak kemenakan or ninik mamak to lease ulayat Nagari or clan ulayat land. Normally, such 
land relinquishment is avoided to maintaim the collective interest. 
If an outsider wants to open fi elds in Nagari Kapar, customary laws does provide two 
means of gaining access. The fi rst is known by the ‘adat di isi, limbago di tuang’, referring to a 
series of procedures which must be gone through to gain the right to temporarily cultivate 
ulayat land. The second requires the payment of Siliah Jariah, a compensations fee to pay 
for the efforts of the land owners who have improved the land. These two terms are really 
well known in adat land acquisition processes. 
Our research found that both the adat di isi, limbago dituang procedure and the payment of 
Siliah Jariah only transfer management or use rights, not ownership rights, to the outside 
leaseholder. The only way that an outsider can gain a stronger right in land is if he or she 
is fi rst adopted by an adat clan and performs daily adat practices. He or she would then be 
called kamanakan dibawah lutuik or kamanakan batali ameh. 
4.6.3  Oil Palm Development in the District
Pasaman has been integrated into the global market economy for a long period of time. 
From the 17th century, it was an important trading centre for spices, rice and gold, a trade 
which intensifi ed in the mid 18th century.146 Oil palm was fi rst introduced to the District 
on a private Dutch estate during the colonial period. After independence, this plantation 
was nationalized and administered by PTPN VI. In 1981, the estate was expanded into 
a 10,000 ha. PIR (inti and plasma) scheme, which provided 2 ha. to each participant as oil 
palm smallholdings and a further 0.2 ha. each for their residence.147 
On 27 September 1989, a meeting was held by the bupati of West Pasaman District 
(Mr. Radjudin Nuh, SH) with all ninik mamak and Pasaman’s community leaders in the 
Tsanawiyah Silaping Building. The meeting was called to discuss the development of 
plantations in Pasaman and was attended by the bupati’s assistants from West Pasaman 
District, the Head of Regional Planning Agency (BAPPEDA) of West Pasaman, the Head 
of Estates Bureau of West Pasaman District (Ir. Rusli Ersy), the Head of National Land 
Agency (BPN) of West Pasaman District (Drs. Syafrin Sirin), the Head of Economic 
Bureau of West Pasaman District (Mr. Anasrul BA), and the representatives of West 
Sumatra Province as well as all sub-district governments.
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In this meeting, the bupati of Pasaman said that the main goal of estates development was 
to improve the welfare and standard of living of the local population. He argued that local 
communities should be involved in the estates through the plasma system. The participants 
of the meeting responded enthusiastically to the government’s plan to invite in investors. 
They also signed an agreement which stated that:
Participants agreed to accept investments in estates;
All ulayat lands that would be acquired by the estate companies should be managed 
and ordered;
All ninik mamak and cucu kemenakan should be involved in the estates development 
under the plasma system;
All ulayat lands used for building roads to ease estates operation would not be 
compensated for except agricultural lands;
The processes of ulayat land acquisition should be accountable;
The amount of Siliah Jariah money payable was to be IDR 50,000 per hectare. 
In 1992, a similar meeting was conducted by PTPN IV in Ophir. There the West Sumatra 
Governor, Hasan Basri Durin, informed the participants of the plan to open oil palm 
estates in Pasaman. He hoped that the estate companies would develop partnerships with 
local communities as had already been developed by PTPN VI.148 These meetings marked 
the starting point of estate expansion in Pasaman. 
On 22 November 1992, the Ministry of Agriculture issued a decree regarding Principle 
Business Approval of Oil Palm Estates to PT PHP in West Pasaman, West Sumatra 
covering 9,000 ha.. This area is located within an area that had been allocated by West 
Sumatra Governor, covering 12,000 ha..149 
The Permata Hijau Pasaman Limited Company (PT PHP) is a joint enterprise originally 
owned by PT Kartika Prima Nabati of Jakarta. In 1999, PT PHP changed its status from 
being a domestic investment company to a foreign direct investment company (PMA). 
Foreign companies that took out shares in PT PHP included Keifl ow Limited (British 
Virgin Island), HVS Investment Limited (British Virgin Island), Bonoto Investment 
Limited (British Virgin Island), and Wilmar Investment Limited (British Virgin Island).150 
Additional funds were sourced from Coffrey International. PT PHP was set up as a palm 
oil company with a mill that was designed to produce 28,600 tonnes of CPO per year, of 
which about 25% was for the domestic market and the rest for export.151 
▪
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Since 1992, Pasaman District has become famous as an oil palm producing area. Oil palm 
estates are now widespread in the six sub-districts. By 1999, the production of oil palm in 
Pasaman District reached 566,957 tons, harvested from 63,249 ha. of estates. However, 
this has not been achieved without problems. On 8 May 2001, the vice bupati of Pasaman 
District noted that the benefi ts were being enjoyed unequally. Estate industries had failed 
to improve local livelihoods. Siliah Jariah payments were not being fairly shared and many 
people were not getting to participate in the plasma schemes. Among the problematic 
estates he specifi cally noted: PT AMP (1,950 hectares), PT TSJ (800 hectares), PT ASM 
(500 hectares), PT Puska (550 hectares), PT Grasindo (2,800 hectares), PT AW (3,899 
hectares), PT PM (2,104 hectares), and PT PMJ, as well as PTPN VI. The offi cial statistics 
for 2000 supported his argument. Of a total population in Pasaman of 504,530 persons, no 
less that 92,033 were living in poverty and hunger, with 778 babies registered as suffering 
malnutrition.152 
4.6.4 Confl ict at Nagari Kapar
On 28 April 2000, a group of people negotiated with police offi cers in Pasaman District in 
order to seek the release of several persons who had been arrested by police.153 The police 
offi cers rejected their demands, thereby increasing the tension between disputing parties. 
Suddenly, a protestor threw a stone that broke the windows of the police station. Incited 
by the stone throwing, other protestors forced their way into the police station to which 
the police responded by shooting rubber bullets and some live rounds, wounding several 
protestors. However, the people were able to overcome police resistance and managed 
to get the imprisoned villagers released from their cells and take them back to their 
community, Nagari Kapar.154 
The action of the Kapar people provoked a strong response from the police. On 29 April 
2000, fully armed police offi cers with two cars and several motorcycles arrived in Nagari 
Kapar. Shooting their weapons into the air, they demanded that the people involved in 
the incident give themselves up. Some people of Kapar were then captured by the police 
when they were in the coffee shop or working in their fi elds. They were arrested and taken 
to the police station in Simpang Empat, Pasaman. However, most of the people being 
sought could not be located by the police since they were hiding or not in their home 
at that moment. This made the police angrier. They swept through and searched for the 
suspects in every house in Kapar, creating an atmosphere of extreme fear. Most of these 
suspects subsequently left their families and ran away from Kapar to the forests or to 
other inland areas. Others fl ed to Jakarta.
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Picture  3. The case of  PHP Company
The following day, at nine in the morning, the police accompanied by the assistants of 
one ninik mamak, Bahar A., came again to Nagari Kapar to search for other men. They 
captured Mr. Bujang Zulkifl i and took him to the police station in Pasaman. He was badly 
beaten on the way there. Five days later, Alisman, another person from Kapar was also 
captured. The police argued that Alisman had attempted to run away, when, in fact, he 
was in his step mother’s house. 
In response to this situation, on 17 May 2000, many people of Kapar, mostly women, came 
to the Pasaman District parliament (DPRD) to hold a demonstration. The demonstration 
was led by Mrs. May, Mrs. Inar and Mrs. One. They urged the parliament to mediate in 
the dispute, and help restore security and order in Nagari Kapar, as well as report the latest 
situation in Kapar to the Chief of Police of Pasaman. 
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Those arrested from Kapar were later released after posting bail of IDR 500,000 per 
person. Then, in the early June 2000, Bahar A. and his assistants and the Vice Chief of 
Police of Pasaman detained Mr. Yurisman in Rao and arrested him. During his detention, 
Yurisan was badly beaten by police offi cers, leading to him being hospitalized in Lb. 
Sikaping Hospital.155 
Why should such violence occur between the people and the police? In the following 
sections we attempt to disentangle the roots of this confl ict. We explore: how lands 
in Nagari Kapar were allocated to the oil palm company; what account was taken of 
customary rights in land; the way that land markets had emerged in an area where such 
transfers were contrary to custom; the distortions in customary institutions that resulted 
and; the long history of land disputes that has resulted. 
4.6.5  Initial Permitting for PT PHP on Ulayat Lands in Nagari Kapar
On 26 July 1992, PT PHP received a recommendation letter from the bupati of Pasaman 
(Mr. Taufi k Marta) to develop oil palm estates.156 The letter noted that, in conformity with 
the statement of the ninik mamak and adat leaders of Nagari Sasak and Nagari Sikilang about 
the territory of Nagari Sunagi Aur in Lembah Malintang subdistrict, the Pasaman District 
government agreed to allocate ulayat lands covering ± 12,000 ha. for an oil palm estate to 
be managed by PT PHP. The company was required to fulfi ll several conditions:
PT PHP Company should request land from the Ministry of Forestry in order to 
acquire areas classifi ed as forests;
PT PHP should negotiate land acquisition process with ninik mamak/adat leaders based 
on mutual agreement because all the lands that will be acquired are ulayat Nagari;
The extent of the estates should be based on surveys by the National Land Agency 
(BPN) in Pasaman District;
PT PHP should act as a bapak angkat (adopted father), in managing the land of local 
communities that covered 10 percent of the total estate area;
If PT PHP Company could not realize its activities within a year, this recommendation 
would be null and void. 
The important point in this letter is that it conditioned the establishment of the estate on 
the prior relinquishment of ulayat land rights by the ninik mamak to the government, which 
would in turn release the land to PT PHP.   
▪
▪
▪
▪
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Picture 4. Recommendation Letter of Land Allocation
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The Governor of West Sumatra, Mr. Hasan Basri Durin, responded to the recommendation 
letter of the bupati by issuing a Governor’s decree,157 allocating 12,000 ha. of land in Nagari 
Sasak, Pasaman Subdistrict, Pasaman District, but also with certain requirements. 
The fi rst requirement, as stated in paragaph 3 of this letter, noted that:
If lands allocated for the estates are ulayat land, PT PHP should conduct land 
acquisition through the Pasaman District government. 
Moreover, paragraph 5 stipulated a second requirement, that:  
PT PHP Company should act as the adopted father of the local farmers and 
accommodate the products of oil palm estates of local farmers in the area 
surrounding PT PHP.
If we compare these two letters, we can note signifi cant differences. The letter of 
recommendation from the bupati of Pasaman District fi rmly stated that lands allocated for 
the purpose of establishing the estate were ulayat Nagari land. Thus, in order to use the 
land, the company should obtain agreement from all the ninik mamak. This decree also 
clearly recognized that the ulayat Nagari land also included an area designated as forest by 
the Ministry of Forests. PT PHP could not ignore ninik mamak who control ulayat rights, 
even though the land was classifi ed as forest.
The West Sumatra Governor, treated the ulayat land as ulayat clan land and considered any 
lands not directly controlled by clans to be State lands. In fact, based on adat rules, not all 
the lands were under the control of clans (berbingkah adat). The consequence was to limit 
the scope of required negotiation to clan land, not the entire area. Therefore, according 
to the Governor, land compensation was only payable for clan lands and neither the 
State nor the company need give any compensation for any lands outside clan lands, 
since all those lands were considered as State lands. In other words, albeit indirectly, this 
Governor’s Decree did not recognize ulayat Nagari land.
It was not until 1995 that, following up the approval in principle (ijin prinsip) of land 
allocation for PT PHP’s oil palm estate,158 the Head of  the National Land Agency (BPN) 
of Pasaman District issued a decree159 granting PT PHP a location permit (ijin lokasi) to 
acquire 3,850 ha. in Pasaman Subdistrict, Pasaman District. This permit states that:
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Land acquisition should be conducted directly by interested parties through land 
title relinquishment. This process should be informed and witnessed by government 
offi cials; 
The amount of land compensation payable should be determined through mutual 
agreement between interested parties;
Agreements with regard to compensation for agricultural crops and or buildings 
attached to the land should also be negotiated directly with the land owners without 
involving any form of mediator;
Land acquisition should be conducted within 12 months after the stipulation of this 
decree, though the decree could be renewed for a further 12 months.
In 1998, the head of the BPN offi ce of Pasaman District issued another decree, granting 
PT PHP a further 1,400 ha. for a nucleus estate and 2,118 ha. for a plasma estate in Maligi 
Village (Pasaman Subdistrict) and Sikilang Village (Lembah Malintang Subdistrict).160 The 
issuance of this permit took into account a letter dated September, 1997, declaring that the 
ninik mamak of Nagari Sasak had agreed to lease their lands, which had been authorized by 
the head of the Kerapatan Adat of Sasak.
Picture 5. Map of Location Permit of PHP Company
▪
▪
▪
▪
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4.6.6  Land Allocation and Development in Nagari Kapar
The local government was not wrong in assuming that the ninik mamak of Nagari Kapar 
were interested in developing their lands. Indeed, in the 1980s, the government had 
allocated several areas in Nagari Kapar for a rice fi eld and irrigation project in Batang 
Tongar. It was the failure of this project which led to the plans to expand oil palm estates 
in Nagari Kapar. 
On January 23, 1980 several ninik mamak in Nagari Kapar had signed a statement about the 
ulayat lands in this Nagari.161 The statement had declared as follows;
The boundaries of ulayat land in Nagari Kapar includes:
The boundary with the Nagari of Lingkuang Aur: Tarok Tongga, Padang Durian 
Hijau, Bintungan Sarang alang di Talao Titisan Kiduak, Rantiang Tibarau and 
Lubuak Languang;
The boundary with the Nagari of Koto Baru: tarok Tongga, Anak air Pabatuan, 
Sailiran Batang Sungai Talang and Tikalak Basi;
The boundary with the Nagari of Sasak: Tikalak Basi, Tunggua Hitam Pamatang 
Sariak, to Labuang Sigoro-Goro/Pulau Kalimonyo;
The boundary with Batang Pasaman: Lubuak Languang, Sapantakan Galah, 
Batang Pasaman, Batang Pasaman and Labuang Sigoro-Goro/Pulau Kalimonyo.
These ulayat lands can be used for development programmes that conform with the 
interests of the government and people of Nagari Kapar. Some projects that have 
been initiated in this Nagari include:
Airport project in Kampuang Laban, Jorong Kapar Utara;
Rice fi eld development projects in Baramban Sasak, Pematang Jambu
Estates and agriculture areas in the border area of Lubuak Languang, Batang 
Pasaman and Rantau Panjang.
Every legal business institution that is interested to acquire lands should get written 
consent from adat leaders, the ninik mamak, the Daulat Parik Batu as well as the Hakim 
Parit Batu in Pasaman.
This agreement was made in order to improve the livelihood of the cucu kemenakan 
who are currently trapped in poverty.
The letter showed that ninik mamak in Nagari Kapar were open to providing  opportunities 
for investors to invest their capital in the Nagari. At the same time, the ninik mamak of 
Nagari Kapar had also supported the district government’s plans to develop rice fi elds on 
their ulayat lands.
On 3 April 1981 a meeting between ninik mamak and community leaders was held in 
Nagari Kapar to discuss the implication of the infl ux of migrants into the Nagari. The 
meeting decided to:
1)
a.
b.
c.
d.
2)
a.
b.
c.
3)
4)
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Accept migrants coming into Jambak and Padang Sari;
Grant these migrants land in Lajur Pematang, Lubuk Gadang, Pangkal Pematang and 
Tandikat;
Grant each migrant family a 2 ha. parcel of land including 0.25 ha. for housing and 
1.75 ha. for rice fi elds;
Grant these fi elds to the migrants between Lubuak Gadang and Batas Batang 
Saman;
Prohibit the lease of all rice fi elds belonging to anak kemenakan in Nagari Kapar, as 
long as the anak kemenakan can show legal evidence of the land ownership or land title;
Require all new comers to make a payment (IDR 75,000) for their parcel of land. The 
payment could be made in three phases: 
First phase, after fulfi lling all requirements for transferring rights and signing an 
agreement/ statement provided by the government of Nagari Kapar, the new 
comers should pay 35 percent from the total amount of compensation.
Second phase, after the fi rst harvest session, 35 percent from total amount of 
compensation should be paid.
Third phase, four months after the second payment, the rest of the payment (30 
percent) should be made.
This meeting also decided to choose a person who would be responsible for matters 
related to the rights of new anak kemenakan in Jambak. The Kerapatan Adat of Nagari 
Kapar was appointed to manage matters related to the arrival of migrants. However, the 
lack of transparency in the allocation of the compensation being paid for lands by the 
newcomers, fomented new disputes in Nagari Kapar. Only a few ninik mamak reaped any 
benefi t from these compensation payments.162 
Local people not only questioned the amount of compensation being paid for the ulayat 
land but also whether the ninik mamak had the authority to negotiate as they had. On 12 
September 1989, a group of pemangku adat and other community leaders sent a letter to 
the subdistrict head of Pasaman. One of the points mentioned in this letter was that ulayat 
land should not be dominated by a restricted group of ninik mamak. Based on adat rules, 
they said, ninik mamak were only custodians of custom (berbingkah adat) and not custodians 
of the land.(berbingkah tanah).163 Therefore, in relinquishing title over ulayat lands in Padang 
Panjang, they had broken adat rules.
A similar statement was later made in a letter sent by the local communities to the Head 
of Pasaman Subdistrict, the Head of BPN of Pasaman and the bupati of Pasaman District. 
On 22 February 1993, in this letter, entitled Gugatan Pengukuran Dan Penjualan Tanah Kosong 
Yang Belum Digarap (Legal Suit on Land Surveying and Trading in Unmanaged Land) they 
stated that the actions of certain ninik mamak, to take control of ulayat lands in Nagari Kapar 
just to serve their own interests, had broken adat rules. When BPN offi cers conducted the 
land surveys, more than a thousand people consisting of adat leaders, religious leaders 
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
a.
b.
c.
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(alim ulama), other ninik mamak and local people attempted to stop the surveys.
4.6.7  PT PHP in dDsputes Over Ulayat Land. 
Another underlying problem in these disputes is that the boundaries between Nagari are 
not registered, mapped or surveyed and are thus often unclear. Customary systems exist to 
resolve these land disputes between Nagari but are rarely given scope to operate when the 
government is involved in land decisions. Now that land markets have begun to operate 
in the area, this lack of precision has begun to generate problems. 
In the case of PT PHP, the company was granted a permit to establish estates in Sikilang 
and Sasak. In the process, ulayat lands in Nagari Sasak and Nagari Kapar were also leased 
to PT PHP Company. As noted by a representative of the Wilmar Group:
To date, the boundaries between ulayat Nagari Sasak and Nagari Kapar are unclear. 
In the initial stage, PT PHP developed estates based on an agreement with Nagari 
Sasak. In the process, people of Nagari Sasak also leased ulayat lands of Nagari Kapar. 
Although the boundaries of ulayat lands in Nagari Kapar were unclear, people of 
Kapar then leased more ulayat lands in 1997. Based on the agreement, 50 percent of 
the area is nucleus estates and the rest of area is plasma estate. While the development 
of nucleus estates has run smoothly, the plasma estate development was hampered due 
to the emergence of land disputes. Local people demanded that the company allocate 
more land for plasma estate than was in the initial agreement.164 
On 6 February 1997, in a letter entitled ‘an agreement among ulayat lands holders’ (Ninik 
mamak/Penghulu Adat) of North Kapar and South Kapar in Nagari Kapar, Pasaman 
Subdistrict, Pasaman, the customary leaders of Nagari Kapar agreed to relinquish their 
ulayat lands for the purpose of oil palm estates development by PT PHP. This letter 
positioned the ninik mamak as the fi rst party and Taufi k Marta, the bupati of Pasaman, as 
the second party. The agreement stated that:
The fi rst party agree to accept PT PHP’s plan to develop oil palm estates in the 
villages of North Kapar and South Kapar, Pasaman District;
The fi rst party agrees to provide and lease ulayat lands in North Kapar and South 
Kapar that are owned and controlled by adat salingka in Nagari Kapar to the second 
party for developing oil palm estates (± 1.600 Ha). The leased land’s boundaries are:
North area is adjacent with Nagari of Lingkuang Aur;
South area is adjacent with Nagari of Sasak;
West area is adjacent with Batang Pasaman
East area is adjacent with the ulayat of Nagari Kapar
The development of the nucleus estate should go hand in hand with that of the plasma 
estate.
1.
2.
a.
b.
c.
d.
3.
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Picture  6. A letter of ulayat land relinquishment 
This letter was signed by both the fi rst and second parties. The fi rst party included 
Syahrun Gampo Alam (Pucuk Adat of Nagari Kapar) and several ninik mamak who declared 
themselves to be leaders who represent their clans in customary and State courts (Mamak 
Kepala Waris). The second party was the bupati of Pasaman. This agreement was witnessed 
by the village heads of North Kapar and South Kapar, the subdistrict head of Pasaman 
and the bupati’s assistant in Pasaman. The letter was accompanied by another letter stating 
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that the ninik mamak were responsible for resolving any potential disputes and confl icting 
claims that could emerge in the future.
Picture 7. The Statement Letter
146 Palm Oil and Land Acquisition in Indonesia
Local community members of Kapar responded to the relinquishment of ulayat lands in 
Nagari Kapar by sending a formal letter on 12 February 1997 to the Head of Pasaman 
Subdistrict that was entitled ‘Ulayat Land Relinquishment in Nagari Kapar’. In this letter, 
the community representatives stated that:
We, Kapar people were really surprised with the distribution of Siliah Jariah money to 
compensate for our ulayat lands on 7 February 1997;
To date, we have no information about the relinquishment of our ulayat lands. The land 
relinquishment process should be based on adat rules. We demand to get information 
concerning, as follows;
The exact date of the agreement between the ninik mamak, the religious leaders 
and the adat leaders and the investors who accepted  our ulayat lands;
The extent and boundaries of the leased ulayat lands. The government also needs 
to set up mechanisms for resolving confl icts between the people and investors;
The amount of Siliah Jariah paid per hectare;
The proportion of lands allocated for the plasma estate and for the nucleus 
estate;
The usage of Siliah Jariah money. 
According to adat rules, ulayat lands belongs to adat community members of the 
Nagari. Therefore, land relinquishment conducted by several delinquent adat leaders 
(oknum ninik mamak) on our behalf cannot be accepted. This action has violated adat 
rules in our Nagari.
Based on the facts described above, we ask the subdistrict head of Pasaman to 
investigate and resolve the dispute particularly with regard to the second point.
1.
2.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
3.
4.
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Picture 8. The Relinquishment Letter of Ulayat Land of Nagari Kapar
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4.6.8  A history of Land Disputes in Nagari Kapar.
Later investigations have revealed more clearly that the dispute over the lease of land to PT 
PHP was but the latest in a long list of community grievances about the way ninik mamak 
have abused their authority to carry out land deals without the consent of community 
members. Based upon information given by adat community members to the Legal Aid 
Foundation (LBH) Padang, such land relinquishment has included:
Pre-1990: land covering 60 ha. was sold to H. Zainir (a Padang entrepreneur).
In 1991, 240 hectares of ulayat land from three villages were managed by a farmer 
group, RTTSK. Later, the land was sold by an ‘oknum’ (delinquent) ninik mamak 
to PT PHP.
Pre-1994, an ’oknum’ ninik mamak sold ± 70 Ha of ulayat land to Jayus.
In 1995, 2,200 ha. of ulayat land in Nagari Kapar was leased to PT PHP.
In 1995, an ’oknum’ ninik mamak sold ulayat land in Nagari Kapar to H. Sarmal (± 
10 hectares).
In 1996, a farmer group (Sidodadi) was formed by local people and fi nancially 
backed by DT. Dawar, an entrepreneur, and ninik mamak of Nagari Air Gadang. 
He controlled 400 ha. of ulayat Nagari lands in Kapar.
In 1996, a community member in Nagari Kapar, H. Buyung Norman, used ulayat 
land covering ± 300 Ha.
In 1997, several ninik mamak sold approximately 12 ha. of ulayat land to offi cers of 
Yarsi Hospital.
The remaining ulayat lands in Nagari Kapar (± 200 hectares) were communally 
managed by community members. 
It was a later dispute about these fi nal 200 ha. of ulayat Nagari lands, mentioned in point 
9, that led to the biggest dispute between local community and ninik mamak. As reported 
by LBH Padang:
In 1999, the people of Nagari Kapar began to use the remaining lands that covered 
approximately 200 ha. In response, a group of ninik mamak intimidated and 
terrorized the people. A farmer, Boy Martin, became the victim of the violence. 
He was jabbed by Buyuang Picak, Bahar’s assistant, when he worked in the fi eld. 
This attack caused a serious wound in the left side of Boy Martin’s head.
In April 2000, a ninik mamak (Bahar A) and his friends, accompanied by police 
offi cers, came to the fi elds that were being used by local people. They sought to 
stop the local people using the lands by threatening them. The police offi cers 
arrested seven local people and put them in jail. These local people included 1) 
Firdaus, 2) Iwan, 3) Pingai, 4) Acong, 5) Sisyam, 6) Ijen and 7) Ucok. 
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
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After hearing the information about the detention of several Kapar people, 
people of Kapar held a meeting in Kapar marketplace to discuss a response to 
the detention. They decided to send several community representatives to the 
police station in order to confi rm the information. 
This then was the background to the attack on the police station in Pasaman, the detention 
and injury of the farmers and so forth. According to LBH Padang:
The case that we are investigating is a demonstration held by 300 people from Kapar 
in front of the police station in Pasaman on 28 April 2000. The demonstration 
was triggered by the detention of seven Kapar people. Police offi cers argued that 
these people were arrested because they were illegally using ulayat lands that had 
been sold to investors. In fact, the community members in Nagari Kapar were 
never informed about, nor did they agreed to sell, their ulayat lands. Based on adat 
law in Minangkabau, ulayat lands cannot be traded. These lands could only be 
managed by community members for fulfi lling their daily needs.
In response to the detention, many Kapar people felt it was urgent to fi ght against 
the police offi cers in order to release their friends from the jail. They argued that 
Kapar people have rights to manage their ulayat lands. Because of the strength 
of solidarity and the close relationships among Nagari members, the people of 
Kapar felt that they had a responsibility to free the jailed Kapar people. This 
led the local people to be engaged in a spontaneous and unorganized action to 
demand that the police offi cers free the people from Kapar. 
In August 2001, a year after the demonstration, further disputes between 
people in Kapar occurred. The protestors burned one person’s house in Kapar. 
Consequently, Yulisman and Fitrizal were arrested by police offi cers. The detention 
was conducted without appropriate mechanisms. In fact, the defendants had not 
been involved in the riot which occurred on 28 April 2000. However, the offi cers 
claimed that both defendants had been engaged in the riot.
In sum, the local people’s detention was a result of manipulations by delinquent 
adat leaders (oknum ninik mamak), investors, and police offi cers. They criminalized 
Kapar farmers in order to stop farmers’ from reclaiming their ulayat lands.165 
4.6.9  Disputes Over Plasma Land
When the research team visited Kapar in Septmber 2005, further demonstrations were 
underway, organized by members of a local farmers’ institution, Tunas Mekar. Farmers 
were occupying the PT PHP site and blocking lorries from coming in and out of the mill. 
They were demanding a fair share in PT PHP’s plasma estate.166 Their demands were thus 
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distinct from other community members who had been demanding the return of their 
ulayat land. The Tunas Mekar group supported their demand for an equal share of the 
plasma estate by referring to the land relinquishment agreement that had been rejected by 
the other group. The agreement had stated that 50 percent of the area leased to PT PHP 
would be established as a plasma estate for distribution to community members.
According to members of Tunas Mekar interviewed during the investigation, the local 
farmers’ cooperative, KUD Kapar, was also involved in the occupation of the PT PHP 
area. This cooperative had been set up as the local counterpart of PT PHP to develop and 
manage the plasma oil palm estate in Nagari Kapar.167  
It was surprising to fi nd that members of KUD Kapar were involved in the occupation. 
The company argued that it had handed over plasma lands to the KUD to be distributed 
to local people. According to the company:
In 1997, the people of Kapar leased their land again, even though in the 
agreement the boundaries of the ulayat land in Nagari Kapar were not clear. The 
land relinquishment was based on an agreement that 50 percent of the estate’s 
area would be allocated for the nucleus estate and the other 50 percent for plasma. 
The development of the nucleus estate then continued [as planned], whereas 
development of the plasma estate was hampered due to ulayat land confl icts [which 
meant the company did not secure all the lands it had expected to get]. Today, 
the people are demanding to get their share of the plasma estate share based on 
the initial agreement. 
The company has handed the land developed as plasma to the KUD. However, 
the distribution of this land has led to disputes. The KUD is an institution set 
up to accommodate the needs of plasma participants. The ninik mamak have the  
authority to choose which people are to be plasma participants. The problem 
emerged when the ninik mamak chose anak kemenakan who did not have rights 
to control the land, for instance, anak kemenakan who have left their lands. 
Furthermore, the ninik mamak do not have clear criteria about who should have 
rights to get plasma holdings.168 
The company explained that the people who were occupying PT PHP’s area were harvesting 
fi ve truckloads of fresh oil palm fruits per day. The problem was being discussed with the 
district government. The company proposed as a solution that they should establish further 
plasma estates outside the designated areas and grant a subsidy of IDR 100,000 per harvest 
on each holding of 2 ha.. The company also proposed that the bupati should discipline the 
local people for occupying company lands and harvesting fresh oil palm fruits. The bupati 
of Pasaman stated that the disputes about PT PHP’s plasma estate had been exhaustively 
discussed between the company, the people, and the district government. However, the 
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company persisted in not distributing a greater proportion of the current oil palm estate 
to the people of Kapar as plasma. Thus, the dispute seemed to be intractable.
The company’s explanation clearly shows that the plasma problems emerged because of the 
disparity between the rate of development of the plasma and nucleus estates. Furthermore, 
there was lack of transparency in the KUD. Because of unclear criteria for selecting 
plasma recipients, plasma was being handed out among anak kemenakan in an unequal way. 
The absence of effective controls, either by the community or the government, over the 
exercise of the ninik mamak’s authority had broadened opportunities for ninik mamak to 
misuse their position and even to sell plasma lots to non ulayat-owners.
4.6.10  Confl icting Views of Land Ownership and Rights Allocation
The presence of investors in the district of West Pasaman has transformed local social 
and economic conditions. The expansion of estates since the 1980s, followed by major 
infrastructure development has brought West Pasaman Barat out of isolation. However, 
the infl ux of these investors has also cause new problems.
In chapter three we noted the tension in Indonesian laws about land. On the one hand, 
the laws respect customary rights, including ulayat, but on the other hand the laws assert 
the overriding imperative of the national interest and subject all lands to an unusual degree 
of centralized control. Even where lands are allocated to private companies, ‘Business 
Use Rights’ (HGU) are deemed to be 25-35 year leaseholds on State lands. Such HGU 
cannot be allocated on forest lands until after the forest lands are transferred out of the 
Ministry of Forests’ jurisdiction. On termination of the lease, HGU lands must be cleared 
of  removable properties and all buildings, and become State lands again.
By contrast, in Minangkabau, all lands are encumbered by ulayat rights. As one academic 
has noted: 
All lands in Minangkabau belong to Nagari, as heritage of the clan, as a source of  
personal wealth, and as a fund of unused land. However, all lands in Minangkabau 
belong to human beings. These lands never belong to an abstract thing.169
The idea that the State should own land is thus contrary to Minangkabau custom and alien 
to Minangkabau thought. Even the kings never owned lands.170 
During Dutch period, the absence of free lands in Minangkabau created diffi culties for 
outsiders seeking to establish estates based on domeinverklaring principle.171 In order to 
ease the investment process, estates companies signed agreements with Minangkabau 
adat communities according to which the land was borrowed not bought from the local 
people, since under custom adat land could not be traded. Most of these agreements were 
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not written. The formal validation of these lending arrangements were established by 
visual surveys of land boundaries (Batas Sepadan) followed by a series of adat ceremonies.
Although the colonial government perceived these agreements as legal, since it recognised 
customary law as applying to native peoples alongside western laws applying to colonials, 
its recognition of a dual legal system could be problematic. When local people had recourse 
to the courts to reclaim their adat lands, judges tended to require written evidence of land 
ownership and contracts. Sometimes, it was impossible for local people to fi nd witnesses 
to land agreements that had been made a long time ago.172 
 
How did the modern State of Indonesia grant HGU over ulayat lands? The Indonesian 
government has its own way of allocating lands for HGU. The law173 states that land 
acquisition could be conducted through local owners fi rst transferring or relinquishing 
their rights over lands to the government, following which the State can grant others 
rights over these lands.
 
As noted, the Minangkabau of Pasaman, do have ways of transferring rights over ulayat 
land to third parties, namely through the procedures of  adat diisi limbago dituang or by 
payment of Siliah Jariah. Article 4 of the bupati of Pasaman’s Decree No. 6 /1998 states 
that: 
Lands for estate purposes are acquired from ninik mamak/ the owner of 
ulayat lands who lease their ulayat lands to the State facilitated by the district 
government. These lands are then allocated to the farmers’ groups that 
participate in plasma schemes under the ‘adopted father’ system.
After the bupati has accepted the land acquisition process and agreed on the 
farmer candidates for the plasma estates, as described in the fi rst paragraph 
of this article, he commands the head of BPN to register these lands as State 
lands, put in boundary markers, and measure these lands in accordance with 
the borders of the land as determined by the land register.
Based on these two articles, we can conclude that these ulayat lands should be leased 
to the district government before the government then grants HGU over these ulayat 
lands. The process of ulayat rights relinquishment is to be accompanied by conducting adat 
ceremonies, such as adat diisi limbago dituang, and by payment of Siliah Jariah.
1.
2.
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Proses Pelepasan Lahan Ulayat Rakyat Pasaman
HGU (TANAH NEGARA)
Ganti Rugi Tanah
INVESTOR PEMDA
Siliah Jariah
MASYARAKAT ADAT
Plasma HAK ATAS TANAH ULAYAT
Picture  9. The Process of Land Acquisition in Pasaman
However, as we have noted, the Siliah Jariah process has been abused and has  become, in 
effect, a mechanism by which outsiders can gain control of Minangkabau adat lands. By 
custom, payment of Siliah Jariah gives recognition of a transfer of use rights, not ownership 
rights. But lack of transparency in the transactions mean that such deals can be all to 
easily manipulatd, even with the connivance of local leaders, who exceed their authority in 
fi nalizing agreements without prior consensus.
Because, from the adat communities’ point of view, there has been no transfer of 
ownership rights, the termination of plantation companies’ operations should lead to the 
land reverting to the community. Indeed, insofar as the land has indigenous owners, the 
land should not be granted as HGU, as HGU can only be granted on State land.
However, from the government’s point of view, once the communities transfer their 
rights in land to the government, they then become State land and can be allocated to 
companies as HGU. Once this leasehold expires these lands revert to the State, not the 
community. In effect, deals with plantation companies lead to permanent land alienation, 
although this is impossible under customary law. This difference in understanding of the 
signifi cance of Siliah Jariah transactions has made adat communities’ wish to reclaim their 
land became more diffi cult.
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According to the Head of BPN in West Pasaman, based on the agrarian law, ulayat rights 
are erased when a HGU is granted over what were ulayat lands. If a HGU is  discontinued 
or is revoked, then the land becomes State land. Even if the government plans to 
return these lands to people to use, the land’s status as State land will persist. This is 
because there are no agrarian regulations that regulate ulayat rights. The same opinion 
was pronounced by the spokesperson for the Wilmar Group whom we interviewed. The 
company representative stated that it has authority to apply for a continuation of a HGU 
but that it did not have a responsibility to resolve and confl icts, which were caused by the 
way the government had acquired and the re-allocated lands and by defi ciencies in tenure 
laws. The company was only complying with such laws as exist. 
The statement of the head of DPRD in West Pasaman becomes relevant. He stated that 
investors in plantations felt that they own estate lands in the nucleus area. During the 
1980s, these investors paid a lot of money to acquire these lands, about IDR 500,000 per 
ha. However, the local people only received IDR 40,000 to IDR. 50,000 per ha. as Siliah 
Jariah money. 
The legal deception was supported by the district government. When resentment towards 
estates increased, the government and other interested parties carried out repressive actions 
to put down resistance. In some cases, the government also gave political recognition 
to those pangulu (traditional leaders) who supported the government and helped them 
disqualify those pangulu who consistently demanded the recognition of ulayat lands.
4.6.11 Legal Irregularities
Our analysis of this case suggests that both customary and national laws have been violated 
in the establishment of the oil palm estates in Kapar. On the one hand, certain ninik 
mamak have used their position to allocate ulayat lands to third parties without adhering to 
adat norms. These violations include:
The relinquishing of lands by only some of the community’s ninik mamak, whereas 
the adat mechanism requires the involvement of all ninik mamak and consultation 
with the whole community. The institution in Nagari Kapar that regulates confl ict 
resolution is called the Pancang Silao, but it was not involved in negotiations. 
Based on adat rules in Kapar, ulayat lands could only be distributed to, and used by, 
kin. Therefore, land sales with outside parties, such as the government or PT PHP 
were prohibited. .
Although norms exist to transfer use rights in ulayat lands to outside parties, the ninik 
mamak sold adat lands in contravention of adat law.
1.
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There were also violations of aspects of the civil law in the relinquishment of ulayat lands. 
The Indonesian Civil Code requires that valid agreements for the trade of commercial 
goods be based on: 
The existence of consensus, 
No deception, 
All parties having legal capacity to enter an agreement, 
Legality of transaction. 
Given that the agreements to lease ulayat lands in Nagari Kapar was only conducted by 
a few of the community’ ninik mamak they may not be legally valid, as such agreements 
could only be entered into by the full group of ninik mamak representing all the anak 
kemenakan of Nagari Kapar. Outside parties wanting to acquire use rights over ulayat lands 
should make agreements with the full group of ninik mamak that really represented all 
anak kemenakan in Nagari Kapar. It also follows that all subsequent transfers of these ulayat 
lands to third parties are null and void.
The third group of violations relate to criminal law. On 21 January 1990, the ninik mamak 
we shall refer to as BAJL, who held the adat title Jando Lela, was dismissed by his anak 
kemenakan, thus losing him his position in the ninik mamak Ampek Didalam. On 22 January 
1990, the clan decided to grant this adat title to Ba Bahari, who then transferred his authority 
as Jando Lela to Rosman. Although BAJL no longer had authority related to his previous 
position as Jando Lela, which includes dealing with the allocation of ulayat lands in Nagari 
Kapar, he continued to exercise these powers on at least seven occasions over a period of 
ten years.174 These actions constitute several violations of the Indonesian Criminal Code 
(KUHP), including the crimes of counterfeiting and fraud.175 
Furthermore, BAJL and his group of ninik mamak can also be considered guilty of the 
crime of Stalionat, as regulated by Article of 358 of KUHP, which states:
Anyone who pursues his own or other people’s benefi t in an illegal manner, by trading, 
bartering or mortgaging any Indonesian land, which does not belong to him, can be 
punished with up to 4 years detention.
BAJL and his colleagues relinquished land rights in Nagari Kapar without consulting their 
kin. They operated as if they had authority over the land, when in fact such a sub-group 
cannot represent all those with an interest ulayat Nagari land. Community members further 
point out that some of the transferred land was in fact ulayat clan land, but that some of 
these clans were not represented by their ninik mamak in the land transfer either.  
▪
▪
▪
▪
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Endnotes:
1 LeBar (1972) refers to the Pesisir as Orang Abung. On the other hand, half the community claim that 
their ancestors were came from the Skala Brak area in sub-district of Balik Bukit and say they have 
lived there for over 450 years ago (Hadikusuma 1989).
2 Boomgard 1998.
3 Repong damar has been widely recognized in Indonesia as a sustainable forest management system 
and the communities were granted the prestigious Kalpataru Award in 1997 in recognition of this.
4 See the MoF Decree No. 47/1998 regarding the Designation of Certain Coastal Forest Areas as a 
Specifi c Purpose Area.
5 ‘Team Eleven’ is a team established by provincial government set up to solve the land disputes in 
Lampung province. The land dispute between the Pesisir and PT KCMU is one of the cases being 
handled by this team. 
6 Satay – braised skewered meat – is commonly sold by street hawkers, who are considered to be people 
of low social status, usually members of the landless poor forced to move to the cities to make a living. 
The camat’s statement was a calculated insult to a proud people living self-suffi ciently off their own lands. 
7 This is a reference to Team Eleven see footnote 5. Tanjung Karang is the Provincial capital.
8 The supposition that PT KCMU is seeking to acquire lands in the HPK area is confi rmed by the 
statement of camat of Bengkunat (Bpk Chairil Azwar) to a  workshop on land use planning held 
in Bengkunat in 2005. He said that PT KCMU had initiated a process to acquire the land but that 
agreement with the communities had not yet been reached. 
9 At the time of the interview the exchange was about IDR 9,500 / US$ 1.00. Compensation with one 
cow per ha. is equivalent to about US$32 / ha. The interviewee is suggesting that farmers are making 
only about US$105.00 per ha. per year from lands being controlled by the oil palm company.
10 See a letter of the Bupati of West Lampung District No. 643/442/Bappeda-LB/1993 dated 19 
November 1993, signed by the Bupati of West Lampung District, HS Umpusinga
11 They said that all families in their village agreed to participate in the oil palm plantation. The formation 
of a village cooperative unit would be decided later. The land should be titled if rights are to be 
recognized. If local people have fi nished their loan payments, they would be granted land titles.
12 See the Decree of the Head of BPN in Lampung District No KPBL/401/03.1/SK/93 on 10 December 
1993 signed by Head of BPN in Lampung District Dr. M. Syaiful Hajani, which was renewed by another 
Decree of Head of BPN in West Lampung No. KPLB.401/01/SK/IL/1995.
13 In line with BPN instruction No. BPN.61c/2008/27/94.
14 See letter of the Head of BPN in Lampung Province No. BPN.61c/2008/27/94, on Socialization before 
the land measurement to be conducted in order to lease the land for PT KCMU, of 31 March 1994.
15 See the Announcement Letter of the Bupati of West Lampung District, No. 593/3.499/LB/1994 dated 
13 April 1994, signed by the Bupati of West Lampung, H.S. Umpusinga. 
16 See the Letter of the Director General of Plantations of the Agricultural Department No. HK.350/
b4.172/03.94 on the Approval of Initiation Permit for Oil Palm Plantation covering 8,500 ha. in the Sub-
district of South Pesisir, West Lampung, dated 19 March 1994. This permit was to last for 12 months. 
The area of oil palm plantation mentioned in this letter differs from that in the Approval Letter of the 
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Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM) No. 448/I/PMDN/1994 of July 8, 2004 which states that the land 
granted for oil palm plantation in the Sub-district of South Pesisir, West Lampung, covered 10,000 ha..
17 This letter is a response of the Bupati of West Lampung to the Letter of Governor of Lampung 
No. 5503/1678/04/94 dated 14 July 1994 concerning the Plan of Additional Location for Oil Palm 
Plantation of KCMU Company in Pesisir Sub-District.
18 This letter did not provide any information regarding the status of the ‘buffer zone area’ or mention that 
it abutted the Bukit Barisan Selatan National Park.
19 Based on the measurement of lands and mapping agency or SIBHPL in Lampung that has been 
agreed by the boundary arrangement committee (PTB).
20 See a letter of the sub district head of Lampung Barat No. 522-12/204/Bapp-LB/1994 to Lampung 
Governor on 16 July 1994 on the utilization of converted production forest in North Pesisir subdistrict 
(Lampung District).
21 See further in a community letter of June 1, 1994 and their attendance in hearing with the head of 
provincial BPN offi ce in June 6, 1994 and the head of plantation offi ce and BKPMD in Lampung, 
June 1994. See also newspaper articles, Merdeka, July 29, 1997 (Masyarakat Minta Izin Prinsip PT 
KCMU dicabut; PT KCMU menggusur tanah rakyat secara membabi buta); Merdeka, July 30 1997 
(Kasus penggusuran Tanah Warga; Pemda Lampung Merasa Diremehkan PT KCMU); Merdeka July 
31, 1997 (Penyepelean Surat Gubernur, Sikap Arogansi PT KCMU); a letter to reject the plantation 
development and expansion were signed by people from Pahmungan village, 16 Marga of adat 
communities in Pesisir, Malaya village, Penengahan village. The letter was sent to the Ministry of 
Forestry and the District government.   
22 Team Eleven represented by Khoiri.
23 The RDP report mentioned that the Provincial parliament (DPRD) commission visited these districts 
(West Lampung, North Lampung and South Lampung) between 20-30 July, 1994. 
24 Prior to this the provincial forestry agency had designated the former production forest, covering 6,000 
hectares, and the whole of the HPK area, covering 5,690 hectares, as settlements and agriculture 
areas as well as for various development projects that conformed to Land Use Plan of Lampung 
Province (District Regulation No. 10 of 1993).
25 See a Recommendation Letter of Lampung Governor No. 503/2116/04/1994, 25 July 1994. See also 
the letter of the Head of Provincial Forestry Agency No. 3601/Kwl-6/1994in 29 December, 29 1994 
(including map and minutes) and instruction No. 22/D.a/I/1995 issued by BPN, 10 January 1995. 
26 See the letter of the Head of Provincial Forestry Agency No. 213/Kwl-6/1995 dated 23 January 1995 
on the agreement of the oil palm plantation of PT KCMU. This letter was reaffi rmed by another letter 
from letter of the Head of Provincial Forestry Agency dated may 17, 2005 No. 1243/Kwl-6/1995 on the 
agreement of oil palm plantation of PT KCMU.  
27 See the Approval Letter of Head of Village of Suka Marga signed by Effendi Husien dated 24 June 
1995 and certifi ed by the camat of Bengkunat, Dr. Syahril. K.
28 See Minutes of Meeting of Musyawarah  June 10, 1995. The signatories and named villages were:
Village head (Kades) Pagar Bukit (Engkon Gunawan), local organization Kota Batu (Purnawardi); 
Village head Penyandingan (Yubhar Hassan), LKMD Penyandingan (Muhtadin); Village head Kota 
Batu (Wahabullah), Kadus Pardasuka (Matrosidi); Sekretaris Desa Negeri Ratu (Syarif Usman); 
Village head (Ibnu Rusyid), Kades Negeri ratu (Sujadi); Village head Kota Jawa (Juaher); Village head 
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Mulang Maya (Choiruddin); Village head Raja Basa (Fatahurrohman); Village head Tanjung Kemala 
(A.Hamidi); Village head Biha (Nusirwan); Village head Way Jambu (Zainal Abidin); Kades Marang 
(Johan Samsi); Village head Kades Sumber Agung (Mursid); Village Head Negeri Ratu Ngambur 
(Syariffudin); Village head Gedung Cahaya Kuningan (Mazkur M).
29 See the Decree of Bupati of West No. 188.45/087/TP/1995 regarding Land Consolidation Planning for 
Plasma oil palm plantation, 13 April 1995. 
30 See the Decree of Bupati of West Lampung No. 188.45/500/BPN/HK/1994 concerning basic land 
prices, July 30, 2004 and unit prices of crops, building and other rights as regulated in the Decree of 
Bupati No. 188.45/223/HK/93, appendix I & II, dated 3 September 1993. The land leasing agreement 
between PT KCMU and villagers in Pagar Bukit represented by Sangidi, Suparlan & Sarmain certifi ed 
by the coordinator of land leasing program for private sectors in the district levels, West Lampung, 
Engkon Gunawan, in 19 April 1995.  
31 See Recommendation of Bupati No. 000/297/TP-LB/1995, 22 June 1995 and the Decree of Bupati No. 
188.45/087/TP/1995, dated June 13 1995
32 See the Decree of Bupati No. 188.45/693/TP/1995, dated 23 June 1995 regarding the implementation 
of land consolidation replacing Decree of Bupati No. 188.45/087/TP/1995 dated 13 June 2005. 
33 Letters were submitted by government offi cials from the following villages:  Way Jambu (19 people), 
Marang (20 people), BiHa (15 people), Pardasuka (10 people), Mulang Maya (9 people), Batu (11 
people), Pagar Bukit (20 people), Negeri Ratu Ngaras (9 people), Negeri Ratu Ngambur (10 people), 
Gedung Cahaya Kuningan (10 people), Pekon Mon (9 people), Sumber Agung (10 people), Tanjung 
Kemala (8 people), Kota Jawa (10 people).
34 See a joint statement of offi cers from 15 villages representing all villagers in 12-14 July 2005. 
35 See joint statement on 30 April 1996, that was certifi ed by the head of district legislature. 
36 See joint statement on 30 April 1996, that was certifi ed by the head of district legislature and all of 
political parties` representatives and Damar farmers of Jejama Beguai (Negeri Ratu Ngaras), Sangen 
(Pardasuka), Kota Batu Mandiri (Mulang Maya) dan Kilu Andun (Raja Basa). 
37 See Bupati Decree No. 975/366/DP.II/LB/1997 of 30 May 1997 on transfer fees. 
38 See Decree of the Head of BPN West Lampung No. 401/01/SK/IL/1996 of 10 January 1996.
39 Compiled from the report of land arrangement of Plasma and nucleus plantation of PT KCMU and 
BPN in 1997.
40 See the report of land arrangement of Plasma and nucleus plantation of PT KCMU and BPN in 1997.
41 See the Bupati Decree No. B/235/ Kpts/B-01/1997 on the designation of nucleus and Plasma 
plantation of 11 November of 1997 signed by Dr. H. Indra Bangsawan as Acting Bupati. See also 
Decree of Bupati No. B/240/KPTS/01/1997 on the implementation of the designation of nucleus and 
Plasma area of PT KCMU dated 19 November 1997 signed by Acting Bupati, Dr. H. Indra Bangsawan.
42 See PT KCMU, 1996, Andal Report.
43 See the letter of Lampung Governor No. 325.28/1640/04/1995 to PT KCMU dated 11 April 1993.
44 See agreement letter between BDNI, KCMU and KUD Karya Mandiri No. 36/80/BDN or 73/KM/05/95 
or  20/KUD-KAMI/5-95 dated 8 May 1995.
45 See the letter of head of Bappeda in Lampung Province No. 522.11/2285/BappedaIV/1999 on the 
proposal of Re-Designation converted production forest area (HPK) in 7 October 1999; a letter of 
the head of forestry department No. 2056/KWL-6/2000 on 12 August 2000; Letter of the Governor of 
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Chapter 5 
Legal Analysis 
Chapter 3 described the legal frameworks that protect the rights of customary law 
communities in Indonesia and that regulates land acquisition for oil palm estates and 
the requisite steps for obtaining investment permits, initiation permits, location permits, 
business permits and, fi nally, business utilization leases for these operations, noting how 
procedures also differ for forest and non-forest areas. Chapter 4 has then examined in 
considerable detail how these laws and procedures are applied or avoided in practice, 
and the reactions of local communities to these impositions. We have seen how the 
constitutional right of adat communities to enjoy collective ownership over natural 
resources, through customary arrangements such as those regulating ulayat land, confl icts 
with other laws designed to promote the commercial development of plantations. 
This chapter explores in more detail this contradiction between State laws which promote 
plantations and customary laws which regulate community rights in land. We do so for two 
main reasons. First because both State law and adat law are respected by adat communities 
as part of their social order and secondly because the Constitution of the Republic of 
Indonesia recognizes and respects the application of adat law in adat regions. 
The presence of two different legal systems both of which are applied in one particular 
area or to one single object of law, land, eventually raises a basic problem: which  legal 
system is to prevail when the two confl ict? The research fi ndings show clearly that in all 
six of the case study areas visited the two bodies of law are in collision. The resulting land 
confl icts are worst when the local adat communities and the oil palm estate companies 
have different interests over the same legal object, ulayat land. On one hand, the local adat 
communities are fi ghting to defend their customary ownership of their ulayat lands. On 
the other hand, the oil palm companies assert the legitimacy of their HGU.  
These confl icts have been expressed in various ways through community resistance to 
the impositions of both the companies and local government. For example, the adat 
community of Dayak Pandu-Ribun conducted demonstrations to protest the action of 
PTPN XIII that took over their ulayat lands for its PIR-BUN project without fulfi lling 
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its promise to hand back part of the land as plasma for the community. Likewise the adat 
community of Kapar, in West Sumatra, has tried to reclaim their ulayat lands after these 
were taken over by PT PHP.
 
The oil palm estates have countered this resistances by the local adat communities by 
reporting those involved to the police, who have then charged the local people with 
trespassing, theft, damage to company properties and so on. Some people argue that 
this legal action by the companies constitutes an attempt to criminalize communities for 
seeking to control what is legitimately theirs - their ulayat lands. Certainly the violations 
of community land rights are contrary to international norms established in international 
laws such as International Labour Organization Convention 169 and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. 
The research fi ndings show that the Republic of Indonesia is negligent in protecting the 
human rights of adat communities by failing to protect adat communities’ rights during 
the development of oil palm estates, leading to evident miscarriages of justice. According 
to the adat communities, this negligence is most evident when the State has revoked rights 
over ulayat lands and converted these lands into HGU for the oil palm estates without 
even notifying affected communities.
5.1.  Legal Analysis of Research Findings 
One of the main research fi ndings is the very real existence of the two different legal 
systems (State law and the adat law). These two legal systems have their own legal concepts 
and regulations over natural resources including land. In all three districts, Sanggau, West 
Pasaman and West Lampung, the research team found strong claims being asserted by 
adat communities, which were urging the oil palm companies and the local government to 
respect and recognize adat law as they apply it in their areas. 
The adat communities in these three districts have their own existing adat laws, including 
the various Dayak groups’ customary jurisdictions in Sanggau District, like the Mayao 
encountered in the case study of PT CNIS, the Pandu-Ribun facing PTPN XIII, the 
Tinying found in the PT MAS case and the Sami in the PT SIA area, the Minangkabau, 
whose adat law over nagari in Kapar has run into confl ict with PT PHP in Pasaman district, 
and the adat laws over the marga of Ngambur, Ngaras and Bengkunat, being affected by 
PT KCMU in West Lampung district. State and adat laws both govern land with respect to 
several main principles relating to ownership of the land, renting and compensation, the 
power of attorney, and punishments or sanction. We now explore each of these principles 
in turn.
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5.1.1 Land Ownership
As noted, a basic concept relating to land ownership in Indonesian State law is the concept 
of the controlling right of the State which has three legally distinct components:
1)  To regulate and manage the allocation, utilisation, reservation and preservation of the 
natural resources of earth, water and air;
2) To regulate and determine legal relationships between individuals and the earth, water, 
as well as air;
 
3)  To regulate and determine the legal relationships between individuals and legal actions 
related to the utilisation of natural resources in the earth, water, and air.
One of the legal interpretations of this concept is that the State has full authority to issue 
or revoke land titles given to any eligible legal subject. In this circumstance, communal 
ownership of land (ulayat land) is not recognized by law unless the State has conferred 
ownership of such areas through specifi c regulations and decisions.
By contrast, adat law validates ulayat rights in land, based upon the evidence of community 
owners. No land can be bought or sold, since adat law prohibits trading in land. The only 
land-related right that can be transferred under adat law is the right of utilization, not of 
land ownership. 
 
5.1.2   Renting and Compensation
The perspective of State and adat laws concerning renting and compensation are substantially 
similar. Both of them identify renting as a temporary controlling right that expires at the 
end of the period of the renting agreement, which right is obtained by a person who agrees 
to pay rent to the owner. Nevertheless, unlike the renting and compensation principles of 
adat law, the renting and compensation principles of State law are required to be written 
in the form of a rental agreement, a difference that often creates problem in practice. The 
research shows that there are signifi cant misunderstanding between adat communities and 
oil palm estates,  particularly with respect to the money that is handed over during the land 
acquisition process. 
On the one hand, adat communities consider land acquisition for the oil palm estates 
purpose to have been performed according to customary renting and compensation 
principles, which never have any implications for the ownership of land. They perceive 
that the money, known as derasa in the customary laws of the Dayak or siliah jariah by the 
Minangkabau, that was given by oil palm estates companies to be compensation for the 
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transfer of the land utilization right to the oil palm estates. In their view, the company 
should give back ulayat lands when the plantation’s term has been run. The research fi nding 
confi rms that there was no intention by the adat communities to sell their ulayat lands. On 
the other hand, the company considers the land to have been sold and sees the money as 
payment for the land transfer. 
5.1.3   Power of Attorney
Under State law, a letter conferring power of attorney over land acquisition should be 
written on sealed paper1, signed by both the provider and recipient of the power of 
attorney, and should state in clear wording which authorities are being delegated by the 
provider to the recipient of the power of attorney and which are not, according to  laws 
and regulations, and must ensure that both the provider and the recipient have legal 
personality under State law.
By contrast, adat laws may have quite different notions of which powers can be conferred 
on community members and may not recognize the concept of the power of attorney. 
For example, according to the Pandu Dayak, when there is an interaction between an adat 
community and outsiders, the role of the adat leaders is merely to communicate agreed 
decisions made in prior adat meetings which generate consensus. Such leaders do not 
enjoy power of attorney, as under State law. Therefore, according to Pandu adat law, a 
Pandu leader cannot make a decision affecting the future of adat community members 
(including ulayat land acquisition) based solely on his or her own discretion. 
A somewhat similar distinction is also made by the Minangkabau, when they note that 
ninik mamak are ‘custodians of custom’ and not ‘custodians of the land’. In negotiating 
over land, they should act according to previously agreed community decisions and not 
according to their own views and interests.
5.1.4   Imposition of Sanctions 
There is also basic difference with regard to the imposition of sanctions under State 
and adat laws. The character of sanction under State law follows the logic of private and 
criminal law. The main purpose is merely to punish the person who breaches the private 
or criminal law, not to maintain other ideal conditions such as the social order or the 
balance of nature. As a consequence, the State will not impose sanctions on any person 
who damages the social order or upsets the balance of nature if they have not violated any 
laws or regulations. By contrast, the main purpose of sanctions imposed under adat law is 
to maintain the social order and balance of nature. 
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We can see these elements in confl ict behind the process of oil palm estates development, 
from the initial phase of spatial planning, through investment, licensing, land acquisition, 
planting and production. We note the following in particular:
1. The adat community has no option to accept or reject proposed oil palm estates. 
When the oil palm companies and local government undertake spatial planning, the local 
government (bupati and local legislature) announce their decision regarding  where oil 
palm estates can be established according to the district spatial plans, without any genuine 
participation by local people, in particular impacted adat communities. 
In all the cases studied, no community members acknowledged being involved in the spatial 
planning exercises that allocate areas for the development of oil palm estates on their ulayat 
lands. They only became aware of these spatial plans later when local government offi cials 
informed the communities of the plan for oil palm estate development and of the need to 
acquire their ulayat lands for development purposes. In other words, the adat communities 
are forced to accept the development of oil palm estates. This coercion becomes clearer 
in those cases where the oil palm  companies, with the support of local government and 
military personnel, physically and verbally pressured community members who reject oil 
palm. 
This coercion has various different expressions, such as the hostile take over of ulayat lands, 
as in the case study of adat community of Kapar, and the physical and verbal intimidation 
of members of the Dayak Pandu Ribun, who were jailed on charges of  being members of 
the (banned) communist party, in the case study of PTPN XIII. 
2. Misleading and manipulating information 
The oil palm companies have a useful tool in communicating development plans to 
communities, a process that is known by the Indonesian term ‘socialization’. This term is 
intentionally chosen, as it is understood as meaning that information is merely disseminated 
to local people after a plan has been decided on by local government. ‘Socialization’ of 
an idea thus means that the local people, including the impacted adat community, have 
no option except to accept the plan. ‘Socialization’ is usually carried out by infl uencing 
local government offi cials from village level up to district level and consists of providing 
general information about where estates are to be located and the ‘too good to be true’ 
benefi ts that they will bring to the adat community. 
Often, this ‘socialization’ results in adat community members registering their holdings in 
ulayat lands for estate development and, commonly, involves the appointment of some 
adat leaders by the companies to act as the informers and to answer any questions raised 
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by community members. In reality, these informers often do not know important details 
in the development plan, with the result that, day in and day out, community members 
are given inaccurate information about the implications of oil palm estates in their area. 
Confused adat community members are just told: ‘Do not be confused, just sign the 
papers!’2   
3. No Consensus 
Throughout the interviews, adat community members admitted that no consensus building 
meetings had been conducted prior to deciding to host oil palm estates. They noted that 
the appearance of oil palm companies in their areas followed the decisions of the local 
government to develop oil palm estates in their districts. As adat communities, they only 
had the obligation to support such development. The case studies of the PT SIA and PT 
PHP revealed how the series of meetings conducted by the companies (and supported 
by the local governments) only consisted of the ‘socialization’ of the oil palm estates 
development plan. Furthermore, in tones of instruction, the companies informed the adat 
communities that they were required to transfer their ulayat lands to the estates because 
the project had been approved by the local government. The companies never asked, and 
did not want to hear, the opinions of the adat communities concerning these projects. 
In any case, especially during the Orde Baru, if the communities rejected the project, the 
company would take over their ulayat lands by force.
A similar pattern can also be detected in the processes allocating land for the nucleus and 
plasma elements of estates. Again, the main reason that no process had been allowed to 
generate local consensus on this issue was that this allocation of land had been stipulated 
by local government regulations. Thus, whenever adat community outgrowers and workers 
questioned the allocation (for example, the ‘7.5’ scheme), the company responded by 
stating that this was in accordance with existing local government regulations. 
4. Agreements and Infringements
Every oil palm estate development normally involves many types of agreements, either 
bilateral agreements between the adat community and the company or between the company 
and the local government, or multilateral agreements between the adat community, the 
company and the local government. The companies recognize two models of agreement, 
as follows:
1. The fi rst model is an agreement in written form on sealed papers, which is signed 
before the authorities. This model is mostly used if the contents of the agreement will 
bring benefi ts to the company. Normally a big party is held following the signature 
process;
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2.  The second model is an agreement made orally, without the approval or confi rmation 
of the highest offi cial of the company and without being witnessed by senior local 
government offi cials.
According to Indonesian law, these two models have different legal consequences. The fi rst 
type of agreement, gives the company a strong position in law in case the adat community 
breaches the agreement. Such a written agreement is considered to be valid evidence 
in cases when the community is held to have infringed the terms of the agreement. By 
contrast, the second kind of agreement hardy protects the adat community because the 
law gives greater weight to written evidence than oral testimony. These two models of 
agreement were found in all the case studies. In simple words, no matter what model of 
agreement was used, the oil palm companies always have a stronger position compared to 
the adat communities. 
 
Endnotes: 
1 The latest price of which is IDR 6,000 per sheet.
2 Letters of agreement whereby adat community member agree to give up their land in favour of 
becoming oil palm estate workers or smallholders.
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Chapter 6 
Implications and Recommendations
The research substantiates, in considerable detail, the oft-made claim that oil palm 
plantations have been established in Indonesia without respect for the rights of indigenous 
peoples and local communities. Yet, international standards, such as those set out in 
international law, elaborated in international jurisprudence, adopted in ‘best practice’ 
codes, consolidated in the United Nations’ Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, and recently adopted by the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil, do require 
respect for such rights. Indeed the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia also requires 
respect for the rights of customary law communities.
The study reveals that the processes which nevertheless lead to these rights being violated 
in the development of oil palm estates result from: 
Contradictory laws, which fail to secure indigenous rights while encouraging land 
expropriation for commercial projects in the ‘national interest’;
An absence of regulations, as a result of which procedures for the recognition of the 
collective land rights of customary law communities are unclear;
Weak institutional capacity, both in the BPN and in the district bureaucracies, which 
makes recognition of customary rights administratively diffi cult;
National and regional policies and spatial planning processes which favour the 
conversion of ulayat lands and forests into oil palm plantations to increase national 
and district revenues.     
The study has also shown that many oil palm companies operating in Indonesia have 
acquired land by doubtful means and many have not adhered to legal requirements 
or procedures, as much due to lax administration by government offi cials as to poor 
performance or dishonesty on the part of the companies themselves.  
All this implies a big risk for Indonesia’s trade in palm oil products. Although the country 
is on the point of becoming the world’s number one producer of crude palm oil, rising 
international awareness of the real costs of this production, in terms of social and 
▪
▪
▪
▪
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environmental impacts, could place this huge trade in jeopardy, as retail and processing 
companies turn to other producers with less questionable or controversial records to 
supply their needs.
If palm oil production in Indonesia is to meet international standards and regain the 
confi dence of investors and buyers, then major reforms are required in national and local 
policies, laws, procedures, implementation and enforcement.  
6.1  Legal Reform
In fact the National Assembly (MPR), the highest body in the legislature, has already 
recognised the need for an overhaul of Indonesian laws related to land and natural resources 
and, in particular, to custom. Legislative Act No. 9 of 2001,1 instructs the parliament 
(DPR) to completely overhaul the natural resource laws in order to strengthen the rights 
of communities and resolve confl icts over resources. When it was initially passed, the 
Act, which carries near Constitutional authority, was widely heralded as a major advance 
but its implementation has since been resisted by the various line ministries charged with 
managing natural resources. However, in 2003, the MPR reiterated its insistence that the 
natural resource laws be revised2 and reform of some of these laws is now slated during 
the DPR’s current legal reform programme.3    
This study suggests that these reforms should pay particular attention to the following. 
6.1.1 Reform the State’s Controlling Right over Land and other Natural Resources
As described in the previous chapters, problems and confl icts over palm oil plantations 
are rooted in unclear and confl icting regulations and government policies that govern the 
ownership, control and management of land and other natural resources. The main legal 
basis for the State’s Controlling Rights (Hak Menguasai Negara) is the 1945 Constitution 
(UUD 1945). This right is further refl ected in various sectoral laws and has then been 
applied by the government through issuing implementing regulations such as Government 
Regulations, Presidential Regulations, Local Regulations, Ministerial Decrees, and so 
forth. Our research fi ndings show that the Indonesian government has used this power 
as its ultimate sanction to assert its authority to control land and other natural resources 
and, in the context of palm oil development, to smooth the path for the development of 
large-scale palm oil plantations. 
The government has intentionally re-interpreted the ‘State’s Controlling Right’ to be the 
‘Government’s Controlling Right’ which then allows it near unfettered discretion in the re-
allocation of resources vital to the livelihoods of Indonesian citizens, including indigenous 
peoples. In so doing, the government stipulates repressive laws and regulations (particularly 
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in natural resources sectors) that have been designed to legitimate the government’s violence 
in acquiring the ulayat land of adat people and local communities. As a consequence, adat 
and local communities, who live close to their land and natural resources, are subject 
to forcible and manipulative acquisition of ulayat land and to subsequent human rights 
violations. To make matters worse, the big palm oil companies also try to benefi t from 
these circumstances by conducting the same forcible and manipulative acquisition of ulayat 
lands from the adat peoples and local communities.
The unfortunate circumstances for adat peoples and local communities, as mentioned 
above, is that the State does not have any clear standards or system to control and monitor 
the application of the State’s Controlling Right by the Government. From the perspective 
of universal constitutional law, every government action should actually be controlled by 
a ‘check and balance’ mechanism, a monitoring action that is performed by the three main 
elements of the State (executive, legislature, and judiciary) and by the public, to control 
and warn the government when the government has misinterpreted or misapplied laws 
and regulations.  However, in Indonesia, public controls on the government are weak or 
ineffective due to the lack of a legal basis for freedom of speech, particularly with respect 
to confl icts over land and other natural resources.
The suffering of adat peoples and local communities because of the misinterpretation by 
the government on how to apply the State’s Controlling Right should be ended. One of 
the solutions is to re-educate Indonesians’ understanding of the State’s Controlling Right, 
especially decision makers and those who draft Indonesian laws and regulations. Beside 
correcting the idea that the Government has a Controlling Right, reform of the State’s 
Controlling Right should take carefuly into account the actual condition of adat peoples 
and local communities as well as the carrying capacity of land, natural resources and the 
environment.  
6.1.2 Eliminate the Conditional Recognition of Adat Communities by the State 
There are three important laws which relates to the processes of palm oil plantation 
development in Indonesia, namely. the Basic Agrarian Law, the Forestry Law and the 
Plantation Law which need to be reformed if the rights of adat communities are to be 
adequately recognised.
The Basic Agrarian Law (UU Pokok Agraria) places a severe limitation on adat rights through 
Article 2 paragraph 4 and Article 3. These articles declare that the implementation of the 
State’s Controlling Right could be delegated to adat law communities through exercise of 
ulayat rights or other similar rights, ‘as long as those rights still exist’, are further set out 
in local regulations and,  most importantly, are exercised in accordance with national and 
state’s interests as well as higher laws and regulations.
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The Forestry Law (UU Kehutanan): likewise places a limitation on adat rights through 
Article 4 paragraph 3, Article 5 paragraph 3 and Article 67 paragraphs 1 and 2. These state 
that customary law communities have rights to utilize and manage forest ‘if they still exist 
and their existance is verifi ed in accordance with certain local regulations’. 
Finally, the Plantation Law (UU Perkebunan) limits adat rights in the process of  land 
acquisition for plantation purposes in Article 9 paragraph 2. According to this clause, 
there are fi ve requirements in which a certain community can be claimed as adat law 
community: (1) adat communities still organize themselves exclusively under customary 
association (rechtsgemeinschaft); (2) the presence of structured customary institutions; (3) the 
presence of a clear legal territory of adat communities; (4) adat communities still practice 
their daily activities according to the existing adat law and institutions; and (5) the local 
government has recognised the existence of such adat comunities in accordance with any 
local regulation on such a recognition.
The laws, in effect, give various government agencies discretion to recognise (or not) 
the existence of adat communities and their rights, and thus substantially limit the ability 
of adat communities to exercise their rights over land and natural resources. This kind 
of recognition weakens adat communities’ position, particularly when they seek to 
defend their ulayat lands against government or company’s expropriation. Regulations 
on land acquisition therefore should be reformed to ensure effective recognition of adat 
communities and provide legal protection to their adat rights.
6.1.3  Protect and Respect Customary Law and Indigenous Peoples’ Rights through  Issuing a Law 
on the Protection of Indigenous Peoples (UU Perlindungan Masyarakat Adat)
Up to now, there is no law specifi cally designed to protect indigenous peoples and their 
rights in Indonesia, even though the Constitution of Indonesia, particularly Article 18B 
gives ample scope for having such a law.. Although some district governments have 
issued District Regulations on adat communities, the content of these regulations tend 
to formalize customary institutions and do not clearly discuss adat rights over land and 
natural resources.  
A specifi c law on adat communities has thus been proposed by indigenous peoples’ 
organisations and supportive lawyers in order to clarify and justify the protection of 
adat communities and their customary rights. Thereby, adat communities would obtain 
legal protection and their customary rights would be effectively recognized. This would 
guarantee the recognition and protecttion of people’s rights whenever the government or 
companies plan development projects on people’s lands.
177Implications and Recommendations
6.1.4   Revoke Presidential Decree on Land Acquisition to Support Development Projects for 
Public Purposes.
As noted above, to date, the Government of Indonesia has issued three regulations 
on land acquisition for development purposes that include Ministry of Home Affairs 
Regulation No.15 of 1975 that was replaced with Presidential Decree No. 55 of 1993. The 
last revision was made in the early 2006 by issuing Presidential Decree No. 36 of 2006 to 
replace the previous decree. This revision has given rise to controversy and critiques from 
various stakeholders. Indonesian NGOs have called for a Judicial Review of Presidential 
Decree No.36 of 2006, claiming that the revised decree was not appropriate and infringes 
human rights principles, by facilitating both physical loss (fi nancial and natural resources 
damage) and psychological loss (threatened and unsafe lives, as well as intimidation), loss 
of properties and even death.
These regulations and decrees are based on the assumption that national interests should 
be allowed to override individual or group interests. Such an assumption could potentially 
endanger the enforcement of human right principles. As described in the Article 4 Law 
No. 39 of 1999 on Human Rights and Article 28I Constitution Law of 1945, the rights to 
life and the right to protection are non-derogable rights that should be restored. 
Hence, laws and regulations that could potentially harm individuals’ and peoples’ rights 
should be revoked. Instead, the state needs to formulate regulations on land acquisition 
for public purposes based on respect for human rights and the principle of Free, Prior and 
Informed Consent, as well as provide suitable payment and compensation for any losses 
or damages caused by utilization of people’s land for development purpose. Only in this 
way can development projects in the national interest be made compatible with securing 
the  welfare of local communities.
6.2  Procedural Reform
In addition to reform of the laws and regulations, it is also necessary to reform the 
procedures related to palm oil plantation development. The following are priorities. 
6.2.1  Stricter Controls on Forest Conversion
As revealed by the case studies investigated in this research, the majority of palm oil 
plantations have been established in State forest areas that have been legally converted 
into non forest areas and then planted as oil palm estates. However, a closer analysis shows 
that the ‘State forest areas’, which were then slated for conversion, were only recently 
designated as ‘forest areas’ and most have not yet been delineated and gazetted as ‘State 
forest aras’ according to legally required procedures. This implies that these areas should 
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not have been categorized as State land. However, most  Initiation Permits (ijin prinsip) 
and Plantation Business Permits issued by the National Land Agency (BPN) and the 
District Government declare these areas to be State Lands regardless of these procedural 
irregularities. By labelling certain lands as ‘State Land’, the state justifi es its actions of 
ignoring or even extinguishing adat communities’ and local people’s rights over their land 
and natural resources.4 
These problems would not occur if the State had clearly defi ned what a ‘former forest 
area’ is.  
Where the designation of these areas was based on implementaion of the existing 
regulations regarding the designation of state forest areas (assignment, delineation, 
and determination of forest area), then FPIC procedures should have been performed 
to get consent from impacted communities on the land use change in which forest area 
is converted into plantation area (estimated at about 14 million hectares to date).
Or if the forest areas had been designated on lands that are still burdened by the rights 
of third parties then conversion of these forest areas should not have been carried out 
as if they were unencumbered State lands. Before carrying out land registration based 
on procedures stated in Government Regulation No. 24 of 1997, the government 
should have identifi ed existing rights on these lands. Subsequently, FPIC procedures 
could then have been performed to obtain people’s consent on land utilization and 
management. (estimated at about 108 million hectares).  
In order to monitor the massive conversion of forest areas into palm oil plantations since 
1969, no less than 23 million hectares of former forest areas need to be inventoried. It 
would then be possible to determine which areas that have been designated and which 
have recently been granted to plantation companies. These data should be made available 
to the public. This action could then help guarantee protection of adat and local rights 
over lands and natural resources in areas being converted to plantations. According to 
Forestry Department statistics, up to 2005, only 12 percent (14 million hectares) of 122 
million hectares of forest areas have yet been delineated and designated. Thus, the rest 
of forest areas covering 108 million hectares have not yet been designated as state forest 
areas. Data collection perfomed by third party needs to be carried out before handing out 
any permits in these areas.
6.2.2  Engage Indigenous Peoples in Developing, Discussing and Applying Policies on Land Use 
and Spatial Planning at the National and Regional Levels
Land use policy provides legal guidance for the government to implement development 
plans. Land use documents consist of government’s plans regarding the use and control 
of land areas. The existing regulations regarding land use planning emphasise the 
rights of people to use available spaces, to undertand the land use plan, to participate 
▪
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effectively in the formulation and application of land use plans, as well as obtaining proper 
compensation for any losses caused by development projects. In reality, however, people 
are not well-informed about land use planning and are rarely able to get access to the 
process of formulating, planning and deciding on land use in their areas. Indeed, the Law 
on Land Use invokes several ideal principles that include accountability, equity, and legal 
protection in the formulation, discussion, as well as designation, of land use. In reality, 
these principles are rarely implemented.
As a consquence of the absence of people’s participation in the land use planning, 
development projects are often implemented in ways that geneate confl icts between the 
communities and the government or companies. It is important, therefore, to formulate 
policies and mechanims that provide a space for people to effectively participate in the 
land use planning.
6.2.3  Implement FPIC Principles on Every Stage of Palm Oil Plantation Development 
Indeed, throughout all phases of palm oil plantation development, from issuance of a 
business permit through to the operational phase, palm oil plantation companies do not 
effectively engage communities so that they can participate in decision-making processes. 
In some cases, token participation has occurred but in a very manipulative manner. 
For instance, in the initial phase of proposing plantation business permits, companies 
are required to formulate Environmental Impact Assesment (Analisis Mengenai Dampak 
Lingkungan/AMDAL) in which communities should be respondents that would be asked 
their opinions toward the business plan. However, our research fi ndings show that none 
of adat communities understand the formulation of AMDAL. They also confessed that 
they had never been interviewed by the companies even though the companies run their 
plantation businesses on ulayat lands. 
This exclusion of popular participation is found at almost every stage of palm oil plantation 
development. Therefore, implementation of the free, prior and informed consent 
(FPIC) principles, as required by the RSPO, is necessary to ensure that people’s voices 
are heard and accomodated in decision-making processes related to palm oil plantation 
development. Through application of this concept, disputes over ulayat land and the 
emergence of community resistances to unfair and manipulative processes of plantation 
expansion should be minimized. 
In accordance with FPIC principles, oil palm plantation development should apply the 
principle at several stages:
During the process when decisions are made on whether or not to include forest areas 
(if the area is forested) 
▪
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At the stage when a plantation business permit is being applied for; this should require 
fully informing the communities about the plantation business plan that will use 
communities’ lands. The government should then consider communities’ concerns 
or disinclinations on the plantation business plan and only grant the business permits 
to the company where the communities are in agreement;
Also prior to the issuance of the Location Permit, ensuring a clear declaration of the 
extent of the areas to be allocated for plantations, the duration of location permit and 
a map of location permit area;
During measurement of the plantation areas, including those located in both forest 
and non forest area. At this stage, the government and company should involve 
communities in designating territorial boundaries and they also should inform 
communities on the extent of areas  that have been delineated;
Issuance of HGU; before issuing the HGU, BPN should listen and consider adat 
communities’ concerns toward utilization of their ulayat land for plantation purpose. 
Only where communities confi rm their willingness to have their ulayat lands used 
by the companies should HGU be issued. In this way, potential confl icts and other 
problems should be resolved before the company gets the fi nal go-ahead.
Implementation of FPIC principles should ensure effective recognition and protection of 
adat rights over ulayat lands and natural resources as well as reduce social and legal impacts 
due to injust impositions by the govenrment or by companies. The National Land Agency 
(BPN), the government agency charged with land matters, should be fully responsible for 
the process of land acqusition for development purposes in Indonesia. Therefore, the 
agency should apply FPIC principles and make sure there is full recognition of adat rights 
on communities’ lands. 
6.2 4  Interim Measures
However, interim measures will also be needed while these legal reforms are pushed 
through and the institutional capacity to implement them effectively is then developed 
– something that may take several years. In the meanwhile, government policy on the 
promotion of oil new palm plantations should be reformed (see following section), while 
interim confl ict resolution mechanisms should be adopted based on mutually agreed 
mechanisms to deal with the problems in existing plantations.5  
This ‘transitional justice’ approach has been advocated by Indonesian NGOs to allow 
confl icts to be dealt with while broader legal reforms are still underway. The approach 
seeks to resolve current deadlocks through extra-legal means, as effective government 
solutions are impossible within the confi nes of current applicable laws or because, in fact, 
it is these very laws which are the main source of injustice. 
▪
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The approach assumes that local communities have the rights to own, use and control 
their lands and all the natural resources pertaining to them.6 It starts by taking  testimony 
from affected community members regarding the processes by which their rights were 
extinguished or violated, and grievances about other violations of rights to land and natural 
resources as well as accompanying human rights violations. It then advocates restitution 
of land or the provision of compensation to affected groups in ways that satisfy them. 
Although such processes cannot easily achieve legal fi nality, they can bring peace to areas 
of confl ict, but they will only work if other parties (companies and local government) are 
prepared to accept the legitimacy of customary rights-holders’ demands and negotiate 
with them as such. Exactly such mechanisms are required to achieve compliance with the 
RSPO standard. 
In some oil palm plantations, affected groups are taking collective actions to take back 
lands that have been forcibly taken from them over the past 32 years. They have been 
doing this by reoccupying land, destroying company assets like buildings and mills, 
razing plantations, chasing plantation workers away and so on. Such actions create scope 
for provocateurs to widen the confl icts and spread social confusion, exacerbating the 
widespread communal violence (known as ‘horizontal confl ict’) that has become such a 
feature of reform era Indonesia. The lack of mechanisms to resolve long-standing tenurial 
disputes underlies many of these troubles.
 
To resolve these ‘time bombs’ in the body politic, spokespeople for the agrarian reform 
movement in Indonesia have proposed the setting up two bodies to deal with them. The 
fi rst would be a national body, under the direct control of the Offi ce of the President, 
with the specifi c function of channelling disputes through a process that fi rst registers 
them and then seeks to resolve them through negotiation, mediation or arbitration, and 
which would also recommend policy reforms, where required. The second would be 
an ad hoc tribunal, established under the Supreme Court,7 that would take such cases 
forward and make lawful decisions on them, thereby binding the disputing parties to the 
agreements they had reached. However, setting up these twin institutions would itself 
require enactment of a law by the legislature.8 
6.3  Oil Palm Policy Reform
Oil palm is not an intrinsically damaging crop. It has been a mainstay of rural economies 
in Africa for thousands of years. It is a fast-growing, productive crop, well suited to 
tropical conditions. Managed right it can be a useful source of food and income for local 
communities. The problems come when the crop is imposed on people’s lands and lives 
without respect for their rights and freedoms. When introduced in this way it can reduce 
previously self-suffi cient farmers, in control of their forests, lands and lives, to powerless 
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estate labourers, out-growers or dispossessed land-owners. Unscrupulous operators 
can then take advantage of the people’s powerlessness, and the lack of protection of 
their rights, to further exploit them. During the Suharto dictatorship, such abuses were 
routine and the oppressive political system made it hard for communities to resist. Today, 
however, communities are more aware of their rights and prepared to confront those who 
abuse them. The result is increasing popular resistance to imposed oil palm schemes. In 
these circumstances, further investment in oil palm is likely to become increasingly risky 
and unattractive to banks and shareholders.
A history of resistance: lessons of the past
In 1825, Diponegoro, Prince of the New Mataram Kingdom of Java fought the Dutch colonial 
government. Diponegoro was offended that his ancestors’ graves were being fenced off with 
bars of wood, marking where a road was soon to be established across a graveyard. The 
result was a fi ve year struggle (1825-1830) between Diponegoro, and his followers, and the 
Dutch colonial government, which led to a long drawn out series of battles on the island of 
Java. Such wars were a major drain on the Dutch colonial government’s treasury and the 
Dutch sought to resolve future confl icts, such as that which later arose in West Sumatra, with 
the rise of the Padri movement, by negotiation and disarmament. Diponegoro was resisting 
the Dutch colonial government’s lack of respect for custom and rights, and the land-grabbing 
that the abuse of his ancestors’ graves represented. 
Today, there are an innumerable number of ‘Diponegoros’ rising up in Indonesia, all with 
different faces but confronting the same underlying problems: land-grabbing and lack of 
respect for custom and rights. The colonial model of establishing palm oil estates is no 
longer tenable. The way forward must be through respect for customary rights and through 
negotiation with local communities, as land-owners entitled to choose what happens on their 
lands.
 
Leading members of the palm oil industry, represented through the Roundtable on 
Sustainable Palm Oil, have now agreed on the need for change. In November 2005, they 
adopted a new voluntary standard which accepts that oil palm estates must not only be 
legal but must be established through respect for customary rights, just land acquisition 
and application of the principle of free, prior and informed consent (and see section 2.1 
and Appendix 1). 
The fi ndings of this study are that very few oil palm estates in Indonesia are likely to 
comply with such a standard, in the short term. Indeed the current policy and legal 
framework encourages a ‘colonial’ model of land acquisition and estate development quite 
contrary to the model now being promoted by the RSPO. It denies customary rights, 
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encourages State-sanctioned land grabbing, and rejects the principle of free, prior and 
informed consent. If the approach to estate development is not changed, there is a risk 
that ‘unsustainable’ Indonesian palm oil will be excluded from international markets. To 
counter this, the Indonesian government’s policy towards palm oil development needs to 
change.
Sawit Watch : a platform for reform
Sawit Watch is an association of individuals who are concerned with the social and 
environmental problems related to oil palm plantation development in Indonesia. It works 
directly with various elements of communities - from smallholder oil palm growers, indigenous 
peoples, workers, women, government agencies, civil society organisations and others - 
to promotes social justice and the enforcement of human rights in oil palm plantations in 
Indonesia. 
Sawit Watch was fi rst established in June 1998 as a consortium of NGOs and individuals 
working on social and environmental issues to counter the adverse impacts of the forest fi res 
of 1997/1998 resulting from uncontrolled forest conversion and land clearance by oil palm 
plantation development. Since then, these members have been actively working on oil palm 
issues in the provinces in Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and West Papua. 
In 2004, Sawit Watch changed its organisational membership from being a consortium of 
NGO and individuals to become an association of individuals. At the same time Sawit Watch 
developed its facilitating and mediating efforts in order to strengthen local communities, 
indigenous peoples, and other impacted groups dealing with the negative effects of oil palm 
plantation development. In order to strengthen the effectiveness of its international advocacy, 
Sawit Watch decided, based on the decisions of a national members’ forum, to get involved 
in the processes of the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO). 
This engagement contributed to the adoption by the RSPO of its ‘standard’ for ‘sustaiable 
palm oil’, the 8 Principles and 39 Criteria of which encompass all facets of sustainability, 
ensuring that production is economically viable, environmentally appropriate and socially 
benefi cial. The challenge ahead is to ensure that these Principles and Criteria are indeed 
complied with by RSPO members and that RSPO membership grows steadily, engaging the 
full range of players involved in the palm oil chain, including retailers and small holders. 
Key policies reforms that are required therefore include:
 
Respect for international laws;
No conversion of primary forest and other ecosystems;
Adherence to the principle of free, prior and informed consent in dealings with 
indigenous peoples and local communities;9 
Respect for customary rights; 
▪
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Establishment of open and mutually acceptable mechanisms for the resolution of 
disputes over contested lands;
No use of fi re in the establishment or maintenance of plantations;
No violence in the development of oil palm estates.
6.4  Implications for Standard Setting
During our investigation people in community workshops and other interviewees, such 
as government offi cials, companies, members of legislatures and local NGOs expressed 
diverse views about palm oil development and the RSPO standard. Despite this the 
research demonstrated an encouraging degree of convergence.
A number of community members and leaders approved of the RSPO principles and 
criteria, noted that they echoed their own perceptions of what was needed and argued 
that they could help ensure good development outcomes; 
The principle of Free, Prior and Informed Consent gained widespread support in 
community workshops and was seen to be compatible with customary systems of 
decision-making;
Some company spokespersons did express the view that RSPO standards would 
be costly to adhere to but these same persons were also opposed to the RSPO in 
principle;
Other company spokespersons favoured the RSPO principles, recognised they 
implied good business practice and felt they could adhere to them;
Interviewees in both local government and the legislatures favoured RSPO standards, 
noting that these should ensure better development outcomes for communities, 
improved business practice, higher revenues to the local administration and less 
corruption and mal-practice. 
‘Codes of Conduct’, ‘Best Practice’ standards and certifi cation standards, such as that 
adopted by the RSPO, are usually ‘voluntary’ standards against which private sector 
operators choose to be measured to improve their performance, reputation and access to 
markets. Verifi cation of compliance thus reviews company operations, practices and paper 
work, not government practice. Yet the companies operate within, and their operations are 
shaped by, State policies, plans, laws, regulations and practices, including malpractices.   
Indeed, one of the basic requirements in any acceptable standard of sustainable production 
is that private sector producers should operate in conformity with the law. Compliance 
with national and ratifi ed international laws is also a requirement of the RSPO standard 
(Principle 2). 
▪
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The study, however, shows that application of this standard to oil palm plantations in 
Indonesia faces a number of contradictory problems:
Relatively few oil palm estates are fully legal with respect to land tenure, land acquisition 
and operating permits;
Many of the failures in compliance are, partly at least, due to failures by government 
agencies charged with land titling, overseeing land acquisition and permitting;
Because Indonesian laws are contradictory, compliance with some laws, such as 
those governing land acquisition, may cause companies to contravene others, notably 
Constitutional and ratifi ed international law requirements for the recognition of 
indigenous rights;
Likewise company compliance with current Indonesian laws regarding land acquisition 
may lead companies into non-compliance with RSPO criteria which require respect 
for customary rights and that no land is acquired without the free, prior and informed 
consent of prior land owners.
These issues can only be fi nally resolved, fi rst, once and if government policies and 
national laws are changed, and made consistent with each other, with the Constitution 
and with Indonesia’s obligations under international law. And secondly, once and if, 
government agencies carry out the tasks it is their duty to perform. This is what we have 
argued for in sections 6.1 and 6.2. But, as we also note, this will take a very long time. In 
the meantime, many, perhaps most, Indonesian palm oil producers will not easily qualify 
for RSPO certifi cates.
Companies and other private sector operators are bound to object to this situation. Indeed 
some already have. Why, they ask, should producers be penalised for the fact that the laws 
are in a mess and government agencies are incompetent and corrupt, or both?   
In the interim, producers and purchasers may feel tempted to demand that the RSPO’s 
standards should not be applied in too literal a way in the Indonesian case; that the standard 
should, in effect, be lowered to take account of national realities. This is bound to lead to 
further disputes:
In the fi rst place, who is to decide what is the appropriate way for the standard to be 
modifi ed so it can take account of national realities? How will the interests of marginal 
groups like indigenous peoples be assured during such a revision process?
More broadly, is it acceptable that palm oil operations in one country should operate 
to a lower level of compliance with the RSPO standard than that required in other 
countries?
Can, indeed, the RSPO recommend selective compliance with the law?
▪
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If RSPO adopted lowered standards in Indonesia, would this not then provide a 
disincentive to the legal and administrative reforms that civil society organisations are 
calling for and that proper adherence to the RSPO standard requires?  
These are issues which the RSPO can no longer put off.10 It is clear that the reform and 
sound operation of a major sector of national importance such as the palm oil sector cannot 
be solved only through voluntary, private sector-led initiatives. Issues that are central to 
the effective application of the RSPO standard - like respect for rights, land titling, land 
use planning, land acquisition and permitting of operations – cannot be achieved without 
the State playing its role in a demonstrably fair and just manner.
Endnotes: 
1 TAP MPR IX/2001 ‘Concerning Agrarian Reform and Natural Resource Management’.
2 TAP MPR VI/2003.
3 PROLEGNAS 2005-2009.
4 In addition, forest areas previously used as logging areas (HPH) or forest industry plantations (HTI) 
are also classifi ed as State Land therby making it easier for the State to control and manage these 
areas.There are ongoing debates about the defi nition of Forest Areas and State Forest Area. These 
controversies have created diffi culties for logging companies which have obtain logging concessions 
(HPH) or industrial forestry plantation concessions (HTI) on undesignated forest areas to obtain eco-
label certifi cation. In many cases, these companies are accused of engaging in illegal logging. 
5 Working Group on Transitional Justice 2000.
6 Dietz 1998.
7 As part of the State Administration Court (Pengadilan Tata Usaha Negara).
8 Fauzi and Kasim 2000.
9 Colchester and McKay 2004.
10 These same issues were raised by Sawit Watch and the Forest Peoples Programme in early 2005 
(SW and FPP 2005a) but have yet to be addressed. 
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Appendix
Total 8 Principles and 39 Criteria
Principle 1 :  Commitment to transparency
1. Criterion 1.1 Oil palm growers and millers provide adequate information to other 
stakeholders on environmental, social and legal issues relevant to RSPO Criteria, 
in appropriate languages & forms to allow for effective participation on decision 
making.
2. Criterion 1.2 Management documents are publicly available, except where this is 
prevented by commercial confi dentiality or where disclosure of information would 
result in negative environmental or social outcomes
Principle 2 :  Compliance with applicable laws and regulations
3. Criterion 2.1 There is compliance with all applicable local, national and ratifi ed 
international laws and regulations
4. Criterion 2.2 The right to use the land can be demonstrated, and is not legitimately 
contested by local communities with demonstrable rights.
5. Criterion 2.3 Use of the land for oil palm does not diminish the legal rights, or 
customary rights, of other users, without their free, prior and informed consent
Principle 3 :  Commitment to long-term economic and fi nancial viability
6. Criterion 3.1 There is an implemented management plan that aims to achieve long-
term economic and fi nancial viability.
Principle 4 :  Use of appropriate best practices by growers and millers
7. Criterion 4.1 Operating procedures are appropriately documented and consistently 
implemented and monitored.
8. Criterion 4.2 Practices maintain soil fertility at, or where possible improve soil 
fertility to, a level that ensures optimal and sustained yield.
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9. Criterion 4.3 Practices minimise and control erosion and degradation of soils.
10. Criterion 4.4 Practices maintain the quality and availability of surface and ground 
water.
11. Criterion 4.5 Pests, diseases, weeds and invasive introduced species are effectively 
managed through using appropriate Integrated Pest Management (IPM) 
techniques.
12. Criterion 4.6 Agrochemicals are used in a way that does not endanger health or 
the environment. There is no prophylactic use, and where agrochemicals are used 
that are categorised as World Health Organisation Type 1A or 1B, or are listed by 
the Stockholm or Rotterdam Conventions, growers are actively seeking to identify 
alternatives, and this is documented. 
13. Criterion 4.7 An occupational health and safety plan is documented, effectively 
communicated and implemented.
14. Criterion 4.8 All staff, workers, smallholders and contractors are appropriately 
trained.
Principle 5 :  Environmental responsibility and conservation of natural resources 
and biodiversity
15. Criterion 5.1 Aspects of plantation and mill management that have environmental 
impacts are identifi ed, and plans to mitigate the negative impacts and promote the 
positive ones are made, implemented and monitored, to demonstrate continuous 
improvement. 
16. Criterion 5.2 The status of rare, threatened or endangered species and high 
conservation value habitats, if any, that exist in the plantation or that could be 
affected by plantation or mill management, shall be identifi ed and their conservation 
taken into account in management plans and operations.
17. Criterion 5.3 Waste is reduced, recycled, re-used and disposed of in an environmentally 
and socially responsible manner.
18. Criterion 5.4 Effi ciency of energy use and use of renewable energy is maximised.
19. Criterion 5.5 Use of fi re for waste disposal and for preparing land for replanting is 
avoided except in specifi c situations, as identifi ed in the ASEAN guidelines or other 
regional best practice.
20. Criterion 5.6 Plans to reduce pollution and emissions, including greenhouse gases, 
are developed, implemented and monitored.
Principle 6 :  Responsible consideration of employees and of individuals and 
communities affected by growers and mills
21. Criterion 6.1 Aspects of plantation and mill management that have social impacts 
are identifi ed in a participatory way, and plans to mitigate the negative impacts and 
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promote the positive ones are made, implemented and monitored, to demonstrate 
continuous improvement. 
22. Criterion 6.2 There are open and transparent methods for communication and 
consultation between growers and/or mills, local communities and other affected 
or interested parties.
23. Criterion 6.3 There is a mutually agreed and documented system for dealing with 
complaints and grievances, which is implemented and accepted by all parties.
24. Criterion 6.4 Any negotiations concerning compensation for loss of legal or customary 
rights are dealt with through a documented system that enables indigenous peoples, 
local communities and other stakeholders to express their views through their own 
representative institutions.
25. Criterion 6.5 Pay and conditions for employees and for employees of contractors 
always meet at least legal or industry minimum standards and are suffi cient to meet 
basic needs of personnel and to provide some discretionary income.
26. Criterion 6.6 The employer respects the right of all personnel to form and join 
trade unions of their choice and to bargain collectively. Where the right to freedom 
of association and collective bargaining are restricted under law, the employer 
facilitates parallel means of independent and free association and bargaining for all 
such personnel.
27. Criterion 6.7 Child labour is not used. Children are not exposed to hazardous 
working conditions. Work by children is acceptable on family farms, under adult 
supervision, and when not interfering with education programmes.
28. Criterion 6.8 The employer shall not engage in or support discrimination based 
on race, caste, national origin, religion, disability, gender, sexual orientation, union 
membership, political affi liation, or age.
29. Criterion 6.9 A policy to prevent sexual harassment and all other forms of violence 
against women and to protect their reproductive rights is developed and applied.  
30. Criterion 6.10 Growers and millers deal fairly and transparently with smallholders 
and other local businesses.
31. Criterion 6.11 Growers and millers contribute to local sustainable development 
wherever appropriate.
Principle 7 :  Responsible development of new plantings
32. Criterion 7.1 A comprehensive and participatory independent social and 
environmental impact assessment is undertaken prior to establishing new plantings 
or operations, or expanding existing ones, and the results incorporated into planning, 
management and operations.
33. Criterion 7.2 Soil surveys and topographic information are used for site planning in 
the establishment of new plantings, and the results are incorporated into plans and 
operations.
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34. Criterion 7.3 New plantings since November 2005 (which is the expected date of 
adoption of these criteria by the RSPO membership), have not replaced primary 
forest or any area containing one or more High Conservation Values.
35. Criterion 7.4 Extensive planting on steep terrain, and/or on marginal and fragile 
soils, is avoided.
36. Criterion 7.5   No new plantings are established on local peoples’ land without their 
free, prior and informed consent, dealt with through a documented system that 
enables indigenous peoples, local communities and other stakeholders to express 
their views through their own representative institutions.
37. Criterion 7.6 Local people are compensated for any agreed land acquisitions and 
relinquishment of rights, subject to their free, prior and informed consent and 
negotiated agreements.
38. Criterion 7.7 Use of fi re in the preparation of new plantings is avoided other than 
in specifi c situations, as identifi ed in the ASEAN guidelines or other regional best 
practice.
Principle 8 :  Commitment to continuous improvement in key areas of activity
39. Criterion 8.1 Growers and millers regularly monitor and review their activities 
and develop and implement action plans that allow demonstrable continuous 
improvement in key operations
